Thousands of members of the Druze community in Sweida in southern Syria were massacred and looted in July. What began as the local murder of a young Druze man in Damascus quickly escalated into a wave of kidnappings, mass killings, and large-scale attacks by pro-Turkish militias and local Bedouin elements.
These crimes were documented and spread on social media as part of a terrorist campaign. The population still remains under a brutal siege – and the world is silent.
“At the time, I said that when [former Syrian president Bashar] Assad falls, Israel should lower its flag to half-mast; I was not mistaken,” Dr. Anan Wahabi, a colonel in the IDF reserves and a fellow at Reichman University’s International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) in Herzliya, told Walla.
Wahabi served in the IDF Intelligence Directorate, commanded operational units, and headed Israel’s international strategic perception, psychological warfare, and cyberwarfare efforts.
“There’s a de facto siege on the Druze there,” he said.
“It’s a terrorist attack on the Druze,” he added, drawing parallels to the October 7 massacre: “It’s terrorism from the same source that justifies murder, rape, and looting.”
The ICT warned in a position paper that Israel cannot allow hostile terrorist forces to gain a foothold on its northern border. The question is not whether to intervene – but how.
Sweida has become “the arena the world forgot,” but Israel cannot ignore it. For the Jewish state, this is a double test: a test of morality toward the Druze community, which is facing an existential crisis; and strategic, regarding threats to its northern border and the regional tensions as a whole.
The ICT warned that over-involvement could drag Israel into a war of attrition in Syria, further damage relations with Turkey, and even ignite internal protests among Druze citizens of Israel – potentially leading to refusal to serve in the security forces.
The position paper was initiated by Prof. Boaz Ganor, Reichman University’s president, a pioneer in the academic study of terrorism, and founder of the ICT. It was prepared by eight ICT fellows, including Wahabi.
But if Israel sits on the sidelines, terrorist organizations could entrench themselves near the border, and southern Syria could become a base for attacks. On the diplomatic front, there are concerns that the new regime led by President Ahmed al-Sharaa could exploit the crisis to build international legitimacy as a “terrorist in a suit.”
On the other hand, the report cites the diplomatic potential in this tectonic shift. Israel could cultivate ties with Arab groups in preparation for “the day after” the Israel-Hamas War, strengthen its commitment to the Druze within Israel, and send a message of solidarity to all minorities in Syria, which could contribute to stabilizing southern areas of the country, strengthen the moderate regional bloc led by Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and secure its position as a central partner in a broad regional settlement led by the United States.
US Rep. Abraham Hamadeh (R-Arizona), a former US Army Reserve intelligence officer, made the first visit in decades by a US official traveling between Jerusalem and Damascus. He spent six hours in Syria last week to meet with Sharaa.
Hamadeh also addressed the need for a secure humanitarian corridor to ensure safe delivery of medical and humanitarian aid to Sweida – explicitly to advance President Donald Trump’s “peace through strength” policy and to push Syria at this time toward normalization with Israel and joining the Abraham Accords.
Until that happens, the report warned, overt Israeli involvement could be perceived as “stamping an Israeli mark” on the Druze, making them even more isolated within Syria. Images coming from Syria of Druze waving the Israeli flag in gratitude for Israel’s support are being framed in Syria and the Arab world as collusion with the enemy.
Act cautiously, combine aid, diplomacy, limited military action
The report details a series of steps Israel should adopt:
1. Controlled humanitarian aid: Expand shipments of medicine and food, but via international mechanisms (Red Crescent, UN) to avoid harming the Druze.
2. Limited military action: Avoid inserting ground forces, and carry out only precise airstrikes in case of a direct threat to the border or the Druze.
3. Diplomatic measures: Maintain close coordination with the US, UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, but also keep a secret dialogue channel with Turkey to avoid direct confrontation.
4. Information campaign: Expose the massacres through international media, mainly Al Jazeera, and counter propaganda portraying the Druze as “Israel’s proxy.”
5. Managing expectations with Israel’s Druze: Establish a joint command room with community leadership, allow legitimate protest, but set redlines against attempts at independent action across the border.
6. Caution regarding autonomy: Israel shouldn’t lead the initiative; instead, it should support it indirectly through civilian aid to avoid stigmatizing the Druze or provoking retribution.
The emerging humanitarian corridor could serve as an interim solution – if managed carefully with broad coordination and discretion. Ultimately, the real question is not only whether Israel will help the Druze, but how it will do so without making them even more isolated in their homeland.
Wahabi believes that funding from Turkey and Qatar, which works to incriminate Israel’s activities in Gaza, is working day and night to divert international attention away from what is happening in Syria.
“First, they created the crisis by essentially renewing an old historic conflict between the Druze and the Bedouin of Jabal al-Druze,” Wahabi said. “Along with that came a supposedly spontaneous call for help to the tribes and all of Syria – and suddenly, forces arrive in large numbers from Turkish-controlled areas, with new vehicles, equipment, weapons, fuel, salaries, everything.
“Israel views this area as a demilitarized zone, but suddenly, there’s this side story, an interim situation that no one quite knows how to handle.”