The full strategic consequences of the conflict with Iran remain to be seen. What has already emerged, however, is a clearer picture of the US-Israel alliance: not a one-sided act of American benevolence or an emergency rescue mission, but a deepening strategic partnership shaped by shared interests, joint capabilities, and mutual benefit. That is exactly why the habitual phrase “aid to Israel” is so misleading.
“Israel is the largest American aircraft carrier in the world that cannot be sunk,” secretary of state Alexander Haig once said. That observation has long captured a strategic truth about the US-Israel relationship. But in today’s debate over American support for Israel, it may be time to update the line: Israel is not only the largest American aircraft carrier in the world that cannot be sunk. It may also be the cheapest.
I recently met in the Knesset with three visiting members of Congress, all staunch supporters of the US-Israel alliance, who had been touring Israel and engaging with our security and political leadership. It was a positive, productive conversation, focused on a shared challenge: how both countries can strengthen that alliance while addressing a growing claim within the nationalist camp that the relationship does not sufficiently serve America’s interests.
Israel is America’s cost-effective strategic ally
One conclusion was unmistakable: calling the US-Israel security framework “aid” is inaccurate, and it hands skeptics an easy talking point, as though this relationship cannot be squared with America First. In reality, the arrangement functions as a strategic exchange that advances American interests, strengthens American industry, and reduces the need for costlier US military exposure.
Every few months, Washington relitigates “US aid to Israel,” as though it were a discretionary act of charity, a foreign transfer sustained primarily by sentiment. That framing is politically unhelpful and descriptively wrong. The word “aid” implies a one-way relationship, dependency, and benevolence unconnected to the donor’s concrete interests. It invites the predictable question: Why are we paying for someone else’s security when Americans have needs at home? It is the wrong framework for a security architecture designed to protect American interests, strengthen American production, and reduce the likelihood of direct American military exposure.
If the United States wants a clearer debate, it should change the terminology. Call it what it functionally is: a US-Israel security exchange, a strategic defense partnership, or an allied capability investment. The label matters because the arrangement itself is not structured as a cash gift, and the returns are not abstract.
Begin with the legal and financial structure. The 2016 memorandum of understanding established a 10-year framework totaling $38 billion, comprising $3.3b. annually in Foreign Military financing and $500 million annually for missile defense cooperation. This is a financing mechanism tied to procurement, services, and production connected to American defense systems and American firms, not general budget support. A significant portion of what is commonly called “aid” functions as sustained demand for US manufacturing and supply chains, supporting the American defense industrial base.
That is the industrial dimension. There is also the strategic dimension, which is more consequential.
In a region that repeatedly generates global shocks, the United States has two basic options: deploy major US assets forward, or rely on capable allies who carry the operational burden locally while remaining interoperable with US systems. The first option is slow to surge, expensive to sustain, and puts Americans in harm’s way.
Effectively, Israel’s continuously present, fully engaged allied force in the region substitutes for that kind of US forward deployment. A “USS Israel” American aircraft carrier, so to speak. And unlike an actual carrier strike group, whose annual operating costs run into the billions of dollars, Israel delivers that strategic presence at a fraction of the cost while placing no American sailors or pilots in the line of fire.
That allied posture produces concrete returns: deterrence that reduces the need for US surges, intelligence and operational learning under real pressure, and joint capabilities such as missile defense and interoperability that strengthen American systems for the wars the US is most likely to face next.
This is a strategic, practical, cost-saving measure that is anything but charity, which is wholly not captured by the term “aid.” It obscures reciprocity and, in doing so, undermines the durability of public support. Labels become shorthand, shorthand becomes perception, and perception becomes policy. When the label is wrong, the coalition built on it becomes fragile.
Renaming the arrangement would also force a more disciplined debate, the kind American citizens deserve. Instead of arguing about assistance, Congress and the public could ask what measurable US returns flow from the partnership, including industrial base benefits, technological advancement, interoperability, intelligence cooperation, and deterrence outcomes. They could also ask what mutual obligations should govern the relationship, ensuring accountability, respect for democratic governance, and alignment on shared threat priorities.
All of this was true even before the war with Iran. But the recent US-Israel coordination in confronting Iran has made the point even harder to ignore. When set against the cold shoulder and strategic impotence shown by older allies, whose defense Washington underwrites at far greater cost each year within the NATO framework, the value proposition of the US-Israel partnership comes into even sharper focus.
Far from being a burden on America, Israel is one of the most cost-effective strategic investments the United States makes anywhere in the world.
The writer is an Israeli lawyer, author, and politician serving as a member of Knesset for the Religious Zionist Party since 2021. He is chair of the Knesset Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee.