What will the next developments regarding US-Israel relations and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process be? It’s possible to make some good predictions, or at least to present the most likely scenarios.
On September 26, Israel’s one-year freeze on building inside West Bank settlements will end. Last October, the original commitment was extended to any construction in Jerusalem outside the pre- 1967 ceasefire lines. The Palestinian Authority now demands that this freeze be extended as a precondition for it entering direct talks with Israel. It also insists that Israel accept the 1967 borders as a defining boundary between itself and a future Palestinian state and agree that an international force patrol them.
The PA’s goal is to use the bait of direct talks to get the United States to accept these and other preconditions and force them on Israel or – just as good – to blame Israel for not making sacrifices and creating a rift in US-Israel relations. Israel does not have a similar option since whatever happens, this US government won’t publicly criticize the PA.
Even if Israel were to meet these conditions, it is not entirely clear that the PA would then talk “directly,” and either way it would still not have made any compromises of its own on issues vital to Israel. This is, then, the old Palestinian leadership’s game of demanding Israeli concessions, yielding nothing even if it wins them, and then insisting that what Israel has thus far conceded on is now the irreversible basis for future talks during which even more unilateral Israeli concessions are demanded.
BINYAMIN NETANYAHU’s government is thus presented with an unpalatable option. It is definitely not going to agree in advance to accept the 1967 borders as the final frontier before negotiations commence. This is beyond what the Israeli government offered at the 2000 Camp David talks and in the Clinton plan of that year, when it proposed what are historically known as “minor border modifications” and later spoke of “territorial swaps.” Israel is certainly not going to make such a major concession when the issues that it wants resolved – resettlement of Palestinian refugees in the state of Palestine, an end to the conflict, recognition of Israel as a Jewish state (in exchange for recognition of Palestine as an Arab state), the status of Jerusalem’s Old City and the Western Wall of the Temple, and security arrangements – have not even been discussed.
This situation also presents a challenge for US policy. The Obama administration cannot support all of the PA’s preconditions and succeed. Yet if it doesn’t meet them all, the PA can just keep refusing to talk. And despite the “pressure” Obama is reportedly applying, given his worldview and strategy, he is unlikely to do anything no matter how the PA behaves. Of course, the PA leadership understands this and, at any rate, is more afraid of its own people and Hamas calling it a traitor than of Obama’s phone calls to Abbas.
This sets up the ridiculous situation – but one common in the era of self-blaming and appeasement-oriented Western diplomacy – in which powerful Western states must beg far weaker and dependent Third World counterparts (or even groups like Hamas or Hizbullah) to give them concessions.
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After all, supposedly the Palestinians are suffering under an occupation (which mostly ended in 1994-1996) and yearning for a state. Shouldn’t they be eager for a deal, ready to compromise with the United States and make concessions to Israel in order to get their independence? Instead, the bizarre misreading of the situation seems to put the PA, which is now reduced to half the territory (without the Gaza Strip) it claims to rule, in the driver’s seat.
In Lebanon, Hizbullah pushes around a UN force mandated by the world community. In the Gaza Strip, Hamas celebrates its reduction of the embargo by firing rockets at Israel while much of the world criticizes Israel and pleads with Hamas to accept concessions.
And so in this topsy-turvey situation it is mostly Netanyahu who will face difficult choices. If he reinstitutes a freeze – despite the fact that there has been absolutely no progress during the one-year of his unilateral concession – there could be serious domestic political repercussions. One or more parties might well walk out of the coalition, forcing him to find substitutes, though he could survive politically far easier than foreign observers think.
NEVERTHELESS, THIS situation is at odds with Netanyahu’s longer-term plan. He has been hoping to continue in office into 2011, call elections at some point, win, and take another term as prime minister. If he’s in office until 2015 there is plenty of time to deal with the Iranian nuclear threat.
This seems to be a realistic scenario. There’s no other viable candidate. Defense Minister Ehud Barak is widely disliked in his own Labor Party; Tzipi Livni has been a failure as opposition leader and her Kadima party has no alternative policy to offer.
Within his Likud party, Netanyahu has been able to manage rebellious rightwingers and he is popular among a public that understandably sees no other route, is skeptical of more unilateral concessions, and has no illusions about the PA’s willingness or ability to make peace. Terrorism is down and the economy is doing remarkably well, whatever its shortcomings, compared to other countries.
So the problem for Netanyahu is: can he find some formula that will
please the United States without causing an internal political battle?
An example is to have a freeze without formally announcing it or
promising to sustain it for a given length of time. In doing so, he
knows that this will not result in peace but merely will avoid having
Israel shoulder the blame if the PA still refuses to talk.
The PA will, of course, look for any possible way to blame Israel while
it happily does everything possible to avoid direct talks. If there are
talks, it will make big demands knowing that the negotiations will break
down. Then it will wait for the world to hand it a state on a silver
platter. It is willing to wait decades.
IT IS possible that US and European policymakers understand this
reality, but for reasons of their own want to pretend that peace is
possible in short order. What they really want is direct talks as fast
as possible so they can say something is happening.
The Obama administration is desperate to claim some diplomatic success
before the November congressional elections. It will probably not bash
Israel before that date. If it has direct talks or has thrown up its
hands at frustration with the PA by then, good US-Israel bilateral
relations may continue well into 2011.
This is the situation: There may be a three-way meeting at which the PA
will try to convince the US that wonderful direct talks can be had if
only it makes Israel hand over everything it want.
Option 1: The US agrees, presses Israel for some unilateral concessions.
Netanyahu offers something or even meets US requests. Here are some
possible scenarios for what might unfold.
A. US accepts a Netanyahu compromise (maybe gives something to Israel),
PA says No. No direct talks. US blames PA but says nothing publicly.
Mahmoud Abbas tells cheering Palestinian crowd: We were steadfast!
B. US accepts Netanyahu compromise, PA says no. No direct talks. US
blames Israel. Hopes perhaps government falls and Kadima comes to power
or coalition ready to make bigger concessions. Avoids open rift in
US-Israel relations until early 2011. Abbas tells cheering Palestinian
crowd: We were steadfast!
C. PA accepts Israeli concessions and asks for US promises and
assurances. Gets more. Goes to talks. Sabotages talks. During talks,
Obama points to ongoing negotiations as proof of his diplomatic success.
US-Israel relations remain good. PA happy with gains which it will use
as a basis in the next round. Abbas tells cheering Palestinian crowd: We
Option 2: US asks Israel to give the PA everything it wants. Netanyahu
offers only part.
A. US accepts Netanyahu compromise (maybe gives something to Israel), PA
says no. US blames PA but says nothing publicly. Abbas tells cheering
Palestinian crowd: We were steadfast!
B. US gets angry that Netanyahu doesn’t give everything. US blames
Israel but avoids open rift in US-Israel relations until early 2011.
Abbas tells cheering Palestinian crowd: We were steadfast!
C. PA takes what is offered then demands even more before going to
talks. US angry at PA but says nothing publicly. Abbas tells cheering
Palestinian crowd: We were steadfast!
D. PA accepts Israeli concessions and asks for US promises and
assurances. Gets more. Goes to talks. Sabotages talks. PA happy with
gains which it will use as a basis in the next round. Abbas tells
cheering Palestinian crowd: We were steadfast!
Option 3: Many meetings, speeches, leaders flying around the world.
Absolutely nothing happens. US-Israel relations remain good. Abbas tells
cheering Palestinian crowd: We were steadfast! The writer is director of the Global
Research in International Affairs Center and editor of Middle East
Review of International Affairs and Turkish Studies. He blogs at
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