The new two-state solution : A realistic approach for the post-October 7 era - opinion

This last conflict has exposed an unprecedented level of violence, requiring fresh thought on a practical solution. A return to the classic two-state solution based on the 1967 borders ignores the facts on the ground and requires neglecting two fundamental geopolitical and strategic issues that have become more relevant than ever.

First, the security danger of what Abba Eban famously called “Auschwitz borders,” referring to the threat of narrow Israeli borders; and second, the lack of territorial contiguity for a future Palestinian state spanning Gaza and the West Bank.

The recent war has elevated the Strip from a besieged enclave to a symbol of Palestinian resilience and identity, drawing solidarity not only from Palestinians everywhere but from the broader region and the world. It has become a new focus of Palestinian nationalism, which reinforces the symbolic justification for establishing a state in the Strip with Gaza City as its capital.

The state’s establishment requires an international rehabilitation mandate, echoing the stability mechanism of the British Mandate and the rehabilitation energy of the Marshall Plan, but focused on Palestinian institution-building.

Led by the United States with massive Gulf investment, the goal is to establish stable, terror-free, and corruption-free Palestinian national institutions capable of absorbing and rehabilitating a large population.

This immense investment is intended to create an enormous economic pulling power that will also allow Palestinians in the West Bank to choose whether they wish to find their place in the new Palestinian state, which will have the largest reconstruction investment in the world.

The scale of this vision aligns with ambitious regional economic frameworks such as the Trump 20-point plan, which emphasized massive infrastructure investment, regional cooperation, and economic revitalization as key pillars for stability.

Simultaneously with the establishment of the state in Gaza, Israel will implement a profound change in the West Bank.

Instead of the complex autonomy model of Oslo, full Israeli sovereignty with civil equality will be introduced. Israel will offer the Palestinian population there full Israeli citizenship, similar to the successful model of the Arab citizens of Israel.

This move echoes the logic of Napoleonic emancipation. As the emperor famously stated, “Aux Juifs comme nation, rien; aux Juifs comme individus, tout” (“To the Jews as a nation, nothing; to the Jews as individuals, everything”).

Israel will require the dissolution of the Palestinian Authority, demanding acceptance of full Israeli law in exchange for complete, egalitarian civil rights.

This step will abolish the distinction between Areas A, B, and C, allowing for full security control while granting full civil rights. The main advantage is moral and international: The path to citizenship will not be perceived as a prolonged occupation, but as an egalitarian solution that neutralizes the “apartheid” claim and grants genuine civil hope.

To address the political and economic challenges and maintain the demographic balance, a gradual citizenship mechanism will be implemented.

This allocation is strongly supported by public opinion: Recent surveys in the West Bank showed that, contrary to conventional wisdom, 28% of Palestinians have expressed an interest in receiving Israeli citizenship.

Specifically, 17% expressed strong willingness and an additional 11% expressed some willingness.

A pragmatic initial group drawn from these circles – composed of those who maintain economic ties and have strongly rejected Hamas atrocities – could serve as a vital bridge between the communities.

These individuals, numbering a few tens of thousands, would receive immediate full Israeli citizenship. They would thus join the approximately 1.7 million Arab citizens of Israel, who have been integrated into Israeli society since the state’s founding.

The immediate process will prioritize this moderate group.

The rest of the Palestinian population in the West Bank will be included in a gradual process over two to three decades, during which citizenship will be granted based on choice and compliance with criteria of education, employment, and non-involvement in terror. This creates a political, security, and demographic safety valve that allows for gradual absorption while maintaining the Jewish majority, preserving the character of the Zionist state, and provides residents with a clear civil horizon and a sense of belonging.

Naturally, part of this population could find its place and fulfill its self-determination within the framework of the new state to be established in Gaza.

The new two-state solution relies on the new momentum created with the end of the war. Furthermore, the physical size of the reduced Palestinian state is not a central factor in its prosperity. Similar to Israel, a small country based on a free economy, international investments, and quality infrastructure can provide security, livelihood, and a sense of belonging

The reduced state could be expanded southward in cooperation with Egypt and the international community, either through the transfer of Egyptian territories, defining them as a “managed territory” by Egypt, or a “long-term lease” for the benefit of the Palestinian state.

This move would be accompanied by significant economic compensation to Egypt and the strengthening of its status as a stabilizing factor in the region. Israel could also contribute some territory near the southern border.

Out of the destruction and tragedy, the new two-state solution can be built – a Palestinian state reduced in size but sovereign and viable, with territorial continuity, alongside a sovereign, democratic, and egalitarian State of Israel with a large moderate Arab minority.

This plan could, for the first time, provide the Palestinian public in Palestine with two essential things it currently lacks: a sovereign state and full Israeli citizenship.