Voices from the Arab press: Extending the ceasefire without Iran's supreme leader

Assessing the extension of the ceasefire with Iran is inseparable from understanding the deeper meaning of the absence of supreme leader Ali Khamenei, a figure whose role approached sanctity within Iran’s political structure. This is not merely a leadership transition but a structural test of the system established since 1979. The uncertainty surrounding his successor – lacking comparable religious authority or political weight – intensifies the moment, especially amid ambiguity about his actual role in decision-making.

The doctrine of Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist was never administrative; it fused political authority with religious legitimacy, so any disruption does not just create a vacuum but forces a reconfiguration of power itself. Historically, Iran relied on a supreme authority balancing the Revolutionary Guard, elected bodies, and clerical institutions. Its erosion produces not smooth transition but competing centers of power, redefining “national interest,” weakening cohesion, and increasing strategic unpredictability.

The Revolutionary Guard emerges as the most capable actor to fill the gap, not only militarily but as a vast security-economic network. But its rise fragments authority rather than stabilizing it, privileging execution over coherence and risking incoherent strategy, especially as negotiators may lack a full sovereign mandate.

Simultaneously, the decline of mediating figures like Ali Larijani, former speaker of the Parliament, removes mechanisms that once absorbed tensions, making conflict within decision structures sharper and less containable.

This internal fragmentation directly shapes foreign policy: negotiations with Washington become extensions of incomplete domestic decision-making rather than coherent diplomacy, complicating implementation of any agreement – especially given US demands on enrichment, missile programs, and strategic assets. Washington thus adopts a dual approach of military deterrence and economic pressure, anchoring its Gulf presence while managing rather than resolving conflict.

In this environment, reopening the strait – rather than achieving comprehensive peace – appears the maximum realistic outcome. The result is a prolonged security equation: entrenched US military presence vs Iran’s leverage through disruption, producing enduring instability and recurring cycles of escalation rather than resolution, with global economic consequences that continue to accumulate.

– Amr Helmy

Reports from Israeli outlet i24NEWS suggest Netanyahu could travel to Washington within weeks, “if the security situation allows,” a caveat that has fueled speculation about renewed conflict even as Israeli strikes against Hezbollah intensify following alleged ceasefire violations.

Meanwhile, Israel continues advancing plans for a buffer zone in southern Lebanon, effectively reshaping post-2000 realities after its withdrawal under UN Resolution 425. Broader Israeli strategic thinking, as reflected in The Economist, reveals internal doubts: former intelligence minister Dan Meridor, quoted by the journal, acknowledged the public’s desire for total victory despite unrealistic objectives, warning that reliance on military solutions alone invites failure.

Analysts note that the only remaining constraint may be Trump’s influence. Ultimately, all roads lead back to Washington, where the Iranian file oscillates between escalation and negotiation, with Hezbollah positioned as a potential lever for expanding conflict. The looming date of May 17, 2026, thus becomes more than symbolic: a possible turning point where past failed peace efforts meet present ambitions for a new regional order – raising the question of whether tentative diplomatic images could evolve into a historic summit. – Ahmed Ayash ■

Since the outbreak of war on February 28, navigation through the Strait of Hormuz – through which roughly 30% of global oil exports, 20% of liquefied natural gas, and significant shares of fertilizers and petrochemicals pass – has nearly halted, triggering severe economic disruption. In 2025 alone, some 30,000 vessels crossed the strait, carrying over $600 billion in energy exports. Prolonged closure could push global losses beyond $8 trillion annually.

With Islamabad talks stalled, affected states must pursue coordinated international action to reopen the passage rather than allowing it to remain hostage to negotiations marked by deep divisions – not only between Washington and Tehran but within Iran itself.

Public disputes between the Revolutionary Guard and civilian officials underscore internal fragmentation, intensified by war, over both negotiation substance and the very principle of engaging the US. Trump’s extension of a temporary ceasefire aimed to allow Tehran to unify its stance, yet was quickly undermined by Iranian attacks on commercial vessels and continued rejection of reopening the strait under ongoing US naval pressure.

Allowing Iran to control an international waterway would set a dangerous precedent unseen since Portuguese dominance in the 16th-17th centuries, ended only by international intervention, after which international law prohibited such control.

Even if talks resume and yield agreement, they may be partial or delayed, especially since Iran seeks leverage ahead of US elections while Washington presses for concessions. In this context, Gulf states and other affected countries must prioritize neutralizing the strait through international mechanisms grounded in maritime law.

A proposed UN Security Council resolution reflects this approach, though blocked by Russia and China – despite both now facing consequences of closure. Alternative initiatives, such as the UK-French-led Hormuz coalition, remain contingent on a durable ceasefire, leaving uncertainty about timing. Thus, only a UN-backed framework offers a viable path to ensuring free navigation, potentially establishing a model for other strategic waterways.

Sometimes a single image can define the political meaning of an event in a country like Lebanon. Against the backdrop of more than a million displaced people and the rubble of over 55 towns and villages in the south, the Islamic Republic chose Beirut, Lebanon’s capital, to commemorate the 40th day since the death of supreme leader Ali Khamenei, who was killed in US-Israeli strikes on February 28.

The scene itself reflects audacity of the highest order, especially as Iran’s Ambassador Mohammad Reza Raouf Sheibani – deemed persona non grata by the Lebanese government – sat prominently in the front row, despite never having formally presented his credentials to the government. His continued presence alone signals the extent of Iranian disregard for Lebanon and its people, rooted in a broader sense of regional superiority.

The image of those seated in the front row, including Lebanon’s health minister and representatives of Hezbollah within the government, distills Tehran’s ongoing bet on maintaining control over Lebanon and preserving it as a strategic asset. It underscores Iran’s insistence that it has not withdrawn and remains ready to challenge the Lebanese state while demonstrating its enduring influence.

This approach is not new; it dates back to the Revolutionary Guard’s arrival in Ba’albek in 1982, when it established a foothold under the pretext of confronting Israel, targeting Lebanese state institutions from the outset.

Over time, Iran expanded its reach through kidnappings, attacks on US assets, and systematic efforts that ultimately drove Washington out of Lebanon, notably after the 1983 bombings of the US embassy and marine barracks. Following Syria’s withdrawal in 2005, Iran effectively filled the vacuum, consolidating its dominance across the country.

Today, however, the image of Khamenei’s commemoration reveals something deeper: an inability to accept that Lebanon may be breaking away from Iran’s orbit amid shifting regional and international realities, especially as conflict has reached Iranian territory after years of projecting power outward through proxies like Hezbollah.