After roughly eight months, Israel and Iran have entered another round of conflict, an outcome that seemed inevitable since their previous war ended in June 2025. In the months that followed, Iran accelerated its efforts to recover and rebuild its military capabilities, focusing primarily on ballistic missiles, as well as on advancing its nuclear program, progressing more rapidly than had been anticipated at the end of the last confrontation.
Last year's war concluded without any formal agreement between the two countries but with significant damage to Iran’s nuclear and missile infrastructure, though it was evident that their capabilities were far from being fully destroyed.
Israel had long sought to address the issue of Iran’s ballistic missiles, viewing them as an “existential threat.”
But, in my view, this characterization is inaccurate, given that, while ballistic missiles pose a threat Israel cannot accept living alongside, the term “existential threat” should be reserved solely for nuclear weapons.
Israel repeatedly attempted to ensure that the issue of ballistic missiles was to be included in any future US-Iran agreement related to nuclear development, with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made several attempts to persuade the United States, and during his most recent meeting with US President Donald Trump in Florida, that the two sides reached a shared understanding on the matter.
In the meantime, a major wave of protests erupted in Iran, distinct from previous uprisings and with the potential to significantly destabilize the Islamic regime.
Trump’s pledge to support the Iranian people and his call to replace the hardline regime converged with the momentum of that meeting with Netanyahu, creating an opening for a campaign which, for the first time, would explicitly address three interconnected issues: the regime itself, Iran’s nuclear program, and its ballistic missile capabilities.
During the nine months that have passed since the previous war, both sides have worked to maximize their learning, accelerate their arms race, and improve their capabilities in order to enter the current round from a stronger position.
Iran, however, is in a weaker and more fragile state than at any point since the 1979 revolution.
Operation Roaring Lion (Epic Fury in the US) differs from June’s Operation Rising Lion in several significant ways: It is no longer solely a direct confrontation between Iran and Israel; from the very first day, the United States has been actively and substantially involved.
What began as an Israel-Iran conflict has now expanded into a broader regional war, stretching its boundaries into Europe through Turkey and Cyprus, and into Asia with the involvement of Azerbaijan.
This has resulted in two major implications.
First: Iran is compelled to spread its firepower across all the countries now involved in the conflict, including those hosting American forces on their territory and beyond. Second: The scale and intensity of the attacks directed at Iran have more than doubled compared to the war in June: in just the first week of the current conflict, over 6,500 combat munitions were deployed, whereas last year the war saw 3,700 munitions used over a span of 12 days.
The threat and the response
Iran is acting differently this time, whether due to operational constraints or lessons learned from the 12 Day War because several major factors have changed. In the previous conflict, Iran took 18 hours to respond to Israel’s surprise attack, whereas in the current round it launched its first missiles just two hours after the opening strike, exactly as earlier intelligence assessments had predicted.
From the outset, Iran’s response has relied on firing individual missiles dispersed in a broad “fan” pattern across a wide geographic area in Israel. In addition, most of its unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) launches have been directed toward Gulf states rather than Israel.
Also, during the first week, Iran launched roughly 110 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), compared to the approximately 1,100 it deployed over 12 days in June.
So far, Israel’s air defense system has not faced a significant challenge from Iran, and its performance has surpassed the interception success rates of Operation Rising Lion. In the first week alone, over 220 missiles were launched toward Israel, and fewer than 10 struck targets.
This improvement reflects both technological upgrades and lessons learned, as well as enhanced readiness, reinforced positions and pre‑prepared deployment sites were set up for a multi‑tier defense scenario. That preparation has proven essential, given the simultaneous launches from Iran and from its proxy Hezbollah in Lebanon, some of which have even been timed to coincide.
As the war progresses and Israel deepens its operational gains by destroying launchers and inflicting substantial damage on production facilities, transportation routes, storage sites, and missile infrastructure, there is an expected decline in Iran’s daily launch volume.
The recent trend of fewer than 20 missiles per day, and at times only isolated launches, reflects this shift. After the first week of the war, it is clear that Iran is employing nearly every missile and capability at its disposal. Thus far, all the missiles launched are those that Israel’s air defense has already encountered in previous rounds of conflict with Iran and its proxies. However this does not guarantee that new or unexpected capabilities won’t appear, and it continues to be essential to remain alert and continually reassess what surprises Iran might introduce onto the battlefield.
Given the regime’s growing sense that time may be running out and that its hold on power could be threatened, we should assume an escalation in its use of threats and a persistent effort to push its proxies into more active and aggressive roles. This applies to both Hezbollah and the Houthis, who remained uninvolved in the fighting during the first week but continue to signal their intention to join the campaign.
It is still too early to draw definitive conclusions about this new war with the Islamic Republic, but after the first week, several trends have become clear. Operational coordination between Israel and the United States has been excellent, both in defense and offense. Force deployment has been carried out with precision and effectiveness, producing impressive results, and American commitment has remained as strong as it was on the war’s opening day.
The war could still end abruptly, especially given Trump’s tendency to make decisions that are not always predictable or part of a long‑term plan.
Hopefully, this time, the outcome will be different.
The author is a former Israel Air Defense Forces Commander