As 53% of Americans view Israel unfavorably, alliance architecture must be rebuilt - analysis

However, the “special relationship” between Israel and the United States – a term coined by president John F. Kennedy in 1962 – is once again at a crossroads and needs to be recalibrated for the sake of the future of both countries.

The goal should be to craft a relationship that reduces Israel’s dependence on American taxpayers’ money, while preserving both the American commitment to Israel’s qualitative military edge, and Israel’s diplomatic freedom of action in an arena that will remain fraught with risks.

The US-Israel relationship has long been based on shared values, common interests, and support in the political arena. However, today 53% of Americans say they view Israel “very unfavorably,” according to polls conducted by the Pew Research Center.

This is partly the result of orchestrated information campaigns about “starvation” and “genocide” in Gaza. Once the signature of left-wing circles and parts of America’s Muslim communities, that view gained momentum in the broader population due to the way in which the war was portrayed by the mainstream media and, even more so, on social networks and in academic discourse.

In addition, attitudes toward Israel have gradually become part of a much broader set of social issues that are splitting American society.

Among those in the woke camp, Palestinians are marked as oppressed and are equated with a broad group of ethnic minorities in the US, such as undocumented immigrants, women, and LGBTQ persons. This is despite the glaring absurdity of connecting sympathy for Hamas with demands for gender equality.

Jews, unless they adopt an anti-Zionist line, are immediately labeled as “white oppressors” with no place in legitimate discourse, in academia, or online.

Alongside these complexities, the considerations driving Trump’s approach to Israel are fundamentally business-like, focused on what directly serves US interests.

We may term this posture “transactional internationalism.” More than anything, Trump aims to preserve America’s stature as the world’s leading military power and to counter China’s impressive rise, even though that may sometimes involve risks for Israel.

That was the framing that led to Trump’s bombing of major nuclear sites in Iran in June, directly joining an Israeli military operation, and completing it where Israeli capabilities fell short.

Trump’s willingness to cross the threshold into direct action shows the extent to which he has embraced the understanding that America faces a global enemy in the strategic alignment of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

But this approach comes with risks and costs for Israel. For example, Israel was pressured into ending its June military campaign in Iran shortly after the US attacks, leaving some of the Islamic regime’s ballistic missile capability intact.

Until recently, there was still reason to believe that the ability of Israel’s friends to drive relevant legislation through Congress remained unchallenged, despite the public mood already described and the deepening partisan rifts.

However, several pillars of the Democratic Party – including Jews and others who have consistently supported Israel – have shifted to a path of escalating criticism, and even calls for cuts in aid to Israel.

All of this comes as some Republicans also adopt worrying positions. Some out of explicit or implicit antisemitism; others due to principled, isolationist-tinged opposition to foreign aid in all its forms. In certain circumstances, practical convergence between them and the progressive Left could impede legislative moves that Israel and its friends seek to advance.

The fissures outlined above began to appear before October 7, and they demand attention at the highest policy level in Israel and the United States.

At the administrative level, Israel needs a dedicated national coordination body for US relations in all facets. Preferably, such a body would be within Israel’s National Security Council, in order to assess the full range of inputs (defense, intelligence, diplomacy, economics, public affairs, and those relating to the Jewish community), integrate them, and chart a balanced and consistent policy.

At the level of diplomacy and international relations, Israel needs to highlight its contribution to advancing US strategic interests against adversaries who are also against Israel. Importantly, this includes Israel’s recent successful use of military force against Iran, Hamas, and Hezbollah.

At the same time, the US and Israel need to chart a course from the current military aid framework to a model of collaboration in cutting-edge technologies that benefit both countries.

The US needs to preserve its commitment to Israel’s qualitative military edge and recognize that a country with a per-capita GDP higher than that of both Germany and Japan can meet its defense requirements through domestic production in some cases, and through joint ventures in others.

Israel and the US should also further adopt a systematic policy of deepening the links between the two countries’ military and intelligence establishments. Among other advantages, it is notable that these institutions maintain functional continuity during political transitions.

Difficult as it may be in the current climate to restrain an ambitious, aggressive US administration, Israel must renew efforts to restore the traditional congressional anchor on both sides of the aisle. Israel must not forfeit Democratic support – or at least the support of most mainstream Democrats.

All of this must be accompanied by a fundamental shift in Israel’s conduct toward American Jewry, with greater attentiveness to positions that will shape future attitudes toward Israel. There should be increased investment in engaging younger generations, confronting challenges on campuses, and efforts to put to rest the notion that Israel deliberately ignores most components of North American Jewry. The road connecting these two halves of the Jewish people in the 21st century must be a two-way street.■