Netanyahu and Mandelblit: The tragic journey from allies to bitter enemies

Mandelblit was so successful as cabinet secretary that Netanyahu aggressively backed him to become attorney-general in 2016. In doing so he put his accuser in office.

By YONAH JEREMY BOB
PRIME MINISTER BENJAMIN NETANYAHU consults with Avichai Mandelblit. (photo credit: REUTERS)
PRIME MINISTER BENJAMIN NETANYAHU consults with Avichai Mandelblit.
(photo credit: REUTERS)
How did Avichai Mandelblit and Benjamin Netanyahu’s relationship transform from years of being close allies and from a leader’s-right-hand-man framework to being bitter enemies?
While serving in Netanyahu’s sphere, directly under him and even his initial period as attorney-general, Mandelblit was prized and given rare respect by Netanyahu among his aides, with Mandelblit looking to cover for the prime minister and clean-up hard issues.
How did their relationship go so far south leading Netanyahu and his lieutenants to try to frame Mandelblit as a traitor and a felon? And what does Netanyahu hope to accomplish by attacking Mandelblit even now when the bribery indictment decision is already made, and his fate is in the hands of the courts more than in that of his ex-aide?
Sources refused to go on record in the current heated circumstances. But from years of interviews and off-record conversations, The Jerusalem Post can present a picture of this unexpected and unprecedented journey.
Mandelblit and Netanyahu started to have close working relations when Mandelblit fought the post-2008-09 Gaza War Goldstone Report’s anti-Israel war-crimes allegations on behalf of the country during his tenure as IDF Military Advocate General from 2004-2011.
In closed discussions prior to leaving the IDF, Mandelblit would sometimes tell stories about important calls from Netanyahu, making clear his admiration for the prime minister.
Though by all accounts, the two men never became close in a personal sense outside of work, Netanyahu was so impressed with Mandelblit as an operator that he lured him into becoming his cabinet secretary from 2013-2016.
At the time, Mandelblit, whose parents were part of the right-wing Etzel group and by all accounts is politically right-of-center, was expected to be appointed as a district court judge.
In those three years, Mandelblit was often Netanyahu’s go-to man behind the scenes on thorny issues.
Ministers have explained they often knew which way to maneuver on an issue by tracking Mandelblit’s moves since they knew he had the prime minister’s ear – and there are plenty of stock photos from that time of the two whispering in each other’s ears as only people with high levels of trust do.
From handling east Jerusalem security dilemmas to combating global delegitimization to negotiating a historic deal between the Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) sector and the non-Orthodox sector (which only fell apart when Mandelblit had already moved to the attorney-general’s office and Netanyahu allowed the Haredi politicians out of their promises), Netanyahu relied on Mandelblit at key moments.
If many of those around Netanyahu were PR spin-doctor types, Mandelblit was his substantive policy man who everyone respected because of his security background in the IDF.
Mandelblit was so successful as cabinet secretary that Netanyahu aggressively backed him, along with Justice Minister Ayelet Shaked, to become attorney-general in 2016.
So Netanyahu literally put his accuser in office.
The two were considered so closely aligned that some of the judicial selection committee members voted against Mandelblit’s candidacy because they thought he would be too close to Netanyahu and potentially conflicted if legal troubles came up.
Mandelblit’s predecessor, Yehuda Weinstein, probed Netanyahu on a variety of issues, but the only time he ordered a criminal investigation was against Sara Netanyahu in the Prime Minister’s Residence Affair in June and July 2015. Weinstein did not order an interrogation of the prime minister.
July 2016 was the first time that Mandelblit himself started on the path of conflict with Netanyahu, when he initiated a “review” of the prime minister in an unspecified case.
But the “initial review” was designed to soft pedal the case and save Netanyahu unnecessary embarrassment so their relationship was still intact.
In fact, for the next several months, Mandelblit was criticized on the Left for protecting Netanyahu from a criminal probe.
It was not until January 2017 that Mandelblit approved the police questioning Netanyahu in Case 1000, the Illegal Gifts Affair.
Around the same time, the story of Case 2000, the Yediot Ahronot-Yisrael Hayom Affair broke.
Although the police were sure that Case 2000 was a slam dunk bribery case, Mandelblit again slow-pedaled the case, viewing it as full of holes.
In July 2017, the state comptroller announced that Netanyahu had not revealed all of his conflicts with Shaul Elovitch of Bezeq to Mandelblit.
In September 2017, Mandelblit finally crossed a first “Rubicon,” filing an indictment against Sara Netanyahu. Even then, critics on the Left focused on his shielding her by closing six out of seven probes and putting off the decision for around two years. Further, Mandelblit had inherited the case from Weinstein, which would have made it harder to toss out entirely.
By February 2018, the police had recommended indicting Netanyahu for bribery in both cases 1000 and 2000.
Despite the stunning recordings of Netanyahu sounding like he was cutting an illegal deal with Yediot Aharonot owner Arnon “Noni” Mozes to reshape the media landscape in Israel,
Mandelblit might have rejected their recommendations.
What ended Mandelblit’s hesitance to turn against his former boss and sponsor was shortly thereafter in February 2018 when the prime minister’s former top aides Shlomo Filber and Nir Hefetz turned state’s witnesses.
The prime minister had become the main suspect in Case 4000, the Bezeq-Walla! Affair – which until then had focused on Filber.
With these two top aides pointing the finger at Netanyahu and giving extensive details about his alleged media bribery scheme, Mandelblit no longer thought he could hold back.
By June 2018, The Jerusalem Post became the first to report that Case 4000 was not only the lead case, but that Mandelblit would indict Netanyahu for the grave charge of bribery. The report also indicated that Case 4000 evidence had moved Mandelblit toward indicting Netanyahu for breach of trust in Case 1000.
In December 2018, the police recommended indicting Netanyahu for bribery in case 4000. Within weeks, the prosecution announced that decisions in all of the cases would be forthcoming within only a few short months.
This set off alarms for Netanyahu.
He was not worried that Mandelblit no longer had his back.
Moving fast, he decided to call early elections. He was sure that even if Mandelblit was leaning toward indicting him, that the attorney-general would hold off on any announcements until after the elections.
When Mandelblit implied he would not change his scheduled announcement to accommodate Netanyahu’s election schedule, the prime minister started his first public relations and legal war against Mandelblit.
At the end of December 2018, Israel Hayom published a story reporting that Netanyahu told people close to him in the Likud that “Mandelblit will be attacked without mercy.”
Netanyahu’s lawyers then issued a statement from the prime minister that, “I want to clarify to the honorable attorney-general, in a way that cannot be misunderstood, that there is no basis to what was published and the words were not said by the prime minister or anyone representing him.”
Yet, when Netanyahu went on the attack at the time, it was usually with full force against Mandelblit’s prosecution team, while referring to Mandelblit as a good man who simply had been too weak to control those serving under him.
Given Netanyahu’s direct broadsides against Mandelblit this past week, it appears that Netanyahu’s double-messaging was a classic game of his making a future threat, but pretending to be ready to play nice if Mandelblit backed down from making a preelection announcement.
In January 2019, the police opened a probe after the grave of Mandelblit’s father was vandalized by supporters of Netanyahu (acting on their own, but allegedly inspired by Netanyahu’s frequent verbal attacks on Mandelblit.)
Though in his public remarks he expressed admiration for Netanyahu and sadness to have to go after him, Mandelblit did not back down and announced an intent to indict Netanyahu on February 28, 2019. This was just slightly more than a month before the April 2019 first of three rounds of elections.
For Netanyahu, this was the final point of no return.
Though Netanyahu managed to pull out a narrow victory in that election, he believed Mandelblit not only threw a wrench into the election plans which could have ended his career, but also betrayed him personally.
Who was Mandelblit – who Netanyahu had appointed – to make a mid-election-season indictment announcement? What about the principle that major prosecution decisions were not made in election season?
Meanwhile, Mandelblit was also done trying to do Netanyahu any special favors.
Mandelblit’s career dream is to join the Supreme Court.
Had Mandelblit backed down from his announced decision timeline due to being intimidated by Netanyahu’s later decision to announce early elections, that dream would probably have ended. The legal establishment would have viewed him as a coward.
Almost all of Mandelblit’s decisions since then have been taken by Netanyahu as further personal signs of betrayal.
Netanyahu wanted no final indictment decision until he had formed a new government. But Mandelblit made the final indictment decision on November 21, 2019 while there was still time where the Knesset could have chosen Benny Gantz to lead the country.
The prime minister hoped for immunity or for no movement in his trial before the March 2 election date. But Mandelblit fought against the immunity request and filed the indictment on January 28 within hours of Netanyahu withdrawing his immunity request.
All of that said, Mandelblit was crucial in helping Netanyahu stay in power during the indictment process.
Had Mandelblit told the High Court of Justice prior to the March 2 election that Netanyahu should be disqualified from running, or post-election that he should be disqualified from forming a government, the High Court might have followed his lead.
Instead, the High Court’s explanation for green-lighting Netanyahu at every stage appeared to mirror Mandelblit’s view sometimes nearly word-for-word.
The last question is why is Netanyahu attacking Mandelblit in such a fiery way now when the prime minister’s fate is in the hands of the court and the attorney-general is mostly out of the picture?
Could it be to soften Mandelblit up for a plea deal with no jail time or to drop the still outstanding probe into Netanyahu’s alleged misreporting of stock dividends? Could it be to get Mandelblit to allow Netanyahu’s tycoon friends to fund his legal defense?
Maybe the attacks are on Mandelblit, but the audience is the court to warn them what will greet them if they dare to convict Netanyahu?
Or is it just emotional revenge with no political strategy?
Whatever the reason, the complete destruction of the relationship between these two once closely allied men will go down in history as one of the great interpersonal tragedies of our time.