Gaza reconstruction trapped between Israeli mistrust, Palestinian fragmentation - analysis

Two years after the Gaza war first erupted, the region stands at a painful and uncertain crossroads. The guns have fallen largely silent, the last live hostages have returned home, and families on both sides are still counting their dead.

The physical and psychological toll has been enormous, and the exhaustion – Israeli and Palestinian alike – is unmistakable. Yet ending the large-scale violence was only the first hurdle. The harder test now is whether Gaza can be rebuilt in a way that reduces the chance of another war. Clearing rubble and repairing roads is difficult enough; restoring trust and a functioning system of governance is far more fragile and complex.

As President Donald Trump’s flagship foreign-policy initiative in his second term, the plan is also entangled in American domestic politics, with the White House determined to retain strategic control even as it seeks broad international backing.

The plan envisages an international security presence, a phased Israeli withdrawal, and a transition to reformed Palestinian institutions under international oversight.

For Washington, the goal has been clear: secure the legitimacy of a UN-backed framework without relinquishing strategic control, while drawing in key Arab partners to share the burden.

The result is an international coalition trapped in a paradox: The Palestinian actors most capable of stabilizing Gaza are precisely the ones that key external players doubt the most.

If outside plans sideline Palestinian agency or impose new rulers from above, they will provoke resistance, not only from armed factions but from ordinary Gazans.

Governance arrangements that feel externally imposed are unlikely to be sustainable. Critics warn that without a credible political horizon and tangible movement toward Palestinian self-determination, such schemes risk entrenching the occupation in all but name.

Experiences from other international missions show that without local buy-in and meaningful participation, governance schemes eventually falter.

Israel’s redlines are clear: demilitarization must precede full-scale reconstruction. Israeli officials insist they will not withdraw without verifiable guarantees that armed groups cannot reconstitute themselves, and donors are reluctant to invest while the prospect of renewed rocket fire remains.

Yet no Arab state has volunteered to confront Hamas directly, and any international stabilization mission is defined as a peacekeeping and monitoring force, not a combat operation.

In practice, this raises the specter of a fragmented Gaza, with zones where reconstruction proceeds under international supervision and others left in political limbo.

European and Arab governments have circulated proposals, but each scheme runs into the same hard wall: the need for simultaneous buy-in from Israelis, Palestinians, the United States, and key regional capitals.

Arab leaders argue that reconstruction cannot be de-linked from Palestinian governance and a credible political horizon. Israel fears that empowering the PA in Gaza could reopen a pathway toward Palestinian statehood under conditions it does not control.

The authority cannot credibly govern a shattered Gaza without internal reforms, new leadership faces, and sustained external support. No single actor possesses enough legitimacy, capacity, and security leverage to manage the situation alone.

The most plausible path is a gradual, step-by-step model in which Palestinian institutions assume limited responsibilities at first and expand their role as they demonstrate competence.

This technocratic approach emphasizes service delivery, local administration, and reconstruction management rather than front-loading the most contentious questions.

Even so, it will only function if the PA undertakes visible reforms, improves transparency, and begins to reconnect with Palestinians. Donors increasingly frame such reforms as a prerequisite for long-term aid and diplomatic backing.

The timing could hardly be more difficult. Gaza’s humanitarian crisis is immediate and acute, while meaningful political reform is slow and contested. If reconstruction moves too slowly, power vacuums will re-emerge, and Hamas or other actors could rebuild their influence.

If the PA or PA-linked technocrats move too quickly without adequate preparation, they risk being overwhelmed and discredited in the eyes of a traumatized population.

Israeli mistrust of the authority is understandable, but a categorical veto on any PA role leads to a dead end. If Hamas cannot be accepted as Gaza’s governing authority and the PA is barred or too weak, the remaining options are bleak: prolonged Israeli military rule or a heavily internationalized administration with little local legitimacy.

In this context, compromise is no longer a lofty ideal but a practical necessity. Israel will have to accept some form of PA-linked involvement, Palestinians will have to reconcile themselves to a gradual expansion of their authority, and Arab states will have to invest political capital and money even while final political arrangements remain unsettled.

Rebuilding Gaza is not just an engineering project or a legal exercise. It is about restoring dignity, agency, and a sense of future in a place where all three have been repeatedly shattered.

International frameworks can sketch out a path, but they cannot rebuild a society on their own. That work falls to people: to Palestinians trying to rebuild their homes and institutions, to Israelis willing to accept new security arrangements, and to regional and global actors prepared to sustain a difficult, imperfect process. For Gaza to truly move forward, reconstruction cannot be something done to Palestinians; it must be something done with them and, ultimately, by them.■