US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth announced on Friday that the administration will build a Qatari Air Force facility in Idaho.
The announcement came as Israel and Hamas agreed on the first stage of a ceasefire that would see the return of the hostages held by the terror group and the ending of military activity by the IDF in the destroyed Gaza Strip.
The United States has hosted foreign military forces before. The Republic of Singapore 428th Fighter Squadron Buccaneers have been hosted at Mountain Home since 2008. However, the new Qatari facility may raise questions about the precedent it sets for future foreign deployments on American soil.
Beyond its military implications, the facility may be part of a broader diplomatic trade-off. The timing of the announcement, just days after Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu issued a rare apology to Doha, for the strike on Hamas officials in Qatar, makes one wonder if the deepening US-Qatar defense partnership was one of the concessions Netanyahu accepted to end the war.
Qatar played a central role in brokering the ceasefire, and its influence over Hamas has long made it a key player in regional diplomacy.
By allowing Qatar to establish a military footprint on American soil, Washington may be signaling its gratitude while also reinforcing Qatar’s strategic importance.
At the end of September, US President Donald Trump signed an executive order that said that the “United States shall regard any armed attack on the territory, sovereignty, or critical infrastructure of the State of Qatar as a threat to the peace and security of the United States.”
Some could argue that the air force facility could be seen as yet another diplomatic reward for Qatar’s mediation efforts, potentially at the expense of Israeli hardliners who opposed any compromise.
Shifting or strengthening
The Israel-Hamas War in Gaza triggered a cascade of diplomatic and military shifts. Talks between Israel and Saudi Arabia, once seen as a cornerstone of Middle East peace, were suspended amid the conflict.
Iran’s support for Hamas and Hezbollah intensified regional tensions, complicating Western efforts to contain Iranian proxies. Russia and China also watched and learned from the conflict.
Yet, despite public condemnation from Arab states, military cooperation between the IDF and several Arab nations has quietly persisted and, in some cases, even expanded.
During Iran’s April 2024 missile barrage on Israel, Arab states, such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia, reportedly provided intelligence and support for interception efforts, showcasing the feasibility of a regional defense alliance, despite public hostility.
According to a report in The Washington Post, senior Israeli and Arab military officials met several times over the past three years, including in Qatar at the American Al Udeid Air Base in May 2024.
In June 2024, IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi met with senior generals from Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt in Bahrain under the auspices of US CENTCOM.
The summit focused on regional threats, particularly Iran. Israeli and Arab military officials also met in Egypt and Jordan.
In April 2025, Qatar and the UAE joined Israel and the US in the Iniochos 2025 air exercise in Greece. This marked Qatar’s first joint training with Israel, signaling a potential thaw in military relations despite political tensions.
The Washington Post report also mentioned five CENTCOM PowerPoint presentations reviewed by the paper that detailed the “creation of what the US military describes as the ‘Regional Security Construct’ that includes Israel, Qatar, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.
The Arab states of Kuwait and Oman, both countries that are not yet part of the Abraham Accords, were listed as “potential partners” that had been briefed on the meetings.
These developments suggest that while political normalization may stall, strategic cooperation, especially against shared threats like Iran, remains a priority. However, several challenges could prevent a full return to pre-war public military collaboration.
Arab governments face domestic pressure over civilian casualties in Gaza, making overt cooperation with Israel politically sensitive. Accusations of war crimes against both Hamas and Israeli officials have polarized international institutions and could complicate joint operations.
Post-War plans
Post-war plans for Gaza’s administration, potentially involving Arab technocrats and international oversight, remain contentious and could affect regional security dynamics.
The end of the Gaza war may not restore global military cooperation to its previous state, but it could usher in a new era of pragmatic, threat-driven alliances. Arab-Israeli military coordination, once unthinkable, is now quietly advancing under US guidance.
While political normalization may lag, shared security interests, especially counterterrorism and missile defense, could drive deeper collaboration.
In this evolving landscape, the future of global military ties will depend not just on peace agreements but on the ability of nations to navigate the maze of complex public sentiments versus strategic imperatives.