Iran just withdrew from the nuke deal – but not really

The Islamic republic's announcement on Sunday that it had ended all restrictions on uranium enrichment was the least significant violation to date.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, May 14, 2019 (photo credit: KHAMENEI.IR)
Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, May 14, 2019
(photo credit: KHAMENEI.IR)
Now that Iran has tossed the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action nuclear deal, the world needs to prepare for the bumpy, ever-escalating avalanche toward a conflict that could be not only between the United States and Iran, but that might also include Israel.
Or do we really need to get ready?
The Islamic Republic’s announcement on Sunday that it had ended all restrictions on uranium enrichment was the least significant violation to date.
One might ask: Is the country racing toward a nuclear bomb?
The answer is not so clear, and it depends on several factors.
There are two other announcements that would mean a dash toward a nuclear bomb: either that Iran is enriching its uranium to a much higher percentage (at least 20% or higher), or that Tehran is reattaching and activating many of its centrifuges. This would be especially indicative if it includes more of its second-generation IR-2m centrifuges.
A third announcement, that it was kicking out the IAEA inspectors, might also show that Iran was making a dash. But Iranian officials specifically said they would keep the inspectors.
If Iran announces any of the above additional escalations in the coming days, then real trouble is brewing.
If not, and if Iran continues to allow the international nuclear watchdog to observe its centrifuges, then nothing has effectively changed.
In fact, the Islamic Republic’s previous four violations dating back to May 2019 had already removed nearly all the uranium-enrichment restrictions, and the only question was how far Ayatollah Ali Khamenei would decide to take the country’s program.
After Sunday night’s announcement, we still do not know the answer to that question.
We do know that if IAEA inspectors remain on site, then we will have regular tracking of how much closer Tehran is getting to a nuclear bomb. This will allow us both to prepare, if necessary, but also to be able to act – with restraint – if its policy of inching forward continues.
It is still quite possible from Sunday’s announcement that Iran will wait to see who wins the November 3, 2020, US presidential elections before it decides whether to move closer to enriching enough uranium for a bomb.
None of this should make Israel or the US feel more secure, of course.
Any potential preemptive-strike plans on Iranian nuclear facilities need to be as ready as ever. But for now, those plans can still confidently be put off for months, probably for at least a year, and maybe indefinitely.
Still, at least as of Sunday night, Iran’s nuclear response to the assassination of IRGC Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani was a lot of bluster with little substance.
The question then shifts to what other actions Khamenei may order, such as attacks on US assets in Iraq, Syria and other hot spots overseas.