Even as Turkey and Egypt are experiencing a renaissance in certain areas militarily, senior Israeli defense sources sense opportunities for Israel and Cairo to work together to counterbalance Ankara’s naval interests, The Jerusalem Post has learned.
Watching Iran choke the world’s economic interests at the Strait of Hormuz and with Turkey rising as a power in the Mediterranean, both the Jewish state and Egypt may eventually realize they have an interest in coordinating even more against any encroachment in the area by Ankara.
Until now, Israeli and Egyptian naval units have cooperated in the framework of international drills going back years, but neither has been seriously challenged in the Mediterranean.
But that is only one interpretation, and there are at least two others.
Despite the optimistic narrative, Egyptian Defense Minister Lt.-Gen. Ashraf Salem Zaher traveled to Ankara on July 13, which, according to some more pessimistic observers, represented a profound structural shift in the geopolitics of the Eastern Mediterranean.
Egypt and Turkey may be moving closer diplomatically, possibly counterbalancing against Israel
This pessimistic narrative states that Egypt and Turkey are moving closer together and potentially toward counterbalancing against Israel.
All of this goes back to the original third narrative: that until now, Turkey and Egypt have wanted nothing to do with one another, even if Cairo has also not helped Jerusalem against Ankara.
This narrative, which was true until the past year, was based on the idea that for over a decade, ideological enmity between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi was a permanent feature of the regional landscape.
Sisi had blamed Erdogan for supporting the Muslim Brotherhood, which took over Egypt from 2012 to 2013, and the Turkish president had blamed the Egyptian president for forcing the Brotherhood out of power.
But Turkey and Egypt have each benefited from the other, especially in recent months: Sisi is securing access to advanced military technology from Turkey without Western human rights conditions, while Erdogan is gaining a massive conventional partner to legitimize his maritime ambitions.
Moreover, the military cooperation between Cairo and Ankara has quickly evolved past superficial diplomacy into deep, structural integration. Their joint maneuvers over the past weeks showed what appeared to be an alarming level of operational alignment.
Turkey’s Anatolian Eagle aerial exercises integrated Egyptian pilots for training under simulated high-threat environments alongside Ankara’s assets. This was immediately followed by the Egyptian Golden Eagle special forces drills, which focused on command interoperability on multiple fronts and theaters.
According to some observers, these were not routine bilateral military drills, but rather part of a process to synthesize the doctrines of two of the region’s most powerful militaries.
Egypt’s concerns over Turkey align with Israeli maritime interests
Senior Israel Navy sources believe that despite Egypt and Turkey turning over a new, highly positive leaf in their relations, Cairo’s concerns about Ankara taking advantage specifically in the maritime arena work naturally with Israeli interests.
Sisi has strong sensitivities about ongoing issues relating to Libya and other areas where Erdogan’s interests might be different.
In these areas, Egypt could work together not just with Israel, but also with Cyprus and Greece to counterbalance Turkey trying to become more aggressive in the Mediterranean, the Post understands.
In late June, Greek Navy Chief Vice Admiral Dimitrios-Eleftherios Kataras visited Israel and met with Naval Commander Vice Admiral Eyal Harel, as well as members of the Shayetet 13 naval commando unit, as the sides deepened joint mechanisms between the two navies.
Pessimists talk about Israel, Greece, Cyprus, and some European countries uniting against Turkey and Egypt.
In either scenario, Israel’s navy is looking into new tactics, including defending against naval drone swarms, something that is already a major threat by air.
On April 16, the navy revealed that one of the untold stories of Israel’s wars since 2023 has been the new cutting-edge activities and cooperation between the naval Operations Directorate, Shayetet 13, the Mossad, and the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency).
The Post understands that while in the past there were frequent meetings and exchanges between the Air Force and senior Mossad officials, including visits to each other’s headquarters to plan joint operations, this has increased substantially with the Naval Operations Directorate now also involved.
The navy has said that in mid-April, Shayetet 13 invaded Naqoura in Lebanon from the sea, the first time such an operation had occurred in Lebanon since 2000.
A new attitude by the IDF toward forward-leaning defense
According to the military, this move was made as part of a new attitude adopted by the IDF and the navy after October 7: a forward-leaning approach to defense.
While for the ground forces, this has manifested itself in the creation of buffer zones in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria, for the navy it has meant special forces carrying out higher-risk and more aggressive operations behind enemy lines.
Without revealing dates and locations, the navy also disclosed that in one case, it sent five Shayetet 13 special forces soldiers on a mission thousands of kilometers away from Israel with no support and no immediate rescue plan if there were complications.
Shayetet 13 is being sent to parts of the world where it has never operated before
In yet another vaguely described mission, the navy said it sent Shayetet 13 on a mission to a part of the world where it has never operated before. The navy said that its joint operations with the Mossad have hit new levels of cooperation in recent years.
While the navy will not confirm specific locations, defense sources indicated that there is nowhere Israeli soldiers operate where Shayetet 13 cannot operate.
This came after reports to the navy that Shaldag operated in Masyaf, Syria, in September 2024; that Shaldag and special forces rescue units operated in Iraq during periods between 2024 and 2026 according to foreign sources; and that Ethiopian-Israeli soldiers operated a special unit in Somaliland in 2026, according to foreign sources.
The navy has also been notoriously evasive about its involvement against the Yemeni Houthis, but in June 2025 it made a rare admission that two of Israel’s navy missile boats, one of them a Sa’ar 6, fired two long-range precision missiles from hundreds of kilometers away at the Houthi port in Hodeidah.
The IDF said that the explosive power of sea-to-land missiles would leave a lasting mark and promote a different kind of deterrence than air-to-ground bombs.
Involving the navy and the Operations Directorate is part of Israel’s broader strategy to deter foreign ships from using or approaching the port, given that naval vessels can remain in the area and strike repeatedly, much more easily than aircraft, which must attack and then immediately fly back to base, lest they run out of fuel.
In addition, the navy, given its capability to remain at sea for an extended period, can be more precise about the ideal operational moment to strike.
Back in June 2025, the IDF said there would be more naval operations against the Houthis in the future, without specifying a time frame.
When asked whether Shayetet 13 had any role in naval operations against the Houthis, senior defense sources have a twinkle and a glint in their eye and like to say that the Houthis at the Port of al-Salif and other ports dread the Israel Navy.
Shayetet 13 commandos themselves, as demonstrated by the confirmed Shayetet 13 operation in Lebanon from mid-April, are always clear that they are ready to operate wherever they are needed.
In addition, the Naval Operations and Intelligence Directorates have been assisting the IDF Southern Command more frequently than ever in targeting whatever remains of Hamas’s naval commandos and its efforts to rejuvenate them.
Even in the last week, more Hamas naval commandos have been killed.
How is it that with likely around 25,000 Hamas terrorists killed by the IDF, a Hamas naval force still exists?
The Post has learned that the Navy’s Operations Directorate believes that as long as there is even one Hamas fighter with a knife and sufficient naval gear to swim undetected onto Israeli shores, the Israeli navy will view them as a threat.
Hamas also lacks the real ships and fancier gear that it had pre-2023, and the Post has learned that the IDF has not recently detected Hamas naval commandos conducting training drills, probably out of fear that they would be quickly targeted.
(According to the IDF, that assessment is likely accurate.)
However, the IDF suspects that enough Hamas individuals are acting in concert clandestinely and concealing naval gear that could be used for smaller-scale terror attacks from the sea, bypassing meticulous land-border defenses, that the Israel Navy feels it must continue to hunt them down to save Israeli lives.
Regarding targeting operations themselves, in some instances the navy provides the basic intelligence on targets, with the air force carrying out the attack, while in others, the navy itself manages the attack, which has also occurred recently.