India’s strategic diversification: moving beyond Russia with the US and Israel

For decades, India’s defense posture was defined by its reliance on Russia. Moscow supplied submarines, aircraft, tanks, and missiles, making it the backbone of India’s arsenal and the partner of choice for New Delhi’s military planners. This long-standing relationship created the perception one echoed recently by former U.S. President Donald Trump — that India remains overwhelmingly dependent on Russian weapons.

Yet in 2025, under Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s third term, this picture has changed dramatically. Far from clinging to a single supplier, New Delhi is pursuing a deliberate strategy of diversification. By deepening partnerships with the United States and Israel, India is reshaping its defense ecosystem, enhancing its technological autonomy, and positioning itself as a global hub of security innovation.

The most visible sign of India’s changing trajectory is its embrace of coproduction with the United States.

Unlike traditional procurement deals, which kept India as a client of foreign suppliers, today’s agreements embed the transfer of knowledge, build local production lines, and create mutual dependence. Projects already underway include the joint production of Javelin anti-tank missiles, the manufacturing of Stryker armored vehicles, and the integration of MQ-9B drones into India’s armed forces. These initiatives are central to Atmanirbhar Bharat Modi’s vision of a self-reliant India. Instead of simply importing weapons, New Delhi is embedding advanced defence industries within its own territory, allowing it to develop, adapt, and export in the future.

This represents a profound departure from the Russian model. For decades, Moscow provided finished systems but offered limited technology transfer. By contrast, US–India coproduction transforms the relationship into one of shared development, creating new industrial capacities on Indian soil and deepening interoperability with American forces.

Alongside defense production, India and the United States are pursuing large-scale industrial ventures that strengthen both economic resilience and national security.

The Micron semiconductor facility in Gujarat is one of the clearest examples. At a time when semiconductors are central to both civilian and military technology, the project ensures that India becomes part of the global supply chain, reducing vulnerability to external shocks and diminishing reliance on China’s dominance in critical minerals and chip manufacturing.

Equally significant is the collaboration between India’s Mahindra Group and the American firm Anduril Industries. Their joint work on maritime systems and unmanned platforms highlights India’s evolution from a consumer of arms to an active contributor in the innovation cycle. This not only supports India’s naval modernization but also builds cross-border industrial partnerships that anchor the bilateral relationship in shared production and research. Together, these ventures demonstrate that diversification is not only about replacing Russian hardware. It is about embedding India in a global innovation network that combines economic development with military modernization.

Beyond hardware and industrial cooperation, New Delhi is focused on building resilient supply chains. India has learned that dependence on a single partner whether Russia for arms or China for minerals  creates strategic vulnerabilities. By developing alternative supply chains in sectors such as semiconductors and rare earth minerals, India is insulating itself from geopolitical disruptions. This effort is as much about deterrence as it is about resilience: the ability to withstand external pressure strengthens New Delhi’s credibility as an autonomous actor in the Indo-Pacific.

Another key feature of the US–India partnership is its multi-dimensional framework. Unlike the largely transactional defense trade with Russia, cooperation with Washington extends across diplomacy, business, academia, and civil society. This institutional anchoring ensures continuity even when political frictions arise. Whether through academic exchanges, joint research programs, or private-sector ventures, the relationship is reinforced by overlapping networks that keep it resilient. For New Delhi, this provides insurance: even if one channel is strained, others continue to operate.

Crucially, India’s diversification is not limited to the United States. Israel has emerged as a vital partner in areas where it offers niche expertise and operational innovation.

Collaboration in cybersecurity, unmanned systems, and advanced defense technologies complements the larger partnership with Washington. For New Delhi, Israel is more than a supplier it is a source of unique capabilities that fill critical gaps. These ties also broaden India’s strategic options, further reducing dependence on Russia and ensuring that it is not locked into a single bilateral track.

In many ways, Israel’s role illustrates the historic importance of diversification. By maintaining parallel partnerships with the US and Israel, India avoids overreliance while maximizing access to cutting-edge technologies. This multi-vector strategy reflects not weakness but strength: the ability to balance multiple relationships while maintaining autonomy.

The implications of this shift are far-reaching. India is no longer a passive client of Russian arms. Instead, it is integrating more closely with US forces, deepening its cooperation with Israel, and reshaping the regional innovation map.  This diversification elevates India’s role in the Indo-Pacific balance of power. By investing in coproduction, supply-chain resilience, and multi-dimensional partnerships, New Delhi is transforming itself into a pivotal player not only militarily but technologically. The narrative that India “rides on Russia’s back” is increasingly outdated. A more accurate description is that India is standing on multiple pillars  American, Israeli, and domestic  and using them to project greater autonomy, resilience, and influence.

India’s strategic diversification marks a historic departure from the past. While Russia remains part of New Delhi’s defense ecosystem, the country is no longer defined by that reliance. Through partnerships with the United States and Israel, India is building a security architecture that is broader, more innovative, and more resilient. This is not only about reducing dependence on Moscow. It is about positioning India as a global center of defense technology a nation that can innovate, produce, and lead in shaping the security environment of the Indo-Pacific.

For policymakers in Washington, Jerusalem, and beyond, the message is clear: a diversified India is a stronger, more capable, and more autonomous partner. And for New Delhi, the journey from dependency to diversification is redefining its place in the world. Recent regional crises only sharpen this imperative. The past two years from the war in Gaza and Houthi attacks linked to Iran, to India’s military confrontation with Pakistan in May 2025, have highlighted the scale and complexity of the threats facing both democracies. These simultaneous challenges underscore why New Delhi and Jerusalem must deepen their partnership, leveraging innovation, resilience, and operational experience to withstand overlapping security shocks.