In addition to the Winograd Committee's general criticism of the IDF's highest echelons for failing to take the state of the home front into consideration, it devoted a subheading to the issue of reducing the rocket fire against civilian targets. "Although the rocket fire began in the first day of the conflict, and although the fire was expected in advance according to all plans (a fact to which the political echelon agrees), no instruction appeared in either the General Staff or the Northern Command to operate directly against rocket fire during the first stage of the war," it said. In fact, the Winograd Committee found that the first time that the topic was directly mentioned as a key goal was on August 4, in the fourth week of the war, as planners began to consider divisional roles in the proposed ground offensive "Change of Direction 9." Even after that decision, the forces being prepared for the assault were not directed to act against rocket launchers, "and thus did not influence any reduction in the scale of Hizbullah rocket fire." Similarly, the use of IDF artillery against rocket launch sites "did not bring good results." Ultimately, the war did nothing to reduce Hizbullah's ability to fire short-range rockets. In fact, rocket fire continued to rain down on the beleaguered northern town of Kiryat Shmona until the final day of the conflict. The report did offer one ray of light when it noted that "in places where the [IDF] forces were temporarily located - in the framework of raids - Hizbullah rocket fire was reduced." But as soon as the troops left, "the rocket fire was renewed."