Sound the trumpets! Middle East peace has arrived because the US, Israel, the Saudis, Egypt, Qatar, and even Pakistan have signed on to US President Donald Trump’s new plan.
Yet there’s one problem that much of the commentary on the plan ignored: Not only has Hamas not signed on, but it was not consulted.
Not much of the international community likes Hamas. But they are the ones holding 48 Israeli hostages, 20 of whom are confirmed alive. That means any deal they will not agree to will not happen.
So the hope is here that Qatar will finally crack down on the Hamas leaders it hosts as guests and that, along with the pressure Hamas is feeling from the IDF destroying Gaza City, the terror group will finally call it a day and come to terms with the new balance of power realities created by the war.
But what if Hamas refuses, or if there are weeks or longer of negotiations, with Monday’s rollout just being the start to the process?
In that case, the IDF is expected to continue taking over the second half of Gaza City (it has already taken over around 50%), and many more than the already 1,250 buildings destroyed in the area will be destroyed.
One interesting twist could be if Trump asks Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to destroy fewer buildings for the coming weeks in case there is an agreement so that the price tag on rebuilding will not have jumped right before a deal.
Yet, that does not seem to be Trump’s or Netanyahu’s style, both men liking to put on maximum pressure in negotiations.
Much of Gaza City's civilian population has evacuated
Around 800,000 of the one million Palestinian civilians who were there a few weeks ago have already evacuated.
Whether the last 200,000 or so will leave or whether some significant portion of them will stay, either because they are hardcore Hamas terrorists or civilians who have trouble evacuating (elderly and families with young children), is an open question.
The IDF has taken over portions of Gaza City multiple times, and each time, somewhere between 100,000-250,000 (the IDF’s final numbers down to that level were unclear) Gazans always stayed.
So the civilian status situation may not change radically.
The biggest mystery is likely how many Hamas terrorists will be killed. To date, it appears that fewer than 200 have been killed since the Gaza City invasion started. The presumption is that many or most Hamas fighters have already fled the city under the guise of the mass civilian exodus.
But after every evacuation from every region of Gaza, some Hamas forces always remained behind to conduct guerrilla warfare. The IDF will eventually corral and arrest or kill those stragglers who stay behind to fight.
However, will this be a mere 30 at a time, as in Beit Hanun further north, the last “large” battle with an organized Hamas force in May? Or will more of the hardcore 2,000-2,500 remaining Hamas fighters put up a fight, as happened earlier in the war during the fall 2023 invasion of Gaza City, the late 2024 invasion of Khan Yunis, and the summer 2024 invasion of Rafah?
The precarious status of the remaining hostages
Another mystery will be the impact on the hostages.
IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Eyal Zamir opposed the current invasion of Gaza City, believing that it would endanger some of the remaining Israeli hostages.
So far, despite over 2,000 aerial and artillery strikes on Gaza City in recent weeks and despite two weeks of ground forces operations, there are no confirmed reports of hostages being harmed.
Will this no-harm-to-hostages record continue as the IDF takes over all of Gaza City and limits where the terrorists can flee and hide with the hostages?
Lastly is the question of harm to Israeli soldiers fighting Hamas.
To date, the harm to Israeli soldiers has been minimal, but it has been far from zero, with at least two instances in the last month where the terror group managed to penetrate Israeli positions.
Will more such penetrations occur as the IDF expands the number of static positions needed to maintain control over more areas, or will the military figure out new and improved tactics to avoid recurrent Hamas penetrations?
Throughout all of this, Hamas has managed to maintain a small amount of rocket fire on the Gaza envelope. But as long as they do not manage to harm anyone, much of the country seems ready to ignore this, even if there is regular disruption of the lives of those residing near the enclave.
Analyzing all of these data points together, it appears that if Hamas rejects or draws out negotiations regarding the Trump plan, continued IDF operations in Gaza City will increase Israeli leverage over Hamas but only gradually and not necessarily in a particularly dramatic fashion.