Palestinian Affairs: And the strife goes on

Even if Abbas is reconciled with Hamas, he'll still be in a precarious position within Fatah.

Abbas 298.88 (photo credit: AP [file])
Abbas 298.88
(photo credit: AP [file])
Earlier this week, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas severely reprimanded his long-time trusted adviser and envoy to Cairo, Nabil Amr, for meeting with Hamas officials in the Egyptian capital. The meeting, which was the first of its kind between Hamas and a senior Fatah official in many months, came in the wake of Egypt's efforts to end the continued power struggle between Hamas and Fatah. The reason why Abbas was enraged when he heard about the meeting was because he did not want to be seen as if he were holding back-channel talks with Hamas at a time when he and his aides have been doing their utmost to convince the international community to continue the boycott against the Islamic movement. Abbas's aides in Ramallah were quick to inform the Americans and Europeans that the meeting was the result of a private initiative by Amr, and that Abbas had not been aware of it in advance. To further stress his position, Abbas this week turned down an Egyptian proposal to hold separate talks with Hamas in Cairo in the coming weeks. The Egyptians were hoping to bring Hamas and Fatah representatives together ahead of a "national reconciliation" conference, which they are planning to hold next month for all the Palestinian factions. Abbas's tough stance is in contrast to his previous conciliatory position in favor of unconditional talks with Hamas to solve the crisis in the Palestinian arena. Hamas representatives said this week that the change in Abbas's position is related to his desire to extend his term in office for another year. Although Abbas's four-year term in office expires in January 2009, he has made it clear that he intends to remain in power for at least another year. Abbas claims that the presidential and parliamentary elections should be held together. (The next vote for the parliament is scheduled for January 2009.) Hamas has already declared that it won't recognize Abbas's legitimacy after January, and would even elect its own president of the PA. Abbas's biggest fear is that the row over his term in office would undermine his status, both locally and in the international arena. He was hoping that the Egyptians would be able to convince Hamas to accept his plan to stay in power for at least another year. EGYPTIAN INTELLIGENCE chief Omar Suleiman did try to persuade the Hamas delegation that visited Cairo recently to change its position on this issue, but to no avail. At one point, he even suggested that Abbas's term be extended for an additional six months, pending new elections, but the idea was dismissed by Hamas as "unconstitutional." Upon learning about Hamas's position, Abbas rushed to inform the Egyptian mediators that he would not hold any separate talks with Hamas. "There's no reason why we should hold bilateral negotiations with Hamas," Abbas wrote in a letter to Suleiman. "We are prepared to meet with them only in the context of a national dialogue conference, and in the presence of all the Palestinian factions." "Abbas is in a difficult situation," remarked a Fatah legislator in Ramallah. "On the one hand, he wants to stay in power. On the other, he's afraid that he would be accused by many Palestinians and Arabs of grabbing power, much of which so far has stemmed from the fact that he was an elected leader. But this could change after January 2009." Abbas's current strategy is based on trying to muster broad Arab backing for his plan to have his term extended. Abbas is now seeking the involvement of the Arab League in the efforts to end the internal Palestinian crisis. Hoping that the Arab League would be able to exert enough pressure on Hamas to cede control over the Gaza Strip and refrain from spoiling his desire to stay in power, Abbas has asked Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa to attend the planned Egyptian-sponsored parley in Cairo next month. However, there's no good reason to believe that the Arab world would be able to endorse a unified policy vis-a-vis the Hamas-Fatah rift, particularly given the fact that some Arab countries continue to support Hamas, whether openly or secretly. At a meeting of PA ambassadors to the Arab countries in Jordan this week, the envoys complained that some of the Gulf states have long been ignoring them in favor of Hamas. The ambassadors also complained that these Gulf countries were channeling funds directly to the Hamas government in Gaza. One of the PA envoys went as far as to describe Qatar as the biggest supporter of Hamas. To complicate matters further, even if the Egyptians succeed in convening the long-awaited "reconciliation conference" in Cairo, there is no guarantee that this would boost Abbas's stance. On the contrary, reconciliation with Hamas is likely to alienate many Fatah operatives who remain staunchly opposed to any form of dialogue with the movement. And it appears that there is no shortage of disgruntled Fatah officials who believe that the time has come for Abbas to step down. And even if Abbas manages to strike a deal with Hamas on his term in office, it's already clear that he will face fierce opposition from many Fatah operatives, especially those who regard themselves as representatives of the "young guard." As if all that were not enough, even representatives of the "old guard" in Fatah, such as Ahmed Qurei, Farouk Qaddoumi and Saeb Erekat, see themselves as potential successors to Abbas. The looming crisis in Fatah - old guard vs. young guard and old guard vs. old guard - will only serve Hamas's interests and strengthen its status in the West Bank.