On November 15, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) celebrated his 90th birthday (the actual date is four months later, but he chose to mark it on Palestinian Independence Day).
The elderly president has served for more than 20 years and is one of the three most prominent leaders of the modern Palestinian system, along with Hajj Amin al-Husseini and Yasser Arafat. He is also one of the oldest rulers in the Middle East.
Against this background, the question of the day after Abu Mazen – an issue that has been discussed for two decades – is being pointedly raised once again.
Abbas suffers from a poor public image, mainly due to accusations of corruption and political degeneration. In almost all public opinion polls over the past decade, more than 80% of the Palestinian public has supported his resignation.
The last of the founding generation of the Palestinian national movement, he personally experienced the 1948 Nakba, or “catastrophe,” marking the flight and expulsion of an estimated 700,000 Palestinians from Israel more than seven decades ago. However, he is seen as a political “dinosaur” who has failed to achieve strategic successes – primarily Palestinian independence – and to develop a dialogue with the younger generation.
Who is next?
The gallery of candidates for Abbas’s succession largely reflects the dismal state of the Palestinian political system. It is an almost permanent group of figures who are gradually aging. The monolithic picture stems from Abbas’s unwillingness to develop a discussion on the question of the day after (like many Middle Eastern leaders who fear internal subversion) and from the collective despair gripping the Palestinian public, most of whom are not interested in the political game and do not believe that a breakthrough or good news will emerge in the post-Abbas era.
Hussein al-Sheikh, who serves as Abbas’s de facto deputy and is secretary of the Palestine Liberation Organization’s Executive Committee, is the most talked-about name as a possible successor.
Recently, apparently under US pressure to implement reforms in the Palestinian Authority, he was named as interim president in the event of Abbas’s sudden absence until elections can be held.
Al-Sheikh has close ties with Israel (and, like Abu Mazen, is careful to maintain coordination with it) and with the US, but he also suffers from a negative public image. Most grievances against him stem from accusations of corruption and the perception that he appeases Israel and avoids confrontation. The latest opinion polls show support for him at 1% to 3%.
Popular from prison
Another prominent personality in the future presidential race is Marwan Barghouti, a senior leader of the Fatah Movement who has been imprisoned in Israel since 2002 after being sentenced to five life terms for terror attacks he orchestrated.
Barghouti embodies a strategic catch-22 for both the Palestinian Authority and Israel. According to all public opinion polls, the imprisoned leader has broad public support and, if he runs for president, is likely to defeat any other candidate from his and Abbas’s Fatah political party, or from Hamas.
His popularity persists even though most Palestinians, especially those born after he was imprisoned, do not know him personally. Yet they see him as a symbol of resistance, or muqawama, against Israel and of the prisoner movement.
Barghouti’s family, particularly his wife, Fadwa, has worked to cultivate his legacy, drawing a parallel between him and South African anti-apartheid leader Nelson Mandela. Recently, the family launched an international campaign demanding his release from jail.
This even prompted a statement from US President Donald Trump last month calling for Israel to discuss the “Barghouti issue.” While the president did not elaborate on exactly what he meant, it was clearly a hint at the need to consider releasing the Fatah leader, with the understanding that he could serve as an effective PA president. This, despite Barghouti’s life sentences in Israel and the fact that the PA’s top brass – particularly his main rival, Hussein al-Sheikh – have no interest in his release.
Still, Barghouti’s bid for the presidency would create many dilemmas for Israel. If he is elected while behind bars, that could lead to international pressure for his release to stabilize the Palestinian system. If he is elected after being released – whether he returns to his home in Ramallah or is expelled from the territories – new dilemmas could arise.
On the one hand, Barghouti has at times signaled support for a two-state vision for Israelis and Palestinians. On the other hand, he adheres to a violent struggle against Israel until Palestinian independence is realized – and he maintains close ties with Hamas. (The terrorist group even sought to secure his release during recent ceasefire negotiations in Gaza.)
It is possible that once released, he would strive to promote reconciliation between the two Palestinian factions, enabling Hamas to integrate into the ruling Palestinian establishment and possibly even take control of it.
In addition to these two prominent candidates – one establishment and unpopular, the other anti-establishment and popular – there are several candidates whose chances are slim but who make up the fabric of the Palestinian political arena.
Jibril Rajoub, secretary of Fatah’s central committee, has support in the Hebron area but has no connection with Israel due to his militant positions. Muhammad Dahlan has support in the Gaza Strip but was expelled from Fatah by Abu Mazen on suspicion of subversion. Nasser al-Kidwa is a former foreign minister and is Yasser Arafat’s nephew. And Salam Fayyad served as Palestinian prime minister from 2007 to 2013 and had good relations with Israel and the international community, but he has limited public support and strained relations with senior Fatah officials.
Day after scenarios
On the day after Abu Mazen, several negative scenarios could arise, such as violent succession struggles within the Fatah faction; the awakening of a “Palestinian Spring” led by young Palestinians seeking to undermine the government in Ramallah; or an attempt by Hamas to shock the Palestinian Authority through military action or public protest and establish a foothold in part or all of the West Bank.
A more optimistic scenario for both sides is that a collective leadership will take over for a transitional period, operating without internal rivalries or domestic protests and maintaining proper relations with Israel and the international community.
Israel must prepare for any scenario and must learn from history that attempts to crown leaders on bayonets usually end in tragedy. One example is Bashir Gemayel and the Phalanges in Lebanon; another is the “village associations” set up in the Palestinian territories in the 1970s and 1980s.
Additionally, Israel must prevent dangerous scenarios, primarily the rapid development of democratic elections in the Palestinian system – a scenario that, given Fatah’s weaknesses, could lead to a Hamas victory similar to the 2006 elections.
In the meantime, Israel should ensure the preservation of stable civilian life in the West Bank, even though that should not be a long-term strategic goal but rather an intermediate step toward deeper discussions about the future of relations with the Palestinians.
Israel must also draw lessons from the trauma of October 7, chiefly that the Palestinian issue cannot be avoided through “conflict management” or “economic peace,” which tend to end in unexpected disasters.■
Michael Milshtein is head of the Forum for Palestinian Studies at the Dayan Center, Tel Aviv University.