Israel’s new disengagement plan

In practice, the disputes between the parties on the core issues, the lack of public support for difficult concessions among the Israeli and Palestinian public, and the internal Palestinian split.

By ORI WERTMAN, CHRISTIAN KAUNERT
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas chairs a session of the weekly cabinet meeting with Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh, in Ramallah (photo credit: REUTERS)
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas chairs a session of the weekly cabinet meeting with Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh, in Ramallah
(photo credit: REUTERS)
Let’s face it. Unfortunately, the probability for an Israeli Palestinian peace agreement is very low. The past is full of diverse attempts in which the two parties tried with direct negotiations and external mediation assistance to reach an agreement, all of which ended in failure.
In practice, the disputes between the parties on the core issues, the lack of public support for difficult concessions among the Israeli and Palestinian public, and the internal Palestinian split, all prevent any possibility of reaching a peace agreement between the parties. In light of the fact that a one-state solution is out of the question, as it will definitely bring to an end the Zionist idea, the two-state solution is the only realistic option available. However, since there is no Palestinian partner for an agreement, the Jewish state has little choice but to take its fate in its hand, set its own borders and create the two-state solution.
But here comes a serious obstacle in the form of world public opinion, which despite its desire to see an Israeli-Palestinian peace reconciliation, its majority, especially within EU, does not significantly consider the security needs of the Jewish state. In this context, these countries, which have not been under an existential threat for a long time, do not understand that an Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 lines could jeopardize the security of the Jewish state, whose narrow waist would be significantly reduced to less than 15 km. For those countries that traditionally support the Palestinian side, Israel must withdraw from the entire West Bank to the 1967 lines in accordance with international law, even though there are legal disputes about it.
In addition, those countries are unable to perceive the danger inherent in Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 lines, mainly in the light of the instability in the Palestinian Authority, which would have already been thwarted by a violent coup by Hamas without the Israeli military presence and the security cooperation with it. In this context, the Islamic State case has already proven that the democratic world must not take risks and allow the growth of extremist forces as happened in Syria and Iraq. Thus, an Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 lines could lead to a Hamas takeover – for which the PA is no less bad than Israel – over the entire West Bank, leading to the establishment of a radical Islamic terrorist state in the Middle East.
In that case, in order to convince world public opinion of the legitimacy of the Israeli move, and if not, at least to soften its opposition, it would be wiser for the Israeli leadership to stop using the term “annexation” and describe the move as a “disengagement,” the same term used to when the operation was conducted in the Gaza Strip in 2005. Although there is a legal dispute over whether the West Bank is an occupied territory – especially after Jordan conquered it in 1948 and forty years later declared that it was giving up its sovereignty over this land – it would be better for Israel to legally and politically argue that it “disengages” from some of these areas and does not “annex” them.
IN THAT context, a reasonable argument would be that a country disengages from a territory that belongs to it, and annexes a land that does not belong to it. Additionally, the term “annexation” refers to other cases in the distant and recent history of annexation cases, the last of which is the annexation of the Crimean peninsula by Russia, a move that the international community views as negative, forceful and illegal.
Practically, while from legal and political perspectives, both terms represent two poles on the spectrum of positive and negative, there is virtually no difference between the two for Israel itself, which will continue to hold territories that are vital to its security – such as the Jordan Valley – and will also ensure its strategic depth. Moreover, as far as international law is concerned, while UN Security Council resolutions do not require Israel to withdraw from all areas of the West Bank, but from territories into recognized and safe borders. A unilateral disengagement from territories in the West Bank, and not their annexation, is the appropriate legal and political response to any UN Security Council resolutions and international law.
In conclusion, whether we refer to the upcoming Israeli move in the West Bank as “disengagement” or “annexation”, security considerations are the ones that have guided Israel’s policy to date. Former prime minister Yitzhak Rabin’s intention in the Oslo Accords was to secure Israel’s future as a Jewish and democratic state with a solid Jewish majority. To that end, peace was a pretext to implement the separation between Israel and the Palestinians and thus prevent the idea of the binational state. Former prime minister Ariel Sharon also understood the demographic danger facing Israel. Hence, Sharon, who did not believe for a moment that an agreement with the Palestinians was an achievable outcome, carried out the unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip, which – like the Oslo accords – was a security measure. Even today, the Israeli leadership led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu understands that in order to securitize the demographic threat, a unilateral move must be executed, one that will ensure Israel’s future as a Jewish and democratic state.
Israel could not have asked for better conditions for such a disengagement plan. The Palestinian refusal to the Trump peace plan, the unprecedented American support for Israel, the tacit acknowledgment of Russia and most of the moderate Arab world for the imminent Israeli move, and, especially, the establishment of the unity government in Israel that has the political power and legitimacy to execute such an act, all constitute fertile ground to implement Israel’s new disengagement plan to secure and recognized borders.
The writers are Ori Wertman, a PhD candidate and research assistant at the International Centre for Policing and Security at the University of South Wales and Christian Kaunert, a professor of policing and security, Director of the International Centre for Policing and Security at University of South Wales, and the Jean Monnet Chairperson of EU counterterrorism.