There is much speculation about the Biden Administration’s brokering of Saudi-Israeli normalization, and for good reason. President Biden has made it clear that he would like to achieve this. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu speaks of his hopes for it. And Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman has publicly said that it is getting closer.
Make no mistake, Saudi normalization with Israel would represent a geopolitical transformation in the Middle East and beyond, especially because of what the Saudis and Americans would be committing to each other – commitments that would bind Saudi security to our own, while also setting boundaries to the Saudi-Chinese relationship.
The Saudi-Chinese commercial relationship will remain significant but would be limited where it crosses into sensitive security areas – not surprisingly in the context of the security relationship that the Saudis want formalized with the United States.
For Israel, normalization with Saudi Arabia has enormous implications for normalizing Israel’s relationship with Muslim-majority countries in the region and internationally. After all, the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques would be making peace with Israel.
The putative leader of Sunni Muslims, who make up close to 85% of all Muslims, would be reconciling with Israel, the state of the Jewish people.
It is hard to exaggerate the meaning of that in terms of greatly reducing the religious nature of the historic conflict between Arabs and Jews.
It is also hard to exaggerate the significance of such a breakthrough for what it is likely to do for building coalitions between those countries in the region that are seeking to build modern, resilient societies.
Their prospects for dealing with climate change, pandemics, and disruptive technologies will improve – unlike those failed or failing states that will not manage to cope with increasing food, water, and health security challenges and will offer their people only hopelessness because “resistance” remains their raison d’etre.
Palestinian impact on normalization
So, such a breakthrough is likely to be of enormous significance. Of course, it will not simply happen.
It is being brokered by the Biden administration, and its bilateral parts – defense treaty, access to weapons and nuclear partnership – do have implications for Israel and need to be part of the US-Israel bilateral discussion.
But the Saudis have one other condition for normalizing: Steps must be taken for the benefit of the Palestinians. From the Saudi perspective, when they do this deal, they want to show that others, like Indonesia and Malaysia, will follow their lead.
For that to happen, the Saudis believe, they cannot settle for merely preventing a negative (e.g. no Israeli annexation), like the UAE did. Instead, they must be able to point to the achievement of something positive and meaningful for the Palestinians.
A measure of Saudi seriousness, in this regard, is that they are focused on practicalities, not impossibilities. They are not pressing for a state now, recognizing that there are two different leaderships in the West Bank and Gaza and understanding that a Palestinian state established now would become a failed state.
They are not talking about the dimensions or attributes of a future Palestinian state; they realize that those must be negotiated and that such negotiations at this time are not possible.
But they do have two requirements: first, life must improve for the Palestinians in a demonstrable way so that it becomes obvious that something is clearly different as a result of the deal. Second, there must be tangible moves on the ground that preserve two states as an outcome.
They don’t want to do a deal that cements a one-state reality and outcome. (I say outcome, and not solution, because one state would perpetuate endless conflict. The Palestinian national identity is not simply going to disappear in one state.)
What does this mean in practical terms? It means that Palestinian economic life and movement improve. (That would require more economic access to Area C, investment in water and road infrastructure, and the kind of contiguity that would make it possible for Palestinians to travel more directly between different points in the West Bank (for instance, what should be a 10-minute drive would no longer take 45 minutes).
As for tangible moves that preserve the possibility of two states, that would require some combination of settlements not expanding territorially so that land is left for a Palestinian state and some increased territorial responsibility for the Palestinian Authority as a way of enhancing the basis for two states over time.
(For the latter, any such transfer of territory would require the PA to perform their security responsibilities – something I suspect the Saudis understand.)
Putting all the pieces together may be a bit like dealing with a Rubric’s Cube to include what the Saudis will ask regarding the Palestinians. Significantly, they are not focused on slogans or mythologies, but on practical steps. Yes, those steps will stress Israel’s government, but what can be achieved is historic in its implications for Israel (and the US). Leadership requires recognizing historic moments and having the courage and wisdom to take advantage of them.
The writer is William Davidson Distinguished Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. For more than 12 years, he played a leading role in shaping US involvement in the Middle East peace process, in both the George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton administrations. He served two and half years as special assistant to president Obama.