Yemen's revolution bogs down

President Ali Abdallah Salih -- or his proxies -- still hold onto power, despite the tenacity of an Arab Spring-inspired protest movement

By STEVEN SOTLOFF
Yemen rally 521 (photo credit: Suhaib Salem/Reuters)
Yemen rally 521
(photo credit: Suhaib Salem/Reuters)
FIVE MONTHS INTO A REVOLUTION they had hoped would take weeks, fatigue is setting in among Yemenis demanding that their leader step down. President Ali Abdallah Salih has been able to outmaneuver his ever-growing number of opponents by resorting to clever ruses and overwhelming force. And though protesters are camped out in cities across the country demanding Salih’s resignation, they have seen their revolution hijacked by generals and tribal sheikhs who are driven by calculated interests that are more complicated than merely seeking the resignation of the country’s long-serving leader.
“We never thought it would take this long to bring down the president,” says Nasr al- Qirbi, referring to Salih. “We saw that in Egypt it took them 18 days to bring down [Egyptian President Hosni] Mubarak. Here it may take us 18 months,” the 23-year-old student in Sana’a explains in a phone interview.
In phone conversations with protesters, journalists, and analysts, Yemenis say that they are exhausted from the protests against Salih and the concomitant violence. Though society has ceased to function, basic staple prices have increased fourfold, and water and electricity are scarcely available.
Demonstrators insist that they will not give up their fight until Salih resigns. But Salih has managed to hold onto the reins, even while recovering in Saudi Arabia following an attack on his presidential palace June 3.
While Yemenis have long been angry with the lack of economic development and pervasive corruption fostered by Salih during his 33 years in power, they never organized mass protests. Limited democracy was established in 1992, with partially free elections. But as time progressed, Salih consolidated his power, muzzled journalists who criticized him, and finally annulled elections altogether in 2009. As he strengthened his grip on political power, he slowly saw his hold on the country’s security slip away. A six-year revolt in the north turned into a war of attrition that consumed substantial military and economic resources. A secessionist movement in the south following a failed 1990 merger between north and south Yemeni states threatened to break the country apart.
But most damaging of all was the resurrection of an al-Qaeda affiliate in the nation’s tribal regions that struck with impunity throughout the country.
The convergence of these grievances and dilemmas led many Western analysts to declare the country on the brink of catastrophe.
Yet Yemen withstood these challenges and muddled along. But the Egyptian revolution galvanized Yemenis into action. “Yemenis have always looked to Egypt as a model. The Muslim Brotherhood chapter founded here in the 1940s was inspired by them, our 1962 military revolution was based on the 1952 Free Officers revolution, and everyone here idolizes Egypt,” says a political science professor in Sana’a who closely studies Egyptian- Yemeni relations. So it is only logical that the youth here would look to their counterparts in Egypt and try to emulate them.”
THAT IS EXACTLY WHAT HAPpened in February when students at Sana’a University erected a makeshift camp outside the campus – replete with tents just like the protesters in Cairo’s Tahrir Square – and dubbed it the “Square of Change.”
“When I saw what happened in Egypt, I was inspired,” said Ali Ahmed, a pharmacology student at the university. “I wanted to do the same thing here.”
But on their way to overthrowing a dictator, something went terribly wrong – Salih dug in and refused to resign as Mubarak did. “It all seemed so easy when we watched what happened on television,” says Ahmed, 26. “The protesters came to Tahrir, they refused to go, and they forced Mubarak to resign after a few weeks. But here, Salih has remained stubborn.”
Not only has Salih proved obdurate, he has demonstrated his willingness to use lethal force against unarmed protesters. On March 18, snipers outside the Square of Change killed more than 40 protesters. At the same time, in cities such as Aden and Ta’izz, south of the capital of Sana’a, tanks have shelled protesters, killing dozens. “At first, some people were scared and wanted to go home,” says Salim al-Jimmal a 32-year-old shoe cobbler who joined the protests following the killings.
“But after their fears subsided, their anger emerged and they became more adamant.”
The protesters were bolstered by the defection of Major General Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar, a Salih relative who had long provided military support to the president and helped him fight political adversaries. After the deaths, al- Ahmar announced he was abandoning Salih and ordering his troops to protect the protesters.
Four months later, the crisis in Yemen remains far from being resolved. Salih has refused to resign, dismissing an initiative by Persian Gulf countries for a peaceful transition of power. Three times he promised to sign the agreement only to back out at the last minute. His tactics have enraged Yemenis and turned many former supporters against him.
“Salih thinks he can still dictate events,” explains a politician from his ruling party, the General People’s Congress. “But his career is over. He is living in the past and just does not understand he can no longer run the show.”
Despite his analysis, the politician concedes that Salih is well-placed to negotiate a transition of power to spare himself the hasty and embarrassing departure that was Mubarak’s fate in Egypt.
Having turned their campaign into a crusade, the protesters are refusing to back down and are confident they can outlast Salih.
Their battle got a boost in June when a bomb exploded in the presidential palace just a few feet from Salih and badly burned him.
Though forced to leave the country and seek treatment in neighboring Saudi Arabia, he still refused to step down. From his Saudi hospital bed, he is managing the country’s affairs via his son and nephews, who control Yemen’s security forces. Questions of when Salih will return to Yemen and how his health is faring have gone unanswered.
TODAY THE COUNTRY IS CRIPpled, the economy is shattered and security is non-existent. Islamist militants have taken over towns and cities in the south after Salih withdrew his forces in order to reinforce the military units in the capital that are propping him up. “We turn the faucet and nothing comes out. We have to wait days in line to get gasoline. We can’t walk outside at night,” complains Arafat Lutf, a 42-yearold grocer. Though neutral about the protests when they began, Lutf now blames Salih for destabilizing the country and for the difficulties he faces. “I don’t really care who runs the country. But I want to have a country that exists and can function.”
International non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have decried the crisis and its effects on Yemen’s impoverished population.
“Malnutrition levels are horrendous. Food prices are going up, so malnutrition levels that are already high are going up too,” Geert Cappelaere, UNICEF’s representative to the country, told journalists at a recent press conference in Sana’a. The price of bread has increased 60 percent and gasoline has skyrocketed 900 percent.
But despite the increase in prices, without access to electricity, people wait in line for days to get gasoline for cars and generators that will provide a few hours of power. “The people here cannot sustain themselves. I fear if the conflict goes on, the country will have a serious crisis that only the international community will be able to solve,” said an NGO worker.
The protesters in the Square of Change, however, have largely been spared the effects of the crisis. Salih’s primary adversaries from the al-Ahmar family, who run the powerful Hashid tribal confederation (not related to General al-Ahmar), have been at the forefront of the campaign to end Salih’s rule. They have put their financial resources behind the protests by ensuring a steady flow of food and supplies to the square every day. “They sure have made the protests much easier for us,” said Hani al-Ansu, who has been in the square since mid-March. “If we did not have food and mats to sleep on, the people would have gone home a long time ago.”
The introduction of the Al-Ahmar family into the revolutionary mix has only compounded Salih’s problems.
“The protests appear to be a battle between the demonstrators in the Square of Change and Salih. But the real war is between the al- Ahmar family and the president,” explains a news editor of an opposition weekly. “The (al- Ahmar) sheikhs are using the protesters to get rid of him. They found a convenient tiger to ride and Salih can’t stop it. The protesters don’t much like the family, but they don’t have the political clout and experience to run the country if Salih steps down.”
Hani Mohammad dismissed this version of events. “We don’t take our orders from them,” says the 41-year-old jeweler, who has been in the Square of Change since late February.
“This movement is about getting rid of the old generation that destroyed the country. The al- Ahmars are just as much to blame for the situation as Salih.”
The al-Ahmar family has a large stake in the Yemeni economy. From franchises for well-known American brands such as the ice cream-maker Baskin Robbins, to owning lucrative mobile phone operators, the family has its hand in numerous businesses. Their wealth and influence have angered many in the Square of Change, but with limited resources and fear of dividing the campaign to oust Salih, the protesters are reluctant to take them on. “The protests are about people being exploited. Since the al-Ahmars run much of the country, the people are mad at them too. But Salih is the poster boy of the protests and can inspire everyone against him, the editor explains.
It appears that Salih can do much more than inspire the protesters. He seems to be in firm control of the country from his hospital bed in Saudi Arabia. Despite eight operations to repair damage to his skin, his proxies in Yemen are still directing affairs at his command.
And with his family’s military units ensuring his continued rule, he appears wellpositioned to dictate the terms of his departure – if and when it comes to that. With protesters refusing to accept anything less than an immediate resignation, Yemeni factions are deadlocked, ensuring that the conflict in Yemen has no end in sight. •