Annexation has parallels in Israel's withdrawal from Gaza in 2005

There are some startling similarities between Israel’s Disengagement from the Gaza Strip and the possible annexation of parts of Judea and Samaria

By HERB KEINON
IDF SOLDIERS take part in a flag-lowering ceremony as they prepare to withdraw from Girit outpost, in the southern Gaza Strip, in 2005. (photo credit: DAVID SILVERMAN / REUTERS)
IDF SOLDIERS take part in a flag-lowering ceremony as they prepare to withdraw from Girit outpost, in the southern Gaza Strip, in 2005.
(photo credit: DAVID SILVERMAN / REUTERS)
Withdrawal and annexation seem like polar opposites.
In one scenario you are leaving territory, in the other making clear an intent to stay forever. The results of the two moves couldn’t be more different, and to compare the two – it would seem – would be like comparing apples to thumbtacks.
Yet as odd and downright counterintuitive as it may appear, there are some startling similarities between Israel’s Disengagement from the Gaza Strip 15 years ago this summer, and the possible extension of Israeli sovereignty over parts of Judea and Samaria this summer. Here is a look at some of them.
Unilateral steps
Although taken with American support, both disengagement and annexation are unilateral steps where Palestinian involvement and cooperation are not deemed necessary. Both steps are examples of Israel deciding to take matters into its own hands to shape its political-security reality, not to remain hostage to Palestinian negotiating positions, and to do what it thinks is in its own best interest.
Both steps – the one undertaken in Gaza, and the one being contemplated for Judea and Samaria – come after Israeli leaders reached the conclusion that there is no partner on the other side.
The prime minister of the disengagement, Ariel Sharon, reached the “no partner” conclusion after seeing the Palestinians reject the very generous offer made by Ehud Barak at Camp David in 2000 and then ignite the Second Intifada just a few months later. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has come to the same conclusion following Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas’s steadfast refusal to negotiate with either Israel or the Americans for years.
As did Sharon’s “disengagement” – a brilliant use of this term rather than the more defeatist “withdrawal” – Netanyahu’s plan to extend Israeli sovereignty beyond the Green Line tantalizingly dangles before the Israeli public the idea that Israel can act on its own without undue concern about what is happening on the other side. As if Israel alone controls its destiny, and the reactions of the other side are either irrelevant or can be controlled.
Jerusalem, however, was unpleasantly surprised when its withdrawal from Gaza led, just a few months later, to Hamas defeating Fatah in Palestinian legislative elections, and then militarily ousting it from Gaza in 2007, leading to a new and very problematic reality in Gaza far different from what Sharon hoped and expected.
The lesson for Netanyahu: unilateral steps taken without any coordination or input from the other side may unleash dangerous dynamics with enormous unintended and unseen consequences.
The Americans
While neither the Gaza withdrawal nor the planned annexation of parts of the West Bank were coordinated with the Palestinians, American support was there.
Some argue that the one of the main reasons Sharon unveiled his disengagement plan in 2003 – with the Second Intifada still roiling the country – was to show the Americans that Israel had a diplomatic horizon so that the US would continue to give Sharon a free hand to take the very strong measures he felt needed to be taken to squelch the Second Intifada.
Sharon and then-president George Bush traded letters about the withdrawal from Gaza, with Bush writing a letter that Israel interpreted as meaning that in any future agreement the US would support Israel retaining the main settlement blocs. Sharon constantly waved this letter and these understandings before the disengagement as concrete benefits Israel would receive for the move.
That letter and those understandings, however, meant little when Bush was replaced by Barack Obama, who entered the White House determined to curb Israeli settlement construction. The letter – as well as the informal agreements on where and how Israel could build in the settlements – became a bone of contention, with then-secretary of state Hillary Clinton saying at one point they were not binding.
That experience is one to keep in mind when looking at annexation, as while this step will be taken under one US administration, another administration may soon take over with a completely different outlook. Don’t think that American government support for one move today will roll over into American government support for the same move down the line. Different administrations have different positions, and – as history has shown when it comes to Israel – they can and do reverse positions of previous administrations.
If this is something that happened with regard to the Bush letter and tacit understandings reached with the Bush administration on settlement construction, it is a definite possibility when considering the likelihood that Joe Biden will replace US President Donald Trump in January, especially since Biden has already made very clear his opposition to annexation.
National cohesion
The Gaza withdrawal, with its uprooting of some 8,000 people from their homes and the total destruction of 21 communities, was a severe trauma for Israeli society, dealing a harsh blow to the national cohesion the country needs as an asset to deal with its constant challenges.
Since no people are set to be removed physically from their homes under the annexation plan, that type of trauma will not be felt if Israel goes ahead with the plan. Nevertheless, while Netanyahu appears to have an easy majority in the Knesset for the move, there is disagreement among the public about the wisdom of the step, especially as voices are raised saying this will lead to yet another wave of Palestinian violence, a break in the security ties with Jordan, and an end to the quiet cooperation over the last few years between Israel and the Gulf states.
A poll taken by the Israel Democracy Institute (IDI) this week showed that 50% of the public supported extending sovereignty to the Jordan Valley – long an area of consensus among Israelis – and some of the settlements, while some 31% were opposed. A quarter of the population favored such a move even without US support.
But if an American administration later turns sour on the idea; if months of violence ensue; if Israel is sanctioned by the EU and censured by the world; and if Jordan does cut its ties, those numbers are likely to shift. To face the challenges all of the above would present the country, a wide consensus on the wisdom of the move would be preferable, if not necessary.
Interestingly enough, the IDI poll figures this week were similar to polling taken in the weeks prior to the withdrawal from Gaza. Two months before disengagement, a Dahaf Institute/Yediot Aharonot poll showed support for the plan at 53%, with 38% opposed. On the day of the withdrawal itself, a poll by the same institute showed that 62% of the public supported it, and 31% opposed.
What this shows is that the government, with a wide range of tools at its disposal, is able to mold public opinion. But although there was strong support for disengagement in the polls, the move still traumatized the nation.
Violence
While the Gaza withdrawal did do away with terrorist attacks against soldiers and settlers inside the strip, it did not stop terrorism, but just led it to a change in its form. No longer would shots be fired on Israeli cars inside the Gaza Strip, or incendiary devices go off against an IDF patrol in the Philadelphia Corridor, but, rather, rockets – tens of thousands of them – would be fired on communities just beyond the fence and further afield.
Sharon, like Barak when he withdrew from Lebanon in May 2000, told the country that if Israel would be fired upon after withdrawing, it would have all the legitimacy in the world to strike back in self-defense.
These words turned out to be empty. Even if Israel did enjoy some legitimacy for defensive actions at the governmental level for actions in Gaza after it withdrew, it quickly evaporated. Witness the Goldstone Report that censured Israel in an unprecedented way after Operation Cast Lead in 2009.
The asymmetric warfare in Gaza – whereby Israel needs to hit terrorist targets hidden behind a civilian shield – is always going to earn Israel sharp denunciation, with or without an umbrella of international legitimacy.
Today various Palestinian groups are threatening violence if Israel goes ahead with the annexation plan. And if Israel was condemned and urged to respond proportionately to violence emanating from Gaza – an area that Israel left completely – all the more so will it be condemned and denounced by the world when responding to possible Palestinian terrorism unleashed after annexation.
Relations with the Arab world
Just a month after the Disengagement from Gaza in 2005, Sharon went to the UN for the annual General Assembly meeting and lumbered through the corridors of the UN as though he were taking a victory lap. Sharon, once the symbol of the aggressive, rejectionist Israeli, was suddenly sought after by presidents, prime ministers and princes who all wanted to slap him on the back and shake his hand.
This was a dramatic reversal of fortune for a man so long viewed as a pariah on the world stage. Sharon’s chief political rival at the time, Netanyahu, quipped in a play on the Hebrew phrase for trading land for peace (shtahim t’murat shalom) that Sharon traded land for red carpets (shtahim t’murat shtihim).
The hope at the time was that this would also pave the way for better relations with the Arab world. It was not to be. The withdrawal led to an increase of terrorism from Gaza, which led to a response from Israel, and therefore an exacerbation of the conflict. And each additional round of fighting in Gaza made it more difficult for Israel and the Arab world to work together to face common foes.
Today Israel’s situation with the Arab world is significantly different and better than it was in 2005. Today Israel enjoys significant, though quiet, relations with Persian Gulf countries.
But today, as then, if a unilateral Israeli step exacerbates the situation with the Palestinians, this will likely impact negatively, as it always does on ties with those states. Even if the governments of some of these states will want to continue with the cooperation with Israel, there will be pressure from below – from the “street,” which always supports the Palestinians – to halt it.
In 2005 Israel did not have that much to lose, because the ties were less significant. In 2020 those ties are much more consequential.