At first glance, the Arab position on the ongoing US-Israel war with Iran appears incoherent. Gulf Arab states have absorbed Iranian missile and drone attacks on critical infrastructure, yet none of them have retaliated militarily, while maintaining open diplomatic channels with Tehran.
Egypt, historically the “big sister” of the Arabs and the traditional strategic anchor of the Middle East, has remained conspicuously absent, even from mediation, while its public discourse, religious institutions, and parliament have expressed support for the Iranian regime, mainly because its antagonist in this war is Israel.
What appears as passivity is, in fact, a strategy. Arab states are allowing the war to reshape Iran’s future while preserving their own strategic position, economic leverage, and political autonomy.
Their tacit approval of the US naval blockade on the Strait of Hormuz underscores this logic. Introduced after the collapse of ceasefire talks, the blockade is meant to escalate pressure on Tehran without a full-scale ground operation.
Publicly, Arab leaders insist this is not their war, despite Iran’s direct targeting of their security and economic interests.
Beyond the public positions, Arab states are mostly supportive of the US-Israel war against the Iranian regime. They only differ with the US on the strategy and endgame.
Ironically, they are more in agreement with Israel’s vision of totally dismantling the Iranian regime than they agree with the US endeavors to find someone within the Iranian regime who can replicate the example of Delcy Rodriguez in Venezuela.
Arabs are not interested in which party emerges victorious out of this war. Iran is not going anywhere after being defeated, and it will continue to be the closest neighbor geographically to the Gulf states. Therefore, their main priority is to make sure that post-war Iran will not be as powerful of a threat as it is right now.
Economic battlefield
In that sense, the US blockade of the Strait of Hormuz plays very well into the hands of Arabs. It transformed the conflict from a direct military confrontation into a war of economic strangulation and controlled escalation. It is precisely the kind of shift Arab states have quietly been waiting for.
The United States has operationalized a full maritime blockade targeting Iranian trade, with warships intercepting vessels and forcing several to turn back, effectively cutting off Iran’s access to global markets.
Simultaneously, Washington has reinforced its military presence in the Gulf with thousands of additional troops and multiple carrier groups, signaling readiness for escalation.
This strategy shift has redefined the nature of the war in a way that gives wealthy Gulf Arab states leverage. Iran’s core strength has never been traditional warfare. Its power lies in its ability to destabilize the region through asymmetric escalation that ranges from mining waterways and targeting energy infrastructure in neighboring states to activating proxy networks.
The naval blockade reverses the equation. It targets the Iranian regime’s economic survival, depriving it of hundreds of millions of dollars in daily revenue, while minimizing opportunities to impose reciprocal costs on its neighbors. For Gulf states, this is the optimal battlefield.
Arab countries have already demonstrated their capacity to absorb and intercept Iranian attacks without collapsing. Their advanced air and missile defense systems have enabled them to maintain internal stability despite repeated strikes. Entering a direct war, however, would expose their cities, energy infrastructure, and economic lifelines to sustained disruption.
Strategic calculus
The current configuration enables Arabs to achieve three strategic objectives simultaneously.
First, they contain the war geographically. Iran has attempted, since the first days of the conflict, to expand the battlefield by targeting Gulf states’ infrastructure and threatening shipping lanes. However, without a reciprocal Arab military response, Tehran has failed to turn these attacks into a region-wide war. The conflict remains largely confined to US-Iran and Israel-Iran dynamics.
Second, they preserve economic continuity under strain. Despite the near-paralysis of the Strait of Hormuz, which carries about one-fifth of the global oil supply, Gulf states have avoided systemic collapse. Even as oil prices surge and shipping routes are disrupted, they retain the ability to operate, adapt, and turn the crisis to their advantage.
Third, they outsource escalation while retaining influence. By allowing the United States to lead the coercive dimension of the war, Gulf states avoid direct entanglement while still shaping outcomes. Their cooperation – whether logistical, intelligence-based, or political – remains indispensable to US operations, even if it is not publicly acknowledged.
On another front, Egypt’s position, often interpreted as an absence, reflects a different but complementary logic. Cairo is not a frontline actor in the Hormuz theater, nor is it directly exposed to Iranian strikes in the same way as the Gulf states. Egypt’s strategic vulnerability lies in global trade disruption, energy price shocks, and the stability of the Suez Canal corridor.
Therefore, Egypt’s restraint is not indifference but risk management. By avoiding direct involvement, Cairo preserves its ability to function as a stabilizing actor in the postwar phase. Its strategic calculation is that influence will matter more after the war than during it, when reconstruction, regional realignment, and new security arrangements begin to take shape.
This also explains the apparent contradiction between public rhetoric and state behavior. Expressions of sympathy toward Iran in Egyptian public discourse do not translate into policy alignment. They serve domestic and regional signaling purposes, while the state maintains a cautious distance from the conflict.
Power redefined
In the Middle East today, the era of symbolic confrontation, when wars were fought for ideological legitimacy, is giving way to a more pragmatic model of statecraft and inter-state affairs. Power is no longer measured by participation in conflict but by the ability to shape its trajectory while minimizing exposure.
Egyptians call it “strategic balance” – the deliberate choice to let others fight the decisive battles, while ensuring that the outcome aligns with long-term national interests. Weakening Iran does not require a direct war, and survival in a volatile region depends on managing risk, not amplifying it.
Watching the flags of Lebanon and Israel flying side by side in Washington in mid-April as peace talks between the two countries’ ambassadors took place was the clearest manifestation yet of this new regional realignment. Freeing Lebanon from Iranian enslavement and setting Lebanon and Israel on a path to a better future as real neighbors is a game changer for the Middle East.
A Lebanon-Israel peace agreement would reset the Middle East to the great momentum of peace that we witnessed for a second before the October 7 attacks.
However, the danger lies in the long term. As the US intensifies its military and economic pressure on Iran, Arab states risk becoming structurally dependent on American escalation cycles. The more successful this model proves, the harder it will be to disentangle from it.
Nonetheless, the current trajectory presents a rare strategic opportunity. If the pressure campaign significantly degrades Iran’s capabilities – through internal fragmentation, economic collapse, or negotiated constraints – the economically powerful Gulf states could emerge from this war in a stronger position than they forcibly entered it. They would have neutralized their most persistent regional threat without sacrificing stability or sovereignty.
This is the paradox at the heart of the Arab position today, and it is the one shaping the future of the Middle East. ■
Dalia Ziada is a Middle East scholar and Washington, DC, coordinator at the Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy (ISGAP).