Israel and the United States have hit the Islamic regime harder and across a wider swath of territory in recent days than during the opening phase of the 12-Day War in June, according to new data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) shared with The Jerusalem Post on Monday.
In June, large stretches of southwestern Iran remained largely untouched in the war’s early days. This time, however, Israeli and American strikes have reached deep into and around Hormozgan Province, Sistan and Baluchestan Province, and Khuzestan Province, signaling a broader campaign.
The scope of retaliation has also shifted. During the June attacks, Tehran concentrated its firepower on Israel. Now, the Islamic regime is expanding its response, targeting neighboring countries and US bases across the region.
“Iran will attempt to impose costs across the region through attacks on tourist areas, expat zones, and US bases. Internal chaos is likely in Iran as succession layers are removed and the chain of command fragments. It’s hard to define a timeline, but this presents a high risk of rapid escalation rather than gradual deterioration,” ACLED CEO Prof. Clionadh Raleigh said.
“The US and Israel have said they are pursuing regime change rather than deterrence. In practical terms, the costs of this will be borne by civilians, with a threat to wider regional stability as regional alignment is increasingly fractured. There is clearly potential for wider conflict involving proxy networks,” Raleigh continued.
Right now, the regime is concerned that they do not have the ammunition or launchers to see the continuation of this conflict through, Dr. Menahem Merhavy, a fellow at The Harry S. Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, explained to The Post. The attacks on neighbors are a “desperate” gamble to see if they will pressure the US to end the attacks.
“I think they're taking a very big bet, because at some point, their neighbors might turn against them again, just like their people if they radiate weakness, or people will feel that they're on the brink of collapse,” he continued. “Their neighbors might join in [on the attacks] and it's a huge risk they're taking, and they're taking this risk exactly because of their despair. Really, they're at a desperate moment now.”
The aims of the war
Turning his attention to the aims of the war, Merhavy said that only a change within the regime is a realistic goal at this point, not a new system of governance.
The power structures may change within the regime, and Iranian politician Ali Larijani may become president, or an IRGC official may take control, turning the country into a military dictatorship, but the chances of Iran emerging into a liberal democracy are slim, he claimed.
In recent weeks, leading up to the death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on Sunday, Larijani has been frequently named as a major player in the Iranian political scene. On Sunday, he said a temporary leadership council would be set up to deal with the power vacuum.
Appointed in August as Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), Larijani has held senior jobs throughout a career marked by loyalty to Khamenei and efforts to expand his power. Larijani ran unsuccessfully for president in 2005 and later sought to contest the 2021 and 2024 presidential elections but was barred both times by the Guardian Council, which cited issues including lifestyle standards and family ties abroad.
The regime “will do their best efforts at the moment, to nominate somebody in the place of Khamenei. That's very important,” Merhavy continued, though added there would be security issues with following the constitutional process, as gathering an assembly of senior clerics and officials is too risky. Larjani’s temporary leadership council, he explained, was to fill the gap and mediate the risk of gathering potential targets under a single roof.
In the short term, the temporary council benefits Larjani, Merhavy explained, but the regime still requires a Supreme Leader, a role Larjani is unsuited for. The longer the regime continues without one, the greater the chance of a civilian uprising, continued.
The regime leadership “knows that every day, every hour this extends, it raises the risk of some uprising among the people,” he said. “It won't happen in the next day or two, but maybe a week from now, it's definitely a possibility. When people start to feel that the system is weak enough to challenge it, they will do it.”
10% of the Iranian population support the regime
Raleigh said that only about 10% of the Iranian population is staunch supporters of the regime, echoing claims made by former US Cyber Command top commander Lt. Gen. Charles L. Moore Jr., who told The Post on Sunday that 80% of Iranians want to see the regime replaced.
Perhaps the most noticeable difference between the June war and now are the events preceding it. Iranians have braved the regime’s brutality to protest, at first, against the country’s economic struggles and, later, the brutal and violent repression of demonstrations. Merhavy noted that Khamenei’s death was openly celebrated on the streets of Iran, and now, with the war, the Basij and security forces are too busy to attempt to suppress dissent.
Turning his attention to the internet blackout, similar to those imposed in early January, has prevented civilians from sharing information online about the strike sites and the status of dissent or civilian damage. As it currently stands, much of the information available is based on the regime’s own narratives.
The majority of the population of Iran is part of an” unorganized opposition movement,” Raleigh explained, adding her prediction that the coming weeks and months will “see a risk of local power struggles as central control weakens, bringing with it potential for jailbreaks, defections, and localized violence.”
Prince Reza Pahlavi taking power?
Asked specifically about exiled prince Reza Pahlavi taking power, given his growing presence in Western discussions, Merhavy said he doubted the feasibility of such a plan despite it aligning with Israeli interests.
“I still see him as an anecdote, and not more than that,” he admitted. “As much as I wish that he would take over, and it's definitely as an Israeli a better kind of outcome, but I think it's too ideal to think that he could take over Iran in the foreseeable future.”
More realistic, Merhavy said the “best you can hope for” in Iran is someone from within the Islamic regime” taking the state somewhere less militaristic or less antagonistic… maybe towards the West.”
“Anything beyond that is a little too naive or too optimistic to hope for,” he claimed.
While ACLED noted significant differences in the opening phases of the wars, Merhavy predicted the conflict would be of similar duration, suspecting the regime would “raise a white flag” before risking losing power.
“They will find some kind of compromise,” he predicted, saying that they will likely commit to giving up their nuclear program and whatever is left of their missiles.
Iran pushing US and Israel to all-out war
The regime was unaware of how far they were pushing the US and Israel to all-out war, to threatening its own existence, he continued, but stated that the point was now being “driven home.” Once aware of how dire the situation is, Merhavy predicted that either a politician or a member of the IRGC would seize control and make an agreement with the US.
The Post noted that Iran has failed to maintain multiple agreements and denied access to IAEA monitors multiple times in the past. Asked then how the US or Israel could trust any time of agreement from this regime, and drop its push for a new governance, Merhavy said that it was important to be realistic about what could actually be achieved.
“I think look for now the best you can hope for, and I think we need to be realistic about what we what is achievable here, is for a trauma to this regime that will make it want to stay away from such a situation in years to come,” he said, implying this war needed to devastate the regime so badly that it would refrain from recreating the conditions that led to the conflict.
While he asserted multiple times that he did not believe the US or Israel could overthrow the regime, he said it “will collapse” eventually. In the meantime, he said Larjani may take Iran “into a somewhat less antagonistic, hostile course towards the West, because otherwise they're really facing much harder years than the previous ones.”