On December 16, US Central Command convened a multination conference in Doha, the capital of Qatar. Its purpose was to establish the International Stabilization Force (ISF), an essential element of phase II of President Donald Trump’s Gaza plan. The enterprise was a failure.
For some reason, no complete list of the nations participating in the conference has yet been provided in official media releases. Published reports of the number of states present vary wildly from “approximately 25,” as reported by The Media Line, to 45, according to Ynet. There were two notable absentees: Israel and Turkey. Neither had been invited.
As for Israel, most political analysts agree that since Washington was trying to convince Arab, Muslim, and other states to send forces or support to Gaza, Israel’s presence would have made their participation more difficult. In the absence of Israel, moreover, it would be easier to keep the focus on the prospective multinational force rather than on Israel’s security demands.
Turkey, it is generally agreed, was not invited because Israel specifically requested its exclusion. Israel has consistently objected to any Turkish security role in postwar Gaza. One commentator likens the idea of allowing Turkish troops into Gaza to welcoming in a Trojan horse.
The purpose of the ISF is to help disarm Hamas, thus preventing Gaza from again becoming a launchpad for attacks on Israel. But Turkey, under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has for years supported Hamas. Senior Hamas leaders have been permitted to reside in Istanbul and Ankara and to maintain offices and networks, including political and operational hubs. Some, like Ismail Haniyeh and his deputy, Saleh al-Arouri, have been granted Turkish citizenship.
Since he came to power, Erdogan, with his Muslim Brotherhood origins, has time and again demonstrated a deep hostility toward Israel. Two weeks after Hamas’s barbaric assault on Israel on October 7, 2023, he described Hamas as a “liberation” movement, adding: “Hamas is not a terrorist organization, it is a group of mujahideen defending their lands and citizens.”
In March 2024, he said: “No one can make us qualify Hamas as a terrorist organization.... Turkey is a country that speaks openly with Hamas leaders and firmly backs them.”
Erdogan has said he is willing to contribute forces immediately to the projected ISF. Still, it is clear that allowing Turkish forces to participate would undermine the enterprise's purpose from the outset.
Rejecting Turkey’s offer must be all the more galling to the US Central Command because, as painfully emerged after the Doha conference, not a single unequivocal commitment was forthcoming from the multitude of nations attending. Media reports indicate that offers of troops, police, or finance remained at the level of “interest” or conditional willingness, pending domestic legal reviews and a clearer mandate, or a UN or treaty framework.
Why Trump's ISF failed at Doha
Just prior to the Doha conference, on December 15, Trump – anticipating a successful outcome – said in the White House that the ISF was “already running.... More and more countries are coming into it. They’re already in, but they’ll send any number of troops that I ask them to send.”
Clearly, Doha failed to deliver the result that Washington had envisaged.
As regards the major Arab states – Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and Jordan – reports prior to the Doha conference indicated all as potential troop contributors. Moreover, Saudi Arabia and the UAE were reported to be “working with the US to secure funding for the deployment of troops to Gaza.”
In the event that none of these states committed soldiers or resources. They and the other Arab governments remained cautious, fearful of risking clashes with Hamas, to say nothing of domestic opposition to policing or disarming Palestinians. Even Qatar as host, while backing the ISF concept, did not pledge troops or funding.
As for the non-Arab Muslim states and the European nations that have expressed support for the ISF – among others, Indonesia, Italy, France, and the UK – although some accounts say Indonesia has “signaled readiness” to send troops, and that Italy “may be the only European country to contribute forces,” expressions of intent have not been converted into formal commitments.
UN and diplomatic reports indicate that, although the UK and France expressed strong support in principle for the rapid deployment of an ISF, neither government used the Doha conference to earmark budgets or announce specific troop numbers. Other invited states (including Pakistan, Azerbaijan, and various Western and Asian allies) appear on lists of those expressing willingness to assist. Still, none converted that willingness into an actual commitment.
The failure to secure firm troop or funding pledges suggests that establishing the ISF will be a more protracted undertaking than initially envisaged. US officials have now acknowledged that, even under optimistic assumptions, building the force could take most of 2026. They have stated a target of approximately 10,000 troops.
PHASE II of the Trump peace plan rests on four interlocking elements: disarming Hamas; further withdrawal of the IDF; transfer of security to the ISF operating alongside vetted Palestinian police; and the establishment of an interim technocratic Palestinian governing committee under a Board of Peace, with an eventual handover to a reformed Palestinian Authority and a pathway to Palestinian self-determination.
All four depend on the ISF actually deploying in meaningful strength, with a clear mandate, rules of engagement, and reliable financing. Following Doha, however, it seems likely that the ISF will emerge later, smaller, and more cautiously than envisaged in the Trump peace plan and UN Resolution 2803, which gave the plan international legitimacy.
Some commentators are now warning that in the absence of clear national commitments, phase II itself risks remaining “largely a blueprint on paper rather than an actionable plan,” with a danger of drifting into a “permanent phase I” in which the IDF would, of necessity, have to remain in Gaza to maintain security.
The writer, a former senior civil servant, is the Middle East correspondent for Eurasia Review. Follow him at: www.a-mid-east-journal.blogspot.com.