Neither Americans nor Afghans want the US to stay in Afghanistan forever, but no one wants the repetition of the 2011 exit mistake from Iraq that caused the rise of ISIS, causing US forces to return to fight the terrorists. To facilitate a responsible withdrawal, the US must first achieve a few goals.
First of all, Biden should explicitly tell the Taliban that the US will come back to Afghanistan with enormous force if the group breaks the terms of the agreement, refuses to resolve the issues by intra-Afghan talks and invites al-Qaeda to again use Afghan soil against the US and its allies after the departure. Warning the Taliban of possible strict sanctions on their leadership, and future targeting of their sanctuaries in case of violation is pivotal for the US to compel them to abide by their commitments.
Moreover, the US will shortly lose bases in Afghanistan from which it has launched combat missions and monitored terrorist groups such as the Taliban, al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. However, a hasty US military withdrawal could reverse the gains for which US troops and their NATO allies fought and spent trillions of dollars over the course of two decades.
The US needs to set conditions for security guarantees if the peace process collapses, and the Taliban returns to war. For that scenario, the US should get bases in the neighboring central and south Asian countries to show the Taliban that its forces are in the region, and can return quickly with counterterrorism operations if the group rejects the negotiated solution and tries to forcefully recapture Afghanistan after the withdrawal.
Furthermore, the US withdrawal should be conditioned on a permanent ceasefire from the Taliban, which will show if they were sincere in the negotiations or only remain interested in victory.
Leaving before a lasting ceasefire is established is an invitation to civil war, leading to a Taliban victory. In fact, the Taliban began celebrating victory after the announcement of the withdrawal, claiming that the US was on the verge of defeat. The Taliban have already prepared militarily for an irresponsible withdrawal scenario. Securing a lasting ceasefire before the departure could stimulate the Taliban to resolve any issues through intra-Afghan talks.
SIMILARLY, RESTARTING the intra-Afghan talks and reaching consensus on major issues – particularly on the power-sharing structure, controversial clauses of the constitution, and upcoming Afghan elections – are paramount before forces withdraw. Certainly, the Taliban will reject a negotiated solution after the US exit, and the intra-Afghan talks would collapse directly.
In that situation, the Taliban would choose war to capture Kabul because they achieved immense support from the regional powers during their incessant visits. Also, the Taliban’s morale has risen enormously after thousands of their veteran fighters were released, a majority of whom have again started fighting with Afghan military.
Initiating a process of “normalizing” the minds of the hard-line Taliban is crucial for the peace-making process. Most battlefield Taliban are still dreaming of victory, knowing the Muslims of Afghanistan have defeated three superpowers in the past century. The first was Great Britain in the 1920s, then the Soviet Union in the 1980s, and now the US. A Taliban spokesman even called the agreement “the defeat of the arrogance of the White House in the face of the white turban.”
These ideologue warriors have also announced they plan to sustain the war against the Afghan government after dealing with the US, which could collapse the entire peace process once the withdrawal is completed.
The war in Afghanistan will continue until the Taliban establish outside sanctuaries where their main leadership, policy-makers and decision-making bodies are in safe havens, recruiting and training fresh madrasa students for boosting the war. Ending the US war in Afghanistan will be tough without first shutting down Taliban sanctuaries near the border. These sanctuaries provide tremendous human resources for escalating the conflict and are a major source of international terrorism.
On the other hand, a great amount of the Taliban’s funds for insurgency comes from wealthy Muslims in Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi, where the group’s representatives frequently go to raise money. Eliminating those sources of funding would immensely ruin the Taliban’s war economy and compel them to end the war.
The Biden administration should talk to Mohammed bin Salman in Riyadh and Mohammed bin Zayed in Abu Dhabi to convince them to stop allowing the funding of the Taliban and to act against those who are backing terrorists and prolonging America’s longest war.
Finally, the US should engage diplomatically with the region’s countries before exiting in order to support a negotiated settlement, as these actors’ interests are contradicted by Taliban militancy in Afghanistan. For instance, Pakistan backs the Taliban in order to control Afghanistan’s foreign policy and counter India’s soft-power influence, while Iran is seeking interests in an unstable Afghanistan, and India is striving for peace in order to capture central Asian markets.
Pakistan and Iran’s roles are important to the success or failure of the peace process. Both countries could play the role of spoilers and destroy the entire negotiating process if they see war as being in their national interests.
The writer is a political analyst focusing on US foreign policy.