Georgia Fallout (Extract)

By EHUD YA’ARI
Extract from an article in Issue 11, September 15, 2008 of The Jerusalem Report. To subscribe to The Jerusalem Report click here. The reverberations of the war in Georgia will surely be heard loud and clear in the Middle East. Even a weakened Russia is still very powerful in our regional arena, especially when it is flexing its muscles. Thus, it is no wonder that, despite the worldwide chorus of protest and condemnation against Russia's strongman Vladimir Putin, the Arab capitals and, of course, Tehran, maintained a tense silence. And incidentally, the same holds for the Russian Federation's Muslim neighbors, Azerbaijan and the Central Asian republics. This silence does not stem from the fact that Georgia is a Christian country, but rather from a general awareness that when the bear comes out of the forest, it's prudent to be cautious. To begin with, throughout the past decade and a half, the entire Caucasus has been reconnecting with its Middle Eastern, Muslim environment. The collapse of the Iron Curtain enabled the Muslim nations among the 50 or so peoples of the Caucasus to return in one fell swoop to their historical, cultural and religious heritage in the lands to the south, for the first time since the czar's armies conquered the region in the 19th century and crushed the Muslim rebellions against Russian rule. The renewal of links takes many forms, including a massive flow of Wahabi concepts and messages from Saudi Arabia and infiltration of jihadist organizations such as Al-Qaeda into the ostensibly secular Sunni societies of the northern Caucasus (but also among the Sunni minority in Shi'ite Azerbaijan). And thanks to the increasing volume of trade with the Persian Gulf and Syria, and some Caucasian lands, more flights leave some cities in the Caucasian to the Middle East than for Moscow. The Middle East is annexing the Caucasus, and once again the Muslim peoples are clinging to the shared fate that would appear to tie them to their coreligionists. This is yet another installment in the long tale of struggles between the Middle East and Euro-Asian Russia over hegemony in the region, struggles that began in the 8th century, when the Khazars, shortly before they converted to Judaism, blocked the Muslim armies storming toward the Volga and the Don. Another round in that confrontation began the moment that Boris Yeltsin restored the independence of the three southern Caucasian states - Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan. And we must remember that Putin has declared openly that the dismantling of the Soviet Union was "the disaster" of the 20th century. Clearly, Putin believes that was a major mistake that should be corrected one way or another. In our region, the Russian invasion of Georgia, and the separation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia from that country, is understood as a strong signal by Putin that he is prepared to take calculated risks to force the United States and its European partners to acknowledge Russia's equal status and to desist from using moves - such as the expansion of NATO deep into the Kremlin's historical sphere of influence and positioning missile systems on Russia's doorstep - to crudely push Russia up against the wall. Putin is seen as giving a warning that under no circumstances will he reconcile with the continued squeeze on his country and that if the White House fails to reach genuine deals with him, Moscow will up its rebellion against the status quo steadily. In the Arab countries, particular attention was paid to threats made by the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, the same man who only two years ago wrote about the new Russia's strategic need to seek cooperation with Islamic forces. Now Lavrov was warning that Russia is not obligated to recognize the sanctity of the borders of its former republics forever. In other words, just as it was cutting off the 70,000 South Ossetians and the some 250,000 Abkhazians from Georgia, Russia could act in the same way toward the Crimean Peninsula, which Nikita Khruschev handed over to Ukraine, even though most of its residents were Russians and, by now, many of the Muslim Tartars who were exiled by Stalin from there were returning home. In the Middle East, everybody reads the threat that Russia would use its minorities across the borders to undermine regimes that don't listen to Moscow - even if this threat is certainly not intended to be carried out in the near future. It should be noted that much of the ferment in the autonomous Muslim republics in the northern Caucasus has been fed by Islamist propagandists, with assistance from the Gulf states. True, ever since the Kremlin installed the Kadirov family as rulers of Chechnya, Arab support for the dying rebellion there has shrunk significantly. But in other republics, mainly Ingushetya but also Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachevo-Cherkessia and certainly in Daghestan, the phenomenon of Muslim revolutionary movements is on the rise, with quiet support of Arab governments. The Russian threat is as clear as daylight: Putin will not tolerate any further attempt to sink him in a Caucasian quagmire; just as he found the way to slap down Mikhael Saakashvili, he will do the same with anyone else who makes a nuisance of himself. The Middle East is thus learning the lesson: In order to avoid raising Putin's wrath, the northern Caucasus, most of whose population is Muslim, must be off-limits. And there are other lessons as well, currently under close and urgent study: Extract from an article in Issue 11, September 15, 2008 of The Jerusalem Report. To subscribe to The Jerusalem Report click here.