Tomorrow, Israel marks three years since the October 7 massacre, the darkest day in the state’s history.
The anniversaries are occasions for mourning, remembrance, and, unfortunately, argument over who bears accountability and responsibility. But they must also remain moments for examining whether the lessons of that catastrophe have actually been absorbed.
Following the military’s investigations into October 7, the IDF intends to base its readiness on what Israel’s enemies are capable of doing, rather than on assessments of what they intend to do.
“It is our duty to investigate and ensure that the lessons are implemented so that we may be more worthy of the trust the people have placed in us,” IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Zamir said at the memorial ceremony held at Zikim military base early Monday.
That idea should extend well beyond the physical battlefield on which IDF soldiers fight and die.
The next strategic surprise will not necessarily resemble the last one. Israel has spent three years trying to strengthen or reinforce its borders, fighting a war on multiple fronts, and reconsidering intelligence assumptions.
Last week Israel came close to another disaster
But adversaries adapt, and a threat to Israelis may emerge through a border fence, a cyberattack, a shipping route, or, as last week demonstrated, from inside the cockpit of a commercial aircraft.
The story is well known and does not need to be repeated here in detail. Indian pilot Capt. Smit Machchhar’s bravery, and the courage of the Israeli passengers, have rightly received enormous praise. But it should not obscure how close Israel came to another disaster, born of the assumption that an extraordinary scenario was too unlikely to demand adequate preparation.
Officials in Oman reportedly removed the terrorist copilot, Hamam al-Hammami, from flying duties over concerns about extremism. The Jerusalem Post has reported on how flydubai hired him without conducting a background check with the Omani government.
Australian authorities had information about his activities during his years there as a student. Royal Air Maroc trained him for three months in 2025 and then declined to employ him.
Meanwhile, in Israel, the usual void of accountability exists: In this case, who is responsible for the security vetting of pilots for airlines flying to Israel?
According to an Israeli source, Hammami told investigators he had researched airlines operating routes to Tel Aviv and deliberately chose flydubai.
This doesn’t necessarily mean every warning would necessarily have reached Israeli authorities, or that every foreign pilot flying to Ben-Gurion Airport can realistically undergo an Israeli intelligence investigation.
But it does mean that the security system must ask whether its assumptions about civil aviation have kept pace with the threats confronting Israel.
October 7 demonstrated the danger of confusing an assessment with a guarantee.
For years, Israel knew that Hamas possessed the capability to breach the border, attack communities, fire rockets, and take hostages. What failed was the assessment of intent. Hamas was believed to be deterred, interested in preserving its rule in Gaza, and unlikely to risk the devastating Israeli response that a major assault would invite.
That assumption collapsed at 6:29 a.m. on October 7, 2023.
The Flydubai incident is obviously different in scale and circumstance – more of a lone-wolf than a pack attack – and it would be unfair to equate the two. But the intellectual warning is familiar.
A trusted airline from a friendly state, operating a routine commercial route to Israel, does not stop presenting security risks simply because the relationship is peaceful and the flight has become ordinary. Nor does the possibility of a radicalized crew member disappear because such a scenario sounds improbable.
Security is partly about preparing for events one hopes never occur.
Israel cannot investigate every imaginable danger with equal intensity. Resources are finite, intelligence is not perfect, and there is always the element of surprise. But October 7 should have permanently lowered Israel’s tolerance for vulnerabilities whose consequences could be catastrophic.
The passengers aboard flight FZ1073 were extraordinarily fortunate and brave. Their ability to improvise under terrifying circumstances saved lives. But Israel’s security doctrine cannot rest on civilian improvisation.
October 7 showed the balance and cost of judging likelihood versus capability. Israel will never be able to anticipate every threat, but it can no longer afford to treat dangerous possibilities as remote simply because they are difficult to imagine. The unthinkable has already happened once.