Among the perspectives that may be offered towards the current, “intensive,”
protracted negotiations, orchestrated by former US senator (from Massachusetts)
John F. Kerry, are observations made by one of his predecessors as Massachusetts
senator, John F. Kennedy, in his celebrated, and inspiring, inaugural
address.
For much of what Kennedy had to say that day – on January 20,
1961 – was about negotiations: not only the need for them, but about the
attitude and approach that ought best be taken if success were to be
achieved.
Of course, Kennedy stressed that negotiation should be from a
position of strength – “We dare not tempt them with weakness” – but it was not
this commonsense realism that was the most remembered feature of his address.
For he went on to say, “to those nations who would make themselves our
adversary,” that the United States offers “not a pledge but a request: that both
sides begin anew the quest for peace.”
In doing so he presented a set of
principles, or precepts, appropriate to any deadly serious “long twilight
struggle.”
His first – and perhaps most important – idea was this: that
adversaries put aside incitement and abuse, as they “begin anew, remembering…
that civility is not a sign of weakness” (while recognizing, as well, that
“sincerity is always subject to proof”).
His overarching principle,
elegantly expressed, was this: “Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us
never fear to negotiate.”
Kennedy – in speaking about his country and the
Soviet Union – was clear not only about the need to negotiate but about what
negotiations ought actually to be about: “Let both sides explore what problems
unite us instead of belaboring those problems which divide us.
“Let both
sides, for the first time, formulate serious and precise proposals… “Let both
sides seek to invoke the wonders of science instead of its
terrors.
Together let us explore the stars, conquer the deserts,
eradicate disease, tap the ocean depths, and encourage the arts and
commerce.”
Unlike some Israeli politicians, Kennedy was not uncomfortable
quoting Scripture: “Let both sides unite to heed in all corners of the earth the
command of Isaiah – to ‘undo the heavy burdens... and to let the oppressed go
free.’” Finally, looking further to the future, Kennedy sketched a brief vision
of peace with security: “And if a beachhead of cooperation may push back the
jungle of suspicion, let both sides join in creating a new endeavor, not a new
balance of power, but a new world of law, where the strong are just and the weak
secure and the peace preserved.”
The rhetoric with which John F. Kennedy
launched his presidency does not envisage a “framework,” painstakingly hammered
out between intractable adversaries, but rather a genuine new beginning, based
on well-articulated, carefully defined interests and values.
Kennedy’s
vision of negotiations has application well beyond discussions taking place
involving the authorities in Jerusalem and Ramallah. For the larger issues of
peace and war ultimately and inevitably embrace relations between Israel and the
Arab and Muslim states both near and far.
The 1947 UN General Assembly
vote was, indeed, for “two states,” a Jewish state and an Arab state. Such was
the language of the UN General Assembly Resolution.
That vocabulary –
involving a proposal to establish a Jewish state alongside an Arab state – does
not come from the present prime minister of Israel, or from Israel’s governing
coalition, but from the UN General Assembly’s own resolution.
The
requirement that Israel’s negotiating partner recognize the existence of a
Jewish state, as an appropriate part of a permanent peace settlement in which
all claims have been resolved, is in this sense assuredly a central, rather than
peripheral, element in the ongoing discussions.
But the requirement is
even more fundamental to Israel’s wider relations with the many Arab League
countries. In a sense, this can regarded as something of a “what if” scenario,
inviting those Arab countries which voted against the 1947 resolution –
rejecting the idea of a Jewish state – to have a “do over,” a second chance: to
demonstrate that today, now, if given another opportunity, in the interest of
peace and reconciliation, and in recognition of all that has occurred since
1947, that they would vote, even if regretfully, differently.
That is the
challenge that former senator Kerry, now secretary of state, today faces: not to
see whether Israel’s negotiators will support a “two-state” solution, one
Jewish, the other Arab – the essence of the 1947 resolution so opposed by the
Arab states of the time (and subsequently) – but whether Arab governments will
do so.
Failure to do so – to (in a sense) retrospectively vote “yes” in
favor of a Jewish and an Arab state – would demonstrate that today, apart from
the governments of Egypt and Jordan, the 1967 post-Six Day War Arab League
summit’s famous statement – the three noes: no peace with Israel, no recognition
of Israel, no negotiations with Israel – remains in force. Sometimes
commentators write about these “principles” in the past tense, but the
governments of Arab states continue to refrain, today, from openly meeting for
discussions with Israeli government representatives: “no negotiations.” Nor is
there peace, nor yet recognition, though neither requires prior agreement on
matters of policy, and both are obligations implicitly found in the UN Charter –
“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state” – by which all UN member states are ostensibly bound.
I suppose
that any Israeli leader can, with little effort, remind themselves, their
adversaries, and their negotiating partners that the Israeli people are, in
Kennedy’s words, “heirs of that first revolution” and that, today, “tempered by
war, disciplined by a hard and bitter peace, proud of our ancient heritage,” the
government and people of Israel are able to “let every nation know, whether it
wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any
hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe,” in order to assure the survival
of Israel and the achievement of its aspirations for liberty, justice and
security.
These undertakings, too, form a part of a proud negotiating
stance for leaders who “never negotiate out of fear” yet at the same time ‘never
fear to negotiate.”
Kerry and indeed all those involved in the current
negotiations would no doubt recognize the truth in Kennedy’s outlook as he
sought negotiations while remaining skeptical about what they might achieve. For
in striving for peace, Kennedy, a self-described “idealist without illusions,”
did not anticipate immediate results – “All this will not be finished in the
first 100 days. Nor will it be finished in the first 1,000 days, nor in the life
of this Administration, nor even perhaps in our lifetime on this planet” – but
he did set a good standard for all negotiators, impatient or otherwise, to keep
before them: “With a good conscience our only sure reward, with history the
final judge of our deeds, let us go forth to lead the land we love, asking His
blessing and His help, but knowing that here on earth God’s work must truly be
our own.”
The writer is a professor of political science at Victoria
University of Wellington, New Zealand.
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