As the drumbeat of war continues to echo, a less binary reality is becoming increasingly clear: Israel is not truly striving to topple the Iranian regime. Instead, it is pursuing a less ambitious yet more practical goal of weakening the regime and rendering it non-threatening, to the point where its ability to harm Israel nears zero.
This mirrors the strategic reality Israel has imposed on Hezbollah’s Lebanon.
Truthfully, this is an achievable goal, and it is closer than it appears. If a direct exchange occurs now, the Iranians will likely manage to retaliate; in the next round, their response will be weaker; and after one or two more phases of strikes, Israel will have almost completely neutralized their retaliatory capabilities.
This is the reality Israel is striving for: to create operational dominance in Iran similar to what has been established in Lebanon. This would allow the Jewish state to carry out strikes there, on a regular basis, to thwart any attempts at reconstruction without Iran having the ability to react, and without the world holding its breath every time Israeli jets head toward Tehran.
This reality would also bolster Iran’s opposition forces and provide relief to protesters by making them less vulnerable.
The current US administration’s tendency to think in “spectacular” terms – planning a multi-systemic, hyper-sophisticated, simultaneous mega-strike to collapse the Revolutionary Guards’ house of cards in a single hammer blow is, unfortunately, neither realistic nor attainable. It stems from an idealistic pursuit of a “magic solution” – a quick fix intended to avoid a history of getting bogged down in overseas wars. It also stems from a profound hesitancy within the Pentagon regarding the actual use of assets beyond exercises, publicized troop buildups, and displays of grandiosity involving stealth jets and aircraft carriers.
US military supposed to be a deterrent
The US wants to strike without being struck. This is an almost absurd expansion of the “no boots on the ground” approach into a “no military forces in a war zone” doctrine. The US military, with all its might, is supposed to be the force that projects deterrence, not the one being deterred.
Instead, Washington seeks hermetic protection for its forces, feeling that its warships and bases in the Middle East are so threatened by Iranian missiles that it raises a fundamental question: What is the world’s strongest military worth if it is so vulnerable, exposed, and fragile?
Furthermore, how can the US tolerate direct threats to the spearhead of its strategic power, the potential sinking of its aircraft carriers?
However, the Americans will eventually have to confront the same brutal reality that Israel has already accepted: An agreement does not intercept the missiles of jihadist entities. A diplomatic signature from a revolutionary theocracy offers little physical protection to a carrier task force in the Persian Gulf.
Sooner or later, Washington will likely reach the inevitable conclusion that the only way to safeguard its forces in the Middle East is through the systematic neutralization of Iran’s ballistic capabilities – mirroring the decimation of Hezbollah’s long-range arsenal. Until then, its strategic spearhead will remain a collection of potential, high-priced hostages.
In Israel, by contrast, the “fear barrier” was crossed long ago. The experience of war has revealed a dormant inner strength within Israelis and a readiness to confront challenges of this magnitude. They have discovered reserves of courage they hadn’t recognized in recent decades, and have become far more pragmatic regarding the use of force and its consequences.
They want to strike. They know they will be hit in return, but they do not fear it. They are willing to pay the price, and not just with military personnel. Unlike the US, whose military alone is in the region while its civilian population remains safe across the ocean, Israel and its people are within missile range. Israelis are well aware of this and do not bow before the threat.
Their confidence also stems from the fact that when they hear declarations like “The Iranian Air Force is ready; the war with Israel helped us restore combat capability,” they view them with immense skepticism. This is because, like other combat branches of the Iranian military (excluding missile units), the Iranian Air Force played no significant part in the war against Israel and demonstrated no real capability.
In other words, the Iranian military’s entire operational contribution in the 12-Day War amounted to firing missiles from underground command centers. And sooner or later, even that capability will be taken from them.
The writer is a PhD candidate in the Department of Middle East Studies at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev and a researcher at the Elyashar Center of the Ben-Zvi Institute.