A case of ad hoc management

During the war the General Staff still did not make an effort to fill in the missing aspects of a clear plan of action.

By REBECCA ANNA STOIL
halutz olmert peretz (photo credit: IDF [file])
halutz olmert peretz
(photo credit: IDF [file])
One of the major criticisms offered by the Winograd Committee of the IDF's performance was that it was managed in an improvised or "rolling" manner. The committee clarified this term, explaining it as "the lack of formulation of an updated operational plan," with "a basket of standing orders" describing responses to an increase in violence on the Lebanese border. "The fact that there was no practiced and updated operational plan caused serious damage to the readiness of all of the military staffs and of the relevant forces to deal with events as they developed," wrote the committee in its final report. Furthermore, it added, during the war - even when it became clear that the conflict would continue - the General Staff still did not make an effort to fill in the missing aspects of a clear plan of action. This lack of a plan, committee members found, was directly opposed to both IDF doctrine as well as to what they termed "common sense." As a result, the report said, the highest levels of the IDF acted in response to "localized incidents" and "mainly in response to incidents in which our forces suffered casualties" rather than sticking to a general plan that apparently simply didn't exist.