Who is responsible for the Abraham Accords? – opinion

Shifts in the regional balance of power, when added to the diminishing importance of the Palestinian cause among Arab populations, has resulted in new opportunities for Israel-Arab relations.

By FRANK SOBCHAK
IRAQI PRIME MINISTER Mustafa al-Kadhimi and Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif wear protective masks during a meeting in Baghdad, Iraq, on July 19. (photo credit: REUTERS)
IRAQI PRIME MINISTER Mustafa al-Kadhimi and Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif wear protective masks during a meeting in Baghdad, Iraq, on July 19.
(photo credit: REUTERS)
Last week, Sudan agreed to the normalization of relations with Israel in exchange for its removal from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, joining Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and a growing chorus of nations that have seemingly put an end to decades of Arab-Israeli conflict. The Trump and Netanyahu administrations have heralded these achievements as byproducts of their diplomatic efforts, and President Trump has been nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize.
Despite these claims, such an assessment would be a poor interpretation of events. Although the Abraham Accords are encouraging and historically significant developments, they are more a byproduct of tectonic changes that have transformed the region over decades than the result of diplomatic work of the parties involved. Most responsible for the accords is the restructuring of the Middle East regional balance of power as well as massive domestic transformations across the Arab world.
For three decades, the two Iraq wars and their aftershocks have restructured the power dynamic of the Middle East, producing what scholars term the phenomenon of balancing, when countries shift alliances to collectively meet the challenges of a rising power. States that have little in common and few incentives to form partnerships band together against what they perceive to be a common and larger foe. Here, the decline of Iraq and the rise of Iran have led countries across the region to reassess their regional and international partnerships.
Such a change in circumstance did not occur overnight. America’s two wars with Iraq, Desert Storm in 1991 and Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, militarily emasculated Iraq, which had long been considered Iran’s regional counterbalance. Iraq’s armed forces, which in 1990 were the fifth largest in the world, now cannot even provide domestic security.
The deterioration of Iraqi military strength increased Iran’s relative power and emboldened its behavior. Iranian surrogates operate in Yemen, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq; all part of an aggressive regional strategy known as the axis of resistance. Iranian forces or their proxies have launched attacks on tankers in the Persian Gulf and oil facilities in Saudi Arabia, exacerbating the traditional Sunni-Shia schism and terrifying many of Iran’s neighbors whose militaries are dwarfed by the new regional hegemon.
Iran’s active military is roughly three times Saudi Arabia’s, and six times the size of UAE’s. Worse, the US, which has often played the role of regional policeman, has seemingly retreated into an era of limited overseas commitments and can’t be counted on to intervene against Iran – a policy consistent across the Obama and Trump administrations. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action – the Iran nuclear deal – viewed by many in the US and Europe as a way to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, is perceived very differently by most Sunni Arab states. They see it as poorly designed and enforced; a destabilizing factor that could result in a nightmarish scenario. These factors have frightened Iran’s neighbors into novel alliances with Israel, which demonstrate the classical balancing verdict that the enemy of my enemy is my friend.
SHIFTS IN the regional balance of power, when added to the diminishing importance of the Palestinian cause among Arab populations, has resulted in new opportunities for Israel-Arab relations. Twenty years ago, when Arabs were polled about their most important personal issue, it was almost always “liberation” for the Palestinians. In Arabic, the word “Jerusalem” was seemingly inseparable from “occupied,” reflecting that the plight of the Palestinians mattered in daily life. Polls today do not reflect these concerns. A Palestinian state has dropped to the second-most important foreign policy issue (behind Iran) for many Arab states, and has often fallen behind economic issues and education in personal concerns. Majorities in many states now see normalization of relations with Israel as a positive development.
Fatigue with the Palestinian conflict, alongside a greater recognition of their own domestic problems, makes many Arabs less inclined to follow the traditional Arab narrative on the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. The fracturing of the Palestinian position into two diametrically different camps in the West Bank and Gaza further accelerated this process. Frustration from the Arab Spring’s lack of progress toward political change refocused many domestic audiences on their own problems rather than those of the Palestinians. And the brutality of the Syrian and Iraqi civil wars put the notion of suffering into painful context.
Access to non-state-run media sources have enabled Arabs across the region to bear witness to these problems as never before. Old orthodoxies are thus questioned. Tired narratives lack the support they once did.
Some Syrians and Lebanese have posted videos stating they would rather be Arabs in Israel than in their own countries, and others have denounced Hezbollah as “worse than Israel.” Even Saudi Arabia, once a stalwart defender of the Palestinians, has begun to criticize Palestinian positions. Put together, these changes have begotten opportunities for advances in relations and normalization; most tellingly manifested in the form of the Abraham Accords.
Given the impacts of the shifts in the Middle East balance of power and Arab domestic political changes, it is more likely than not that subsequent normalizations between Israel and other Arab states will occur in the near future.
However, more important than the simple tally of new alliances is the question of how long-lasting and deep-rooted those new friendships prove to be. Allegiances that have shifted can shift back. That reality raises questions.
If the interests that led to normalization abruptly change, how heightened will concerns over the controversial sale of advanced F-35s stealth fighters to the UAE become? Those concerns remain, despite Israel’s recent condoning of the sale. Will Sudan’s removal from the list of state sponsors of terrorism result in a real change of behavior and policy? Time will tell, but before we celebrate in earnest, these questions are certainly worthy of answers.
The writer is a retired US Army Special Forces colonel and a publishing contributor at the Mir Yam Institute