The Iranian embassy in Paris acts as a branch office of Iran’s secret services, a French report into Iran’s ‘shadow war’ revealed this week.
“The infiltration of the Islamic Republic of Iran in France” was compiled by the France2050 think tank and has been presented to the French Parliament and the Interior Ministry.
The report states that Iran has two major aims: to pressure France on the Iranian nuclear issue and Israel, and to bring “chaos without war” into the heart of democracies as part of the strategy of “global jihad” written into the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Among some of the most striking revelations of the report is that the Iranian embassy in Paris works actively on behalf of the IRGC Quds Force (QF) to recruit journalists, academics, and students who can act as propaganda tools of the Iranian regime.
According to the report, the person responsible for setting up this influence network is Ali Reza Khalili, the deputy head of the Iranian embassy. Iranian spymasters carefully scrutinize political television shows, radio broadcasts, newspapers, and university conferences to spot “compatible profiles” for potential agents and then organize seminars or events to facilitate meetings.
“The goal: to seduce them intellectually and reshape their understanding of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” the report said.
It noted that while some agents are offered payment for their involvement, “the embassy prefers influence agents motivated by ideology rather than money.”
Once recruited, the individuals are told to disseminate Tehran-friendly talking points in the media, at conferences, and at public events.
One individual discussed in the report is Franco-Iranian influencer Shahin Hazamy, who posts pro-regime content online. He is also known for his endorsement of the “axis of resistance,” made up of Tehran’s proxies, such as Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). Hazamy has been seen with Iranian officials in Tehran but is also often seen next to members of the left-wing La France Insoumise (LFI) party during public demonstrations.
He is currently under formal investigation for “apology of terrorism.”
The report also discusses Iran’s infiltration of French academic institutions. This is mainly done through “soft power” methods. For example, the Iranian Embassy in Paris organized a meeting with representatives from a dozen universities and grandes écoles (elite schools) in the Paris region in 2025.
One of the intended demographics for agent recruitment by the embassy is academics, with the intention of generating unrest from within. In 2024, France arrested Bashir Biazar in Dijon in June 2024 for conducting influence operations on behalf of Iranian intelligence and infiltrating local universities to stir agitation.
Another method used by Iran to stir agitation is the weaponization of pro-Palestinian protests to create tension in French society. The report noted that the large-scale display of Palestinian flags in France is partially organized by Iran to “bring chaos without war.”
FURTHER INFILTRATION has occurred in political circles. The report openly names LFI politicians Rima Hassan, Mathilde Panot, Thomas Portes, Sébastien Delogu, and Ersilia Soudais of parroting Iranian-backed narratives or of associating with figures linked to the PFLP.
“The deputies of La France Insoumise serve as relays for the proxies and propaganda of the Islamic Republic of Iran in France,” reads the report, noting that some have even been the subject of complaints for condoning terrorism. It noted that many of the deputies mentioned have, for nearly three years, taken part in meetings with one or more members of the PFLP acting under the orders of the Iranian mullahs, openly showing their support for individuals previously convicted of terrorism.
The authors write that their most “sincere hope” is that the report might eventually encourage French parliamentarians to launch a commission of inquiry, which would be able to “shed full light on the extent of the infiltration phenomenon in question.”
It also advises France and other Western countries to adopt a “much firmer stance toward threats and aggression emanating from Tehran.”
“They must adopt the same mindset as the Islamic Republic and no longer fall into the trap of ‘terror diplomacy.’ This means demonstrating greater resolve in the case of Western hostage-takings (of dual nationals or foreign citizens). In short, Western countries must truly change their policy instead of giving in to Iranian blackmail by paying ransoms or releasing Iranian prisoners, criminals, or terrorists in exchange for their citizens. The goal is to demonstrate that this type of blackmail no longer works and that, on the contrary, it can strengthen Western positions against the Iranian regime.”
Long and short-term predictions and recommendations
The report presents likely scenarios should measures not be adopted.
It predicts that in the next 12 to 18 months, Iran will carry out a targeted assassination of a dissident or a Jewish/Israeli figure. It also predicts that it will sabotage media outlets and carry out an attack linked to the escalation in the Middle East.
In the short term (0-6 months), the report recommends that the French authorities map Iran’s front organizations and their funding sources and strengthen the security of people and places at high risk (especially those relating to Jews and Iranian opposition leaders).
In the medium term (6-18 months), the report recommends that France press for the IRGC to be designated a terrorist organization at the European Union level and that it strengthen visa controls for individuals linked to the regime.
So far, France’s infrastructure in charge of fighting Iranian terror includes the General Directorate for Internal Security, which surveils and dismantles hostile networks; the Central Office for the Repression of Illicit Drug Trafficking, which targets facilitators of organized crime; Vigipirate, which is in charge of security measures for public events and vulnerable sites; and various judicial tools such as the Parisian anti-terrorism magistrates, which manage the threat through legal means.
“The IRGC/QF presence in France is active, sophisticated, and persistent,” the report states. “It is not enough to neutralize individual plots; the deeper challenge is to resist Tehran’s long-term efforts to undermine democratic resilience through fear, manipulation, and covert coercion.
“France must combine intelligence operations, law enforcement, diplomatic pressure, and community engagement in a sustained campaign. The shadow war is here, and the cost of complacency will be measured in lives, liberties, and sovereignty.”