Seth J. Frantzman’s new book, The October 7 War: Israel’s Battle for Security in Gaza, is indispensable for anyone who wants to understand what led to the current war, how it has been fought, where the errors lay, and as a guidepost to understand what’s next. Frantzman is the senior Middle East correspondent at The Jerusalem Post, covering all of Israel’s wars over the last 15 years and being on the front lines during the war against ISIS.
It is not easy to write a book whose ending, the active war against Hamas, has not yet been written. Years from now, this conflict may be referenced more as another battle in a much longer and far-reaching jihadist war where Shi’ites and Sunnis work together in their common interest to destroy Israel, undermine moderate Gulf states, and expel the United States from the region. The head of the octopus is Islamist Iran, and Hamas is just one Sunni Arab tentacle that shares its genocidal agenda.
The October 7 surprise Hamas attack cannot be viewed as an isolated event. To fully understand that fateful day and the hundreds of days that have followed, one also needs to understand the regional and international dynamics, Israel’s domestic politics, and the hubris, lack of imagination, underestimation of the adversary, and profound operational and intelligence failures.
Seth Frantzman’s account of Israel’s days after October 7, its military response, and tactical successes is indispensable for anyone creating policy and planning for the ensuing stages of a war on potentially seven fronts. Many have forgotten the critical features and lessons to be drawn, obscured with time. Frantzman’s account reminds you of what transpired and explains why it happened.
Understanding the Israel-Hamas War
The book is divided into three sections: the road that led to October 7; the day of the attack and how Israel regrouped in the early days; and then how it reshaped the battlefield over time to degrade Hamas.
One day, there will be a comprehensive investigation, and Frantzman will have a chance to write the second volume of the Hamas war. But two significant blind spots to highlight are that most Israeli defense, security, and political figures believed Hamas was incapable of a substantial attack on the scale of October 7, only capable of small raids and infiltrations. The other was an over-reliance on the smart barrier, failing to create a reliable second line of defense inland.
Israel is in the early stages of planning and building a new underground tunnel barrier between the Sinai and Gaza, along the seven-mile-long Philadelphi Corridor, from the Kerem Shalom border crossing to the Mediterranean. Frantzman points out that “historically, defensive lines have not worked.” From Israel’s failed Bar-Lev line in the Sinai to the French Maginot Line of World War II to the multi-billion dollar smart fence along the Gaza border pre-October 7, defensive barriers like defensive anti-missile systems are a help but cannot be relied on alone to thwart a determined enemy.
Over-reliance on defensive walls was exemplified by the IDF brigadier-general in charge of the Gaza fence protection unit, who said in 2021, “Today I can inform the residents of the Gaza border area that there is a barrier underground and above ground with advance systems that in the best possible way will prevent infiltration into Israel.”
This is not to say that fences and barriers aren’t worth having, as the Gaza smart fence did stop underground tunnels entering Israel from Gaza; and I recently saw a new smart fence in Kalkilya, an Arab city on Israel’s seam line in Samaria, which dramatically decreased infiltrations.
To understand Gaza, Frantzman tells us that we must know its history because the “October 7 massacre has roots in how Hamas took over Gaza and turned it into a base for terror. Gaza has played a pivotal role in the history of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians…. Israel has faced terrorist threats from Gaza since 1948…. In 1948, when Israel declared independence, the Egyptian army invaded and occupied the area between Rafah and Gaza City. (They) hosted the Mufti of Jerusalem, a rabid antisemite, ally of Nazism and Palestinian nationalism.”
Israel created a line of kibbutzim and moshavim along the 37-mile Gaza border. “This is how Israel would lay claim to this land and defend it. The threat to Israel today from Gaza has its roots in the 1950s when Egyptians controlled the land and, working with Palestinians, tried to make life unbearable for Jews. Much of Palestinian political history has hinged on developments in Gaza, including the impetus for the uprising known as the First Intifada in 1987 that led to the creation of Hamas, a religious nationalist movement” with its roots in the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.
The Second Intifada’s most emblematic image occurred in Gaza when a Palestinian boy, Mohammed al-Dura, was killed, and the photos went viral. Israel was blamed and, years later, was vindicated; but by then, Hamas homicide bombers were terrorizing Israel, and the world community continued to condemn Israel.
Frantzman says, “At each point in history when Israel was about to achieve peace, Hamas would seek to sabotage the efforts via massive deadly attacks. The same would occur in Oct 2023 when Hamas sought to derail normalization with Saudi Arabia and peace in the region.”
I am not quite sure peace would have emerged, but without Hamas there was the possibility for prolonged quiet and better arrangements with Palestinians. Hamas’s ability to coordinate an attack on the scale of October 7 was not believed by most of the security establishment, with some exceptions like former defense minister Avigdor Liberman, who quit the coalition because it appeased Hamas; and Brig.-Gen. (res.) Yossi Kuperwasser, who was criticized for saying in 2023 that Israel should confront Hamas and not wait. Avi Dichter was prescient in 2014, saying Israel would need a year to dismantle Hamas’s infrastructure.
According to Liberman in an interview with Frantzman, there was a meeting a week before October 7 in the Prime Minister’s Office with the Israeli security establishment, all claiming Hamas was deterred and didn’t have an interest in “escalation.”
From a political perspective, Israel’s relative quiet since the 2014 war was a victory. A new multi-layered anti-missile system was in place, the economy was humming, and no one wanted to look behind the curtain. However, in early 2023, according to the Times of Israel, a “core of senior officers said Israel’s adversaries were growing stronger for decades, and existing IDF capabilities and doctrines are increasingly ill-suited to respond effectively to the threat.”
Frantzman points out, “It’s important to understand Israel’s military transition in the 2000s and its pioneering investment in new technology. The IDF’s embrace of new technology was designed to overcome threats from Hamas and Hezbollah. However, just as Israel had been surprised in 1973 and 2006, the technology was not a magic wand against an ever-changing enemy. This is a lesson from many Western armies that invested in expensive technology while neglecting larger conventional army formations. For instance, Israel learned from October 7 and its aftermath that it needed more tanks and combat helicopters. Technology is not a substitute for strategy and tactics.” What emerged in the 2020s was the Momentum Plan to “bring intel and tech to front line troops to make warfare more efficient.”
Before October 7, Frantzman says, “Iran was planning for a multi-front war against Israel.” What my friends in Congress and the executive branch don’t get is the extent to which Iran and its proxies, like Hamas, are jihadist and revolutionary in ideology and that American appeasement and de-escalation are used as part of their long-term plan to take over the Middle East.
To fully comprehend October 7 and Hamas also requires knowledge of the Muslim Brotherhood, the axis of resistance (Iran, Russia, North Korea, and China), the 1979 Iranian Revolution, America’s failed wars in the Middle East, Israel’s previous wars with Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Palestinian Authority.
In the current Gaza battle, which is now entering a phase of counterinsurgency and guerrilla warfare, if Israel is to defeat Hamas, Frantzman says Israel “must learn from the mistakes, conceptions, hubris, and complacency that led to October 7.”
Foundation for Defense of Democracies Chief Executive Mark Dubowitz writes, “After the horrific attacks, many are trying to isolate Israel and make the world forget the horrors that Hamas inflicted. It is important to remember the crimes that Hamas committed and the necessity and legitimacy of Israel’s response in Gaza.” The October 7 War does just that.
Seth Frantzman’s book is essential for all Middle East experts and those concerned about the fate of the Jewish state and US-Israel relations. Like his last two books, Drone Wars: Pioneers, Killing Machines, Artificial Intelligence and the Battle for the Future; and After ISIS: America, Iran and the Struggle for the Middle East, they are requisite reading to comprehend the dangers and opportunities to confront enemies of Israel and America. ■
The writer is the director of MEPIN (Middle East Political Information Network) and Mandel Strategies, a consulting firm for business and government officials in the Middle East, and regularly briefs members of the US Congress and their foreign policy aides.
- The October 7 War: Israel’s Battle for Security in Gaza
- Seth J. Frantzman
- Wicked Son, 2024
- 348 pages, $19.74 (paperback)