The return of the hostages will bring national joy. Yet three factors could blur the sense of victory and leave a heavy burden on the country and on families: the fate of the 28 missing or fallen whose remains may not all come home, doubts about implementing Phase Two of the published framework, and the danger that rebuilding Gaza will strengthen Hamas rather than dismantle it.
The agreement reached with Hamas is encouraging and heartening. If and when all living hostages return to Israel within 72 hours, the backdrop will be one of national celebration. But at least three issues could overshadow the joy and the feeling of victory.
The first is the 28 fallen. It already seems clear that not all of them will return, neither in the next 72 hours nor in the near or distant future. Hamas has no incentive to return them, since it gains the major prisoner releases for living hostages. An international force made up of Qatar, Egypt, and Turkey, whose task would be to locate the remains of hostages who were killed, would increase those countries’ presence in Gaza.
It is doubtful, however, that such a force would have reason to invest real effort in bringing the fallen home. The families whose sons do not return may soon find that the government and media lose interest in their grief, just as happened to the families of Hadar Goldin and Oron Shaul, whose remains have been held in Gaza since 2014.
The second is the gap that has already emerged between those celebrating the end of the war, including President Donald Trump, and what is written in Trump’s own plan. In the framework published eleven days ago, it is clearly defined that after the first stage, the return of the hostages, a second stage must follow in which Hamas disarms and governance in the Strip passes to another body.
It does not appear that any actor, including the United States, has a real interest in pressuring Hamas until it agrees to hand over its weapons. In theory, if the second stage does not occur, the IDF can still be deployed along the “revised Yellow Line” inside Gaza, the army’s forward defensive line.
Enables terrorist cells to keep trying to attack
Such a posture entrenches friction with Gaza’s population, enables terrorist cells to keep trying to attack the defensive positions and barriers the IDF is building, and requires Israel to refrain from initiating any offensive move in response.
In theory, if Hamas fails to fulfill all of its obligations, including Phase Two, Israel has the right to resume the war. It seems, however, that no actor, including the United States, would support that. I assess that it will be very difficult to implement Phase Two, particularly under the original framework.
The third is the risk of reconstruction. Israel has no interest in Gaza being rebuilt for its own sake. Rebuilding Gaza would be an Israeli concession, a worthy one if it truly takes place in parallel with full demilitarization of the Strip.
Full demilitarization means demolishing the tunnels that remain, dismantling the remaining rocket-production facilities, and collecting all weapons. There is a reasonable fear that Gaza will be rebuilt even without demilitarization. Even today a conference is being held in Paris whose purpose is to begin reconstruction activity in Gaza.
If the Gaza Strip is rebuilt and prospers but is not demilitarized, and Hamas remains the de facto significant military force there, we will face a threat reminiscent of October 7 within a few years. Hamas built its power prior to October 7, 2023 on the basis of a rebuilt, thriving Gaza to which large sums of money flowed.
Israel must therefore insist that no reconstruction begin in Gaza without implementing the second stage of the Trump framework. Israel’s advantage is its control over all crossings into Gaza, including the Rafah crossing. If we give ground on this issue, as the world desires, we will, in effect, create a situation of ending the war in exchange for the return of all the hostages alone.
Hamas proposed such a framework a year or more ago. That would then raise the political question of what the government achieved by rejecting that deal for a whole year. Dozens of soldiers were killed, the condition of the living hostages worsened, and some of the fallen disappeared beneath the ruins of homes in Gaza.
If, by contrast, we succeed in implementing the second stage of the Trump framework, the government will be able to argue, rightly, that the achievement is greater than what could have been obtained in the past.