Military success is not the same as political victory. The United States and Israel may have degraded Iran’s capabilities and struck key assets, but they are no closer to achieving their stated objective: meaningful political change in Tehran.
If the conflict ends soon, the opposite risk looms.
A wounded but intact regime – with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) now in charge – could emerge more radicalized, more paranoid, and more willing to lash out asymmetrically against American and Israeli interests and regional stability, including in the Strait of Hormuz.
History is clear: Short of invasion or occupation, regimes rarely fall from external pressure alone. Air campaigns, sanctions, and covert pressure can weaken a regime, but they usually do not replace it. Regimes collapse when outside pressure intersects with fractures from within. That is where current strategy falls short.
Washington and Jerusalem have focused on degrading the regime’s capabilities but have given far less attention to shaping the internal incentives of those who sustain it.
Two additional elements are essential to changing those incentives. First, a credible alternative. Regimes fall when citizens, elites, and security forces come to see a different order as both desirable and achievable. Iran lacks such an option. The opposition remains fragmented, though efforts by groups like the Iran Freedom Congress and figures such as Reza Pahlavi point toward a possible unifying framework – one that remains incomplete.
The second element is just as critical: creating the conditions for elite defection. That means creating credible off-ramps that encourage insiders to step away. Iran’s regime endures by holding together a coalition of actors with very different motivations.
At the top sit ideological hardliners and those most implicated in repression. Beneath them is a far larger group – military officers, economic managers, bureaucrats, and political functionaries – whose loyalty is often pragmatic, rooted in career incentives, access to resources, and fear of what comes next. A successful strategy must drive a wedge between these groups.
It requires shifting the internal calculus of this broader tier. Many are less ideological than dependent on the regime for stability and income. They will not move unless they can see a path that preserves their status, security, or livelihood.
The objective is not to coerce them into rebellion, but to encourage them to hedge, stand aside, or quietly disengage at critical moments. In a system like Iran’s – where power is dispersed across networks such as the IRGC – even localized non-cooperation, hesitation, or refusal to enforce orders can spread and fragment the regime’s ability to act.
Decisive off-ramps
This is where those off-ramps become decisive. Elites remain loyal when exit means ruin – and begin to shift when stepping away offers a safer future than staying. That requires clear, differentiated assurances: accountability for the worst abuses, but conditional guarantees for others, including personal safety, protection for families, and, where needed, safe passage into exile or structured retirement.
Such guarantees must be credible – often requiring tacit or explicit backing from external actors. Without them, even disillusioned insiders will stay out of fear.
Security forces are decisive – especially Iran’s regular military. Unlike the IRGC, which is built to defend the regime, the conventional army (Artesh) is oriented toward defending the nation and is typically less ideological. Its loyalty is therefore more conditional. To shift it, officers must believe that restraint – or refusal to repress – will not be punished but will preserve their role in a future order.
The message should be simple: Their highest duty is to the Iranian people, not the regime. When that belief takes hold, even limited hesitation can fracture the system.
These incentives matter only if they reach the right audiences – mid-level officials, security officers, and economic actors most likely to reconsider their loyalty. They need clear signals that stepping away is safer than staying and that a viable path exists on the other side.
This requires using trusted channels – personal networks, diaspora ties, and secure digital communication – to ensure the message is heard and believed. When these signals penetrate the regime’s inner networks, defection becomes far more likely.
The urgency of shifting loyalty within the regime is underscored by its willingness to use force against its own population. The killing of tens of thousands of protesters earlier this year makes clear that mass mobilization alone cannot succeed if the security apparatus remains intact. Only fractures within that apparatus – defections or refusals to repress – can create the space for opposition networks to organize, coordinate, and gain traction.
Regimes change when the balance of power shifts – not only in the streets, but within the state. That requires both an organized opposition and a regime weakened enough to lose internal cohesion. Such moments become decisive when insiders are given a credible exit door – one they can take without catastrophic consequences.
That is the missing piece.
For the Iranian opposition, the task is clear: Unify, present a credible vision, and signal to those inside the system that there is a place for them in a post-regime order if they step away from repression.
For the United States and Israel, the lesson is equally clear. Military pressure alone will not produce political change. It must be paired with a strategy that targets the regime’s internal pillars – combining selective pressure with credible guarantees, deepening elite divisions, and making defection safer than loyalty.
Without that, Tehran may emerge weakened – but still standing, and more dangerous.
The writer teaches political risk at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies and writes about and works on fragile states and political transitions.