Walking the Tightrope

Cairo and Jerusalem have similar objectives – not to allow the peace agreement to collapse.

By SHLOMO GAZIT
Egypt israel peace cartoon 521 (photo credit: Avi Katz)
Egypt israel peace cartoon 521
(photo credit: Avi Katz)
Thirty-two years ago Israel and Egypt signed a peace agreement. We were highly critical of the way Cairo implemented the “cold” peace. However, it has endured a succession of major crises – the Israel Air Force attack on the Iraqi nuclear facility at Osirak in 1981; the first Lebanon war one year later; the first and second intifadas; the Second Lebanon War in 2006 and the IDF operation in Gaza two years later.
The crises brought in their wake the recall of the Egyptian ambassador back to Cairo. Despite this, the Egyptian regime firmly believed that it was in its strategic interest to maintain the peace agreement.
The decision to initiate a peace process with Israel was undertaken by Anwar Sadat, who chose to reorder Egypt’s national priorities and to focus on stabilizing and developing the country’s economy. An assassin’s bullet struck him down and from 1981, his successor Hosni Mubarak continued Sadat’s policy toward Israel. Both of them were confident that their grip on the reins of power was strong enough to continue this policy, despite public opinion being firmly opposed.
No more. A few months ago the multitudes in Cairo’s Tahrir Square deposed Mubarak. At this stage, and apparently in the foreseeable future, Egypt will not be blessed by a strong and stable government. This is evident everywhere. Raucous rallies influence the new military government, which is forced to take important decisions under pressure.
I believe that Cairo’s strategic interests have not changed. Indeed, in Egypt’s present unstable political, social and economic climate, it could have no interest in a military confrontation with Israel. Hence the new rulers have so far resisted the pressure of the mob and announced their intention to respect the peace agreement. However, we can’t rely on this. On the one hand, the current regime is not strong enough to withstand significant popular pressure. And on the other, the success of the crowds in Tahrir Square has given the street a feeling of omnipotence.
The previous regime was also not capable of completely controlling the Sinai Peninsula and, indeed, we witnessed severe terror attacks. The new situation in Cairo has weakened this control even further, leading to the mid-August terror attack on the Eilat road and the recurring sabotage of the gas pipeline to Israel and Jordan.
We call upon Egypt to deal firmly with the Sinai Bedouin and to prevent Palestinian groups from operating against Israel. The Egyptian response has been, with some justification, that the peace agreement required the demilitarization of the peninsula and that no military forces would be deployed across the Suez Canal into Sinai. Their contention is that, without the presence of a military force, they cannot prevent terrorist actions.
The clause in the peace agreement that dealt with the demilitarization of Sinai was demanded by Israel and was intended to prevent an Egyptian attack similar to the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War in 1973. Israel, which lost the 250-kilometer wide Sinai buffer zone, had sought to forestall an attack that would start on the new border, close to its heartland. The threat today is very different – Israel is interested in preventing terror and both sides are anxious to avoid an escalation.
Therefore, despite the demilitarization clause, Israel agrees to allow Egypt to deploy military forces in Sinai. This is a calculated risk that entails some danger to the security of Israel, but is no doubt justified in the present circumstances.
It is also in Israel’s strategic interest to maintain the peace agreement with Egypt (and with Jordan as well, of course). We are compelled, with every incident in the Gaza Strip and in Sinai, to choose between a hard-hitting military response and exercising restraint, in order not to jeopardize the current delicate relationship with Egypt.
Israel needs to demonstrate resolute and responsible leadership. It is not easy not to respond with full force while rockets are landing in Beersheba and Ashdod. There is no guarantee that such a rocket won’t hit a sensitive target and cause us severe and painful losses. The street will demand vengeance and the opposition will demand “restoring Israel’s deterrence.” These are both proper and understandable requirements in normal circumstances. Nevertheless, a responsible leadership cannot react with knee-jerk reflexes. It cannot ignore long-term strategic considerations.
Both sides are walking on a tightrope. Cairo and Jerusalem have similar objectives – not to allow the peace agreement to collapse. Such a collapse could bring in its wake a war, which neither party is interested in. It is not easy to walk the tightrope, but it is infinitely preferable to the alternative.
Maj. Gen. (ret.) Shlomo Gazit, a former head of IDF Military Intelligence, is a senior research fellow at Tel Aviv University’s Institute of National Security Studies.