Reconsidering Israel's nuclear posture
A nuclear weapons capable Iran would represent an existential threat to Israel, but not to the United States.
By PROF. LOUIS RENÉ BERES, ADMIRAL LEON EDNEY
October 14, 2013 19:19
Rouhani press conference in New York 370.
(photo credit: Screenshot)
“For By Wise Counsel, Thou Shalt Make Thy War”
Should there be no eleventh-hour preemption against Iran’s developing nuclear weapon infrastructures, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his security cabinet will have to focus intently on the country's longstanding policy of deliberate nuclear ambiguity. This is because effective nuclear deterrence against an already-nuclear Iran may then require certain selective confirmations of Israel's usable, secure, and penetration-capable retaliatory forces., More exactly, should Israel find itself faced with a nuclear weapons fait accompli in Iran, the precise and optimal levels of Israeli nuclear disclosure needed to contain this threat would then have to be based upon careful systematic examination.
To begin, some differentiations are necessary. A nuclear weapons capable Iran would represent an existential threat to Israel, but not to the United States. Recently, UN/US sanctions, which have already impacted Iran in certain tangible economic terms, are prompting a preliminary or newly exploratory discourse between Washington and Tehran. In consequence, Israel will quickly need to decide whether it can now place any reasonably enlarged faith in diplomatic solutions to Iran’s undimmed pursuit of nuclear weapons. In all likelihood, nothing can actually stop Iran's nuclear weapons program, other than physically destroying it. The core problem involves substantially more than Tehran's intermittently expressed desire to eradicate Israel. It is, rather, a more general issue of Iranian national power.