The race against time during missile attacks has exposed how private Telegram and WhatsApp systems often outpace Home Front Command alerts, thanks to access to civilian command-and-control systems connected directly to radar-based data.
While the state carries out additional verification checks to avoid false alarms, private operators circulate raw information as soon as the Israeli Air Force identifies an initial indication of a launch.
In an exclusive interview, Liron Bar, developer of the Tzeva Adom (Red Alert) app, explained the mechanism that allows bots to act faster than the official system, while warning about the dangers of partial or inaccurate information reaching the public through these channels.
When a Tzeva Adom siren sounds across Israel, most of the public follows Home Front Command instructions and enters protected spaces. Even so, a widespread phenomenon has developed in recent years: Telegram groups and messaging-app bots reporting missile launches well before the sirens are activated.
Many people wonder how a private individual running a Telegram channel can obtain information before an official military body that operates some of the world’s most advanced radar systems.
The answer, Bar said, lies in information systems shared by the military and civilian bodies, and in the time gap created by the need to verify data before issuing a public alert. Bar said the secret lies in a system known as Shu’al Ezrahi (Civilian Fox), a command-and-control platform developed by Home Front Command and now installed in the emergency operations rooms of many municipalities and major organizations across Israel.
The system is directly connected to Home Front Command data and displays precise map polygons showing where a missile is expected to land and at exactly what time.
According to Bar, the operators of the best-known Telegram channels are effectively serving as conduits for information coming from those same emergency rooms. In some cases, they leak the information themselves. In others, the data is leaked to them from municipal command centers and emergency operations rooms that receive it in real time. The moment someone sees an alert in the Civilian Fox system, they immediately feed it into a bot or group, and within seconds, the information reaches tens of thousands of people.
Military decision-making process reason for delay
The reason these bots and private groups often beat Home Front Command to the punch lies in the military decision-making process. Once radar detects a launch, it passes an initial indication to the Israeli Air Force that a missile is moving toward Israel. That information is then transferred to Home Front Command, which must decide whether to activate the sirens.
Bar said Home Front Command conducts a repeated and careful review before issuing every alert. There are cases, he noted, in which a launch initially appears to be heading toward Jerusalem, but further checks show the missile is expected to fall in Jordan rather than Israel. For that reason, the official system does not send out an alert based only on the first detection. The military prefers to wait a few more seconds to ensure the threat is truly relevant to the population, while private operators distribute the information the moment it appears on the screen in the emergency room.
As the missile’s flight progresses, the indication becomes more accurate. Computerized systems generate a kind of ellipse marking the estimated impact zone, and that area narrows as the missile continues on its path. Bar said that in the past, information was sometimes distributed as much as eight minutes before impact, but modern systems are now more focused. If the public is alerted two minutes before impact, the information is far more accurate regarding the final location.
Early information comes with risks
Although early information may seem appealing, Bar stressed that it comes with real risks. He said he always advises people not to rely on outside apps, even though “knowledge is power.” For some people, he said, early information can do more harm than good, creating unnecessary anxiety, especially when it is not precise.
One of the central problems with these groups, he added, is a kind of telephone-game effect. Bar said he knows operators who pass on information late or in distorted form. An operator may write that an impact is expected in three minutes when, in reality, only one minute remains. For that reason, he said, the unequivocal recommendation is to get information only from the official Home Front Command app. The military system is the only one directly linked to the physical warning sirens, and no private app has that same direct connection.
Another issue raised by the report is the system’s ability to identify missiles that split apart. The Shu’al system includes detailed information about the nature of the threat, including cases in which a missile breaks into multiple warheads or large fragments. Operators in the groups see that information and translate it into quick text alerts for the public.
Still, there are areas where the system is less effective, such as open areas in the Arava region or along Route 6, where there are no clearly defined polygons as there are inside cities.
In the end, fast-moving Telegram information may satisfy curiosity and perhaps offer a sense of control, but in real time, only the official system provides the highest level of protection. According to the report, that system prevents casualties in more than 95% of cases when the public follows instructions.