When Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu meets President Donald Trump at the White House next week, it should mark a critical inflection point: the adoption of a roadmap for ending the Israel-Hamas War as part of a major realignment of the Middle East.
Netanyahu is a divisive leader whose actions are often met with extraordinary skepticism, but right now he deserves a share of the credit for defanging Iran and proxies. That creates political and diplomatic capital that can yield results – and can rehabilitate.
The Gaza war has gone on too long, and should end quickly and not with another complex phase structure – with the blood-curdling “selection” of which hostages are freed. Moreover, even if what comes is a 60-day ceasefire, as reported, it should lead to a permanent one. There is a way to do this that’s both strategic and humane.
From the beginning, Israel could have recovered the hostages at the cost of leaving Hamas intact and in power. However cruel it was, most Israelis were willing to risk hostages’ safety to avoid that outcome. But such a posture was never going to survive six months, a year, or more. It is now approaching 21 months, and it flipped long ago.
Now, significant swaths of Gaza lie in ruins, with most structures believed to have been destroyed or damaged. Hamas has seen most of its leaders and battalions eliminated, yet it can still deploy an armed mafia capable of controlling the territory upon which it brought such destruction. So there remains at least minority support in Israel for the argument that the job is not done.
But this is, in truth, not the only reason for the continuation of the war. The far Right flank of the coalition – which can in theory bring it down – wants permanent occupation, if possible depopulation, and renewed Jewish settlement. That’s unpopular, so it’s muted.
This debate cannot go on forever. Ending the war is not only an imperative in its own right, but also opens the door to possible normalization deals with other countries – not only Saudi Arabia but also Lebanon and Syria. Here too, the government and military deserve credit: The thrashing of Hezbollah last year not only freed Israel to act against Iran without fear of rockets from the Lebanese militia but also rescued its two neighbors to the north.
<br><strong>Roadmap for how to proceed</strong>
First, agree to a ceasefire and bring the hostages home as quickly as possible. If it must be done in the framework of a 60-day lull, then negotiate in good faith to actually end the war, unlike what occurred in February.
Second, accept in principle that the Palestinian Authority is the only “brand” available to replace Hamas. The absurd equating by government mouthpieces of Hamas and the PA (which cooperates with Israel on security) is self-defeating.
The goal must be to ensure that the version of the PA that reclaims Gaza is improved and strengthened. The desperation caused by the war creates significant leverage to force reforms, and the structure should be supported by the Arab League via a practical, on-the-ground presence by Arab states and also Western powers.
Indeed, Hamas has already indicated that it would accept this. The issue will be the group’s resistance to laying down its arms. It prefers to operate as a militia terrorizing the civilian government, as Hezbollah did for decades in Lebanon.
So Hamas and the Palestinians must be presented with two scenarios.
In one, everyone makes clear that no Hamas alternative will step in if the group remains armed. Gaza would remain sealed and reconstruction frozen, with only basic humanitarian aid flowing as an impenetrable barrier is erected.
Because the place is truly unlivable, Palestinians who want to leave would be allowed temporary refuge in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and other large countries; these countries would be compensated handsomely.
Many Gazans would indeed leave – which is a terrifying prospect for Hamas. The message would be brutal but unambiguous: As long as Hamas remains in power, you remain in ruins and the territory will be gradually, and at least temporarily, depopulated.
THE SECOND option would be vastly more promising to Gazans.
Hamas disarms, its remaining leaders get amnesty or exile, and the new civilian and security authority described above arrives. This unlocks massive Gulf funding – perhaps $100 billion, essentially in escrow in the Gulf. No more vague promises of aid, instead an internationally monitored and rigorously implemented equivalent of the Marshall Plan, to make Gaza a model for what can happen when jihadists are defeated.
Faced with such a binary choice, with the second option backed by the Arab League, the European Union, and NATO (Trump can organize it), Palestinian public opinion would rapidly move in that direction. It will eventually prevail, and until it does, the first scenario continues.
Israel would need to be compensated for its risks with an expansion of the Abraham Accords. The Saudis in particular will need handling, since they are committed to linkage between normalization and the currently impossible creation of a Palestinian state.
Yet, the world – particularly the United States – has significant leverage. First, the US can offer a formal defense pact that guarantees Saudi security, providing the kind of deterrent umbrella the kingdom has long sought.
Second, Washington can greenlight a civilian nuclear program, under international safeguards, allowing Riyadh to develop atomic energy without weapons-grade enrichment. Third, a sweeping technology package, including advanced air defenses, cybersecurity cooperation, and joint R&D on artificial intelligence and clean energy, which could position Saudi Arabia as the Arab world’s innovation hub.
ALL OF THIS would happen with Israel involved as the region’s preeminent military and tech power.
Will Netanyahu resist this? Continuing the Israel-Hamas War is unpopular, and the advantages to Israel of ending it are huge. The prime minister faces elections next year, anyway, in which, absent a reboot, his prospects aren’t great.
If he chooses the path I advise, then even if the radicals bolt, the moderate opposition would give him a parliamentary umbrella for a while. It might even make Netanyahu electable again. A political idiot, quite plainly, he is not.
The writer is a former chief editor of the Associated Press in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East; a former chairman of the Foreign Press Association in Jerusalem; and an author of two books about Israel. Follow his newsletter “Ask Questions Later” at danperry.substack.com.