Syria, Gaza: How the IDF handles different threats to Israel - analysis

These days, the IDF can operate there multiple times a week – and that is the goal in this equation.

By UDI SHAHAM
IDF SOLDIERS from the 669 Unit during a training exercise last year. (photo credit: YOSSI ALONI/FLASH90)
IDF SOLDIERS from the 669 Unit during a training exercise last year.
(photo credit: YOSSI ALONI/FLASH90)
This was an eventful week for the IDF.
Early Wednesday morning there were reports of a massive attack attributed to Israel near Al Bukamal and Deir al-Zor in eastern Syria. Some 60 Syrians and Iranians were killed, and headquarters and logistical compounds serving Iran and its militias were destroyed, according to reports.
The purpose of these strikes was to block the renewed efforts of Iran to entrench itself along the Syrian-Iraqi border.
Another purpose was to signal to the incoming American administration – set to take office on Wednesday – that Israel will not halt its efforts to fight Iranian attempts to get closer to its borders.
This was the latest of four attacks attributed to Israel in less than a month, including in Maysaf, al-Zabadani and Al Kiswah.
In another event on Wednesday on the other side of the country, the IDF attacked an empty Hamas post in the Gaza Strip in response to sniper fire at a force operating near the border.
The images from these IDF attacks made one wonder: how can Hamas be deterred if that is the Israeli response?
Moreover, how is it that where two sovereign countries are involved, in most cases, Israel dares to carry out wide-scale airstrikes, while its response to live fire from a small, poor, stateless terrorist organization is to shoot up some vacant targets?
The answer can be divided into two: the context and the goal.
Comparing the northern front and the Gaza front is asymmetrical. Unlike incidents along the northern border, where the IDF first thinks how it should respond in a strategic response, in Gaza, the forces operate according to the local rules of engagement – real-time response.
Every move carried out by Israel in the North is heavily calculated, and every response there is strategic and meant to serve a purpose.
In the Gaza incident, the tank fire at the Hamas posts was in immediate response to the sniper fire.
One might ask: so why doesn’t the IDF send its fighter jets to attack actual targets in the Gaza Strip? The answer is in the IDF’s perceived goals.
The incident on Wednesday happened during routine IDF activity along the border, just west of the fence. IDF operating in the perimeter area is crucial to sustaining the security of the fence and the border.
However, the IDF activities in the perimeter are often challenged by Hamas, which wants to assert its dominance in the area. What happened Wednesday was that a hidden sniper shot at the shielded window of a D9 armored bulldozer, buy did not hit anyone.
Contrary to the usual incidences when Hamas forces are visible during these kinds of IDF activities, this time it is believed that the hidden sniper was part of a planned activity.
So why didn’t he hit anyone? Probably because Hamas is cautiously deterred, and knows the price it will pay if it actually harms an Israeli soldier.
Putting this in context: not every Hamas cry for attention justifies an escalation.
It seems as if the IDF and Hamas both understand the balancing equation and how it works.
For almost two years – between March 2018, when the “Great March of Return” border riots started, until December 2019 – the perimeter was a venue for riots and violent protests, which limited the IDF’s ability to operate within the Gaza border.
These days, the IDF can operate there multiple times a week – and that is the goal in this equation.