Israel’s decision on December 26, 2025, to recognize Somaliland and establish full diplomatic relations was a rare, deliberate break from the global consensus. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar framed it as historic.

Somaliland’s President, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi, welcomed the move and said his government wants to join the Abraham Accords framework.

The pushback was just as swift. Somalia denounced the recognition as an attack on its sovereignty. Saudi Arabia publicly opposed it, and the Arab League rejected the step outright. Egypt said it had coordinated with Somalia, Turkey, and Djibouti in refusing the move. The African Union Commission’s chair, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, urged Israel to respect Somalia’s territorial integrity.

Israel should not pretend this is cost-free. Recognizing a breakaway entity is never neutral, and it will complicate its ties in parts of Africa and with some regional capitals. Still, foreign policy is not a popularity contest. It is a calculation of interests, risks, and timing.

Let’s begin with the upside.

Somalis react after Israel became the first country to formally recognise the self-declared Republic of Somaliland as an independent and sovereign state, in Mogadishu, Somalia, December 27, 2025
Somalis react after Israel became the first country to formally recognise the self-declared Republic of Somaliland as an independent and sovereign state, in Mogadishu, Somalia, December 27, 2025 (credit: REUTERS/FEISAL OMAR)

Geography: Somaliland sits on the Gulf of Aden near the Bab al-Mandab choke point, the narrow gateway between the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea.

In an era of missiles, drones, and maritime intimidation, proximity matters. It means better situational awareness, more options to coordinate with partners, and a stronger ability to help keep trade routes open. The US Maritime Administration has issued advisories warning of an elevated risk to vessels transiting the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandab, and the Gulf of Aden.

Somaliland stability in contrast with Somalian turmoil

An Atlantic Council analysis found that Bab al-Mandab traffic plunged during the Israel-Hamas crisis, and the International Monetary Fund estimated that Suez trade volume was down about 50% in early 2024.

Secondly, Somaliland is not a diplomatic fiction. It reasserted de facto independence in 1991 and has developed institutions that, for decades, have operated independently of Mogadishu. An Israeli security analysis published in late 2025 said that Somaliland has maintained a relatively calm security environment, stable internal politics, and regular elections, and that it has contrasted sharply with Somalia’s continued instability.

There is also a civilian agenda with a real upside. If Israel wants recognition to be defensible, this should be measured in visible, practical cooperation: Agriculture and water resilience, public health projects, training, and technology partnerships that create jobs and credibility.

Somaliland wants allies and investment; Israel wants strategic depth and a reliable foothold in a volatile corridor. Both can be served through a development-first partnership that is transparent and easy to verify on the ground.

Precedents and risks of escalation

Now, to the risks, which any responsible type of support must recognize.

The first is precedent. Many African states treat inherited borders as a stabilizing norm, and Israel will be accused of weakening that principle.

Secondly, there is the escalation risk. The Red Sea arena is active, and every headline can be turned into a pretext by hostile actors. An INSS assessment noted Somaliland’s proximity to Houthi-controlled areas across the Gulf of Aden and treats the Houthi threat as a real driver of strategic interest in the territory.

If Israel pairs recognition with loose talk about bases or secret footprints, it will hand its enemies a propaganda gift and raise the risk to shipping.

A third risk is the slow burn of retaliation through Somalia, encompassing diplomatic campaigns, legal moves, and pressure on partners that Israel needs elsewhere in Africa. Israel does not have to accept a Somali veto, but it should treat Mogadishu’s response as a long campaign rather than a one-day storm.

So what posture makes this decision worth it? Discipline. Keep the relationship transparent and primarily civilian, focus on development and maritime stability, and avoid provocative messaging.

Invest in quiet outreach to African and regional partners, explain that this is not a border revision project, and prioritize constructive work that is hard to demonize. Maintain a working channel with Somalia where possible, including on anti-piracy and humanitarian issues, and let actions, not slogans, define the relationship.

Israel is right to take calculated diplomatic risks when the upside is real. If Jerusalem pairs recognition with restraint and serious diplomacy, this step can widen Israel’s diplomatic playbook and strengthen its strategic depth, without turning Somaliland into another proxy battleground.