(photo credit: courtesy)
May the good Lord protect us from news analysis and Middle East experts. Is the
Arab world really in shock over the Tunisian upheaval? Is this really a symptom
for a coming upheaval in the Arab world?
Perhaps I’m wrong but a word of caution
is in order. I think the answer is no.
LET’S BEGIN by looking back at far
bigger shocks that have made Arab regimes tremble.
First, there was the
fall of communism and the Soviet bloc. The Soviet Union was the superpower
patron of many Arab regimes, their source of weapons and diplomatic support,
their supposed protector from Israel and the US.
Yet more than that, it
was a basic role model – especially for political and economic organization –
for a number of these regimes, most obviously Egypt, Iraq and Syria. I don’t
mean they copied it exactly, but the statist, single-party rule, government
control over wide swathes of life is how they functioned for decades.
did the regimes respond? By tightening up and killing off real hope of
democratic reform. And they did quite well for themselves.
There was also
another time when (some) Arab regimes trembled, the Iranian revolution of
1978-1979. Indeed, they are still trembling at the prospect of overthrow
by a revolutionary Islamist movement. These groups now form the principal
opposition in most Arab countries – but not in Tunisia – and elements of them
are quite ready to use violence. Indeed, this is the most important
conflict not only in the Arab world but in the Middle East as a
And there is a third occasion when (radical) Arab regimes tremble:
the US overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003. Might the US also overthrow them?
This applied especially to Syria and Libya but others felt it also. As totally
unlikely as this seemed in Washington, it was not so unthinkable in Arab
capitals. But they got over it when it became clear that there was no such
threat. Libya reacted by surrendering all of its nuclear ambitions.
ARAB regimes begin to tremble sometimes. But when the going gets tough, the
tough don’t tremble very long; they take counteraction.
Are the events in
Tunisia a new occasion for Arab regimes to tremble? Maybe a tiny bit for a tiny
moment. The fact is that Tunisia has been a special case among Arab
regimes for decades. It is the most Europeanized, a country where women have the
most equality and the Islamist movement is proportionately weakest. It is also
the only country that has had just two rulers in 55 years.
to neighboring Algeria where the Islamists built a power base in part on similar
material grievances to those that motivated the Tunisian riots, won an election,
were then confronted by the military and the result was an incredibly bloody and
vicious civil war in which tens of thousands were killed.
this to Palestinian politics where corruption and incompetence led to the rise
of Hamas, which seized the Gaza Strip by force. Let’s face it, if not for
massive Western aid and Israeli security assistance to the Palestinian Authority
– which does not repay this with any flexibility in negotiating, by the way –
Hamas would probably be ruling the West Bank by now.
That is the kind of
scenario faced in various ways by Egypt, Jordan, Syria and other Arab countries.
That is what they fear, not a citizens’ spontaneous uprising that is easily
defused by some minor changes at little cost in casualties.
There is no
reason to believe that the events in Tunisia signal a regime change. More
likely: only a partial leadership change.
WHAT DOES it mean for other
Arab countries? It calls to their attention the stress of serious economic
difficulties given international problems and local mismanagement. The signal is
that governments have to ease up a bit on their masses regarding pricing of
basic commodities and other services. An obvious case in this regard is
Jordan. But Jordan is crisscrossed by East Banker/Palestinian and proregime/
Islamist factors that make it quite a different situation.
the notable thing about the Tunisian upheaval was that it was a spontaneous
rebellion against an incompetent and corrupt government that had followed
roughly the same policies for 55 years without a single serious challenge.
Spontaneous rebellions are not going to happen if there are people clamoring to
organize them for a specific political agenda beforehand. (The closest thing to
that happening before was in Iran in 1978, but that’s another story.)
Incidentally, the thing to watch now is whether the Islamists profit from the
discontent and the partial opening up of civil society to become much stronger.
In that case, a future crisis might follow the pattern more common now in the
This is not, then, a turning point in Arab or Middle Eastern
political history. It will, however, take its place as a precedent that
will affect the thinking of governments, Islamist oppositions and the small
pro-democratic movements. It gives the governments cause to make
adjustments, the Islamists ideas about posing as “good government” activists and
the democrats some hope for the future.
The writer is director of the
Global Research in International Affairs Center and editor of Middle East Review
of International Affairs Journal and Turkish Studies. He blogs at