Recent conversations in Washington with officials at the State Department and Congress centered on the question: Where can the Trump administration achieve a meaningful diplomatic breakthrough in the Middle East?
With regime change in Iran no longer a policy objective, and with the MoU unlikely to meaningfully constrain the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program, ballistic missile development, human rights abuses, or support for terrorist proxies, it is difficult to envision significant progress as long as the IRGC remains the dominant force in Iran.
In Gaza, Hamas continues to rebuild its military capabilities, while no credible international or Palestinian partner appears willing or able to disarm the group. As a result, the administration’s realistic diplomatic opportunities have narrowed to two arenas: Lebanon and Syria.
Surprisingly, of the two, Syria may offer the more achievable path.
Lebanon presents an encouraging picture at first glance. Israel and Lebanon share no deep-rooted historical animosity beyond their longstanding security disputes, and their remaining border issues are ultimately negotiable. The current US-Israel-Lebanon trilateral framework even contemplates, for the first time, the possibility of eventual peace between the two countries.
The question is whether Lebanon’s failed state can seize this opportunity to alter its trajectory. Unfortunately, the country’s structural constraints remain formidable.
Two different paths
Despite suffering significant setbacks in its recent conflict with Israel, Hezbollah continues to dominate Lebanon’s military balance. Its influence remains deeply entrenched across the country’s political institutions and security and intelligence services, while many Lebanese fear the prospect of renewed civil war more than Hezbollah’s continued dominance.
For its part, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) continues to regard Hezbollah as its most valuable regional proxy and the spearhead of its broader regional ambitions, making it highly unlikely to relinquish that strategic asset.
Lebanon’s political system further complicates reform. The country’s power-sharing arrangement divides authority among a Sunni prime minister, a Christian president, and a Shi’ite parliamentary speaker. Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri frequently aligns with Hezbollah’s interests, limiting the state’s ability to consolidate authority over armed groups.
Syria presents a different picture. President Ahmed al-Sharaa presides over an authoritarian system and serves as the country’s central decision-maker, exercising considerably greater authority than Lebanon’s fragmented government. However, independent local militias, tribal networks, and diverse ethnic and communal actors in southern and northeastern Syria continue to constrain Damascus’s reach.
These constraints may still create a diplomatic opening, provided Washington is willing to invest sustained diplomatic and economic capital if Syria is genuinely prepared to move toward normalization with Israel.
The challenge is obvious.
Al-Sharaa’s past includes leadership roles within al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate before allegedly breaking with the organization. Some Israeli and many American officials view him as a pragmatic Islamist whose long-term intentions remain uncertain.
Can such a leader fundamentally change course?
Conditions for engagement
The Trump administration appears willing to give him that opportunity, easing sanctions and opening diplomatic channels before substantial reforms have materialized. Some Democrats have likewise argued that engagement offers the best chance to influence Syria’s trajectory.
Caution, however, remains warranted.
Rather than offering unconditional support, Washington should insist on measurable reciprocal steps. The first test should involve Syria’s treatment of its minorities. Kurds, Druze, Christians, and Alawites have all faced violence and discrimination by forces affiliated with the current government.
Before discussing broader regional normalization, the United States should secure verifiable protections for these communities and ensure they receive equitable access to humanitarian assistance and reconstruction funding. These would provide evidence that Damascus intends to govern differently from other Islamist regimes.
Whether Washington pursues such a strategy depends partly on how much diplomatic attention the administration is willing to devote to Syria, which currently ranks behind Iran, Gaza, and Lebanon on its list of priorities.
Ironically, Syria may prove the easiest arena in which to demonstrate diplomatic progress.
Recent reporting has suggested that prospects for Israeli-Syrian normalization before Israel’s next elections remain limited. Damascus continues to insist that Israel withdraw from areas it occupied after Bashar al-Assad’s government collapsed.
Israel should carefully examine what Syria may be willing to offer in return.
If negotiations merely produce another ceasefire or temporary disengagement agreement, the strategic value would be modest, as would any Israeli concessions. But if Syria is prepared for genuine normalization, including permanent non-aggression, economic cooperation, people-to-people engagement, and eventually diplomatic relations, the calculation changes considerably.
Such an agreement cannot require Israel to relinquish the Golan Heights, whose strategic importance has only grown over time.
The buffer zone into which Israel moved after the fall of Assad was established following the 1974 Israel-Syria Disengagement Agreement and presents a more flexible negotiating space.
Strategic calculus
I have visited Israel’s northern frontier with Israeli military intelligence officers and spoken extensively with security and defense leaders about the security implications of Israel’s current positions inside the buffer zone.
The consensus I encountered was noteworthy.
If Syria demonstrated a genuine commitment to normalization backed by robust American security guarantees, Israel could likely relinquish most of the forward positions it now occupies. The principal exception is the Syrian Hermon high ground, whose commanding elevation remains strategically important for Israeli intelligence and defense.
Some officials suggested that, under extraordinary circumstances and with sufficiently strong security guarantees, that position might also become negotiable.
Such discussions illustrate that territorial questions may not be the greatest obstacle.
The larger strategic concern is Turkey.
Any future agreement should include clear limits on Turkish military entrenchment inside Syria. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has steadily expanded Ankara’s influence there, and many Israeli security officials increasingly view Turkey, not only Iran, as a long-term strategic threat.
During Israel’s long campaign against Iranian military entrenchment in Syria, Jerusalem retained broad operational freedom to strike IRGC and Hezbollah assets. Confronting a NATO member embedded inside Syria would present an entirely different strategic equation.
This concern becomes more significant if Washington proceeds with advanced military sales to Turkey, including renewed access to sophisticated aircraft and defense technologies. Such decisions raise questions about preserving Israel’s congressionally mandated Qualitative Military Edge, particularly given Erdogan’s increasingly hostile rhetoric toward Israel.
Ultimately, Syria cannot be viewed in isolation from Iran.
As long as the IRGC remains the dominant force in Tehran, Iran will continue seeking influence across Lebanon, Syria, Gaza, and elsewhere in the Middle East. Any diplomatic achievements in these arenas will therefore remain vulnerable to Iranian efforts to undermine them through proxies and regional partners.
Policymakers must work with today’s strategic realities rather than ideal scenarios.
The administration may initially focus on Lebanon because progress there appears politically attractive. Yet Lebanon’s internal divisions and Hezbollah’s entrenched power make meaningful implementation extraordinarily difficult.
Syria, despite its own considerable risks, offers a different possibility. A centralized government capable of making decisions, American leverage through sanctions relief and reconstruction assistance, and Israeli willingness to consider carefully calibrated territorial adjustments could together create an opening for genuine diplomacy.
After conversations with Syria specialists in Washington, one conclusion emerged: Normalization with Syria may represent the administration’s best opportunity for a tangible foreign policy success in the Middle East.
Whether that opportunity can be transformed into a durable peace remains an open question. ■
Dr. Mandel is the Director of MEPIN, the Middle East Political Information Network; the senior security editor of The Jerusalem Report; and regularly briefs foreign policy advisors, members of Congress, and officials at the State Department.