Another reason why the two-state solution is a non-starter


This past Friday I had an opportunity to discuss issues relating to the presence of over 360,000 Jews in Judea and Samaria with a senior news editor, his local correspondent and another prominent local journalist/editor.
As usual with these face-to-faces meetings, it is difficult to touch on some of the intense and ideological underpinnings.  One concern of theirs was the feasibility of the “two-state solution”.  
That, of course, as my readers know, is an anomaly since two states already exist that were part of the Palestine Mandate: Israel and Jordan.  And Jordan is geographically larger, by far, 80% of the territory.  In fact, by decision of the League of Nations, Jewish settlement was to be postponed (in reality, forbidden until this day) in TransJordan, later to become the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.*
Among many reasons a "two-state solution" is unworkable and even a non-starter is that the Arab hostility to the Jewish state is not a territorial question, i.e., where the borders should be, but rather existential, i.e., should the Jewish state exist at all.
An indication is this phrasing:
A delegation from 1948-occupied Palestine, headed by Sheikh Raed Salah, head of the Islamic Movement in 48 occupied territories
Israel, the state, even in its pre-1967 configuration, is "occupied".
As I have written numerous times, the dismantloement of Jewish communities, aka "settlements", all established after 1967, and therefore before any "occupation" existed, could not logically be a solutioin in that they were not a problem prior to the outbreak of the Sis Days War.  Their removal solves nothing that reflects on the real Arab opposition to Israel.
Jewish nationalism - Zionism - is the enemy of Palestinianism.
Its obliteration and extinction is the sole option.
Salah is an Israeli citizen, resident of Um El-Fahm and he considers himself "occupied".
That position is widely-held and is actively promoted by many of the NGOs assisting Arab civic society in a subversive ideology.
There is no reason to establish another Arab state in the former Palestine Mandate, especially as I think there already are three: Jordan, Hamastan in Gaza and Fatahland in Judea and Samaria.  A state will undermine regional stability and implode in violence while causing Israel an intolerable security situation.
It is a non-starter.
The “Mandate for Palestine” document did not set final borders. It left this for the Mandatory to stipulate in a binding appendix to the final document in the form of a memorandum. However, Article 6 of the “Mandate” clearly states:
“The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and shall encourage, in co-operation with the Jewish agency referred to in Article 4, close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes.”
Article 25 of the “Mandate for Palestine” entitled the Mandatory to change the terms of the Mandate in the territory east of the Jordan River:
“In the territories lying between the Jordan and the eastern boundary of Palestine as ultimately determined, the Mandatory shall be entitled, with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations, to postpone or withhold application of such provision of this Mandate as he may consider inapplicable to the existing local conditions ...”
Great Britain activated this option in the above-mentioned memorandum of September 16, 1922, which the Mandatory sent to the League of Nations and which the League subsequently approved – making it a legally binding integral part of the “Mandate.”
Thus the “Mandate for Palestine” brought to fruition a fourth Arab state east of the Jordan River, realized in 1946 when the Hashemite Kingdom of Trans-Jordan was granted independence from Great Britain.