China’s Middle East strategy in the shadow of the Russia-Ukraine war - opinion

The war in Ukraine has shaken the global order, reviving Cold War-style divisions and prompting countries to reassess their strategic alignments.

While Europe is the conflict’s epicenter, its geopolitical shock waves have reverberated across the Middle East, accelerating China’s emergence as a key actor in a region historically dominated by US and Russian influence.

The Ukraine war, by tying down Western attention and resources, has opened space for China to expand its presence in the Middle East, where it now seeks not only energy security but also long-term influence.

The Middle East today is marked by strategic hedging. Regional states are avoiding exclusive loyalty to any single power, preferring to balance relations with the US, China, and Russia. The Ukraine conflict has added urgency to this balancing act, intensifying concerns about energy, food security, and political instability.

China’s engagement with the Middle East is deeply rooted in energy security. In 2023, more than 36% of China’s oil imports came from the Gulf. Even as Beijing ramped up Russian oil imports, it avoided over-reliance by securing long-term LNG contracts with countries like Qatar and Saudi Arabia.

But energy is just the starting point. It opens pathways for broader economic integration. Today, Chinese investments also span renewable energy, digital infrastructure, and AI. This strategic diversification transforms China from a mere energy consumer into a central development partner for the region.

The BRI has made China the Middle East’s premier infrastructure partner. By 2023, the region accounted for over a third of global BRI construction spending, with projects ranging from ports and railways to smart cities and 5G networks. Trade volume between China and the region surged from $294b. in 2019 to $480b. in 2022.

This economic entrenchment serves dual goals: securing supply chains and embedding Chinese standards and technologies in the region’s future. Saudi Arabia alone accounted for $19b. in BRI deals in 2024, including high-profile projects like the Riyadh metro.

Beyond commerce, China is positioning itself as a leader of a multipolar world order. The Middle East is central to this vision. In 2024, Egypt, Iran, and the UAE joined BRICS+, while Saudi Arabia was invited to follow. These moves signal a break from Western-centric alignments and a tilt toward alternative institutions.

China has also pushed for Middle Eastern participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and rolled out new multilateral frameworks, such as the Global Development and Global Civilization Initiatives. Amid growing North-South divides, Beijing’s emphasis on “South-South solidarity” resonates across the Middle East.

This was followed by China’s facilitation of reconciliation talks among 14 Palestinian factions, including Hamas and Fatah, culminating in the July 2024 Beijing Declaration on Palestinian unity and plans for a provisional national government.

These efforts represent a notable shift from China’s traditionally reserved diplomatic posture. Unlike the United States, which has often relied on military involvement and security commitments in the Middle East, China has opted for a risk-averse approach, preferring mediation and dialogue over direct intervention.

While China’s role as a mediator has produced significant symbolic gains, reinforcing its image as a constructive global actor and an alternative to Western methods, its influence remains limited by its reluctance to assume the costs and risks associated with deeper security engagement.

Nevertheless, the symbolism of China’s mediation carries weight. By positioning itself as a peace broker, Beijing projects itself as a global power offering new diplomatic models. The narrative resonates with many countries in the Global South seeking alternatives to Western-led conflict resolution.

Despite its growing clout, China’s influence in the Middle East has clear boundaries. Beijing has not committed to the political or military involvement that defines US strategy in the region. Nor has it proven willing to bear significant costs to defend its interests.

Moreover, the resurgence of US influence following the Hamas attack in October 2023 has exposed the fragility of China’s soft power in times of crisis. For example, Beijing’s reticence to pressure Iran to curb Houthi attacks has highlighted the gap between rhetoric and leverage. For example, Beijing’s reticence to pressure Iran to curb Houthi attacks has highlighted the gap between rhetoric and leverage.

The PRC’s approach has long emphasized building bilateral ties with key Middle Eastern states, developing institutional frameworks like the Belt and Road Initiative, and integrating the region into multilateral groupings such as BRICS and the SCO.

The war in Ukraine has, however, accelerated existing trends. It has made Middle Eastern countries more receptive to Chinese overtures, as they seek to hedge against geopolitical volatility and the unpredictability of Western policy.

Beijing, in turn, has intensified efforts to secure energy supplies and promote the use of the renminbi in trade, while also leveraging the widening ideological divide between East and West to position itself as a champion of the Global South.

Nonetheless, the fundamentals of China’s Middle East strategy remain unchanged. The region’s complexity, volatility, and strategic importance mean that no single power, including China, can dominate it outright.

China’s influence continues to be defined by pragmatic economic engagement and cautious diplomacy, rather than by pursuing hegemony or a direct challenge to US security leadership. The Russia-Ukraine war has cast a shadow, quickening the pace of change, but it is not the architect of China’s long-term ambitions in the Middle East.