State prosecutors on Wednesday filed an indictment with the Nazareth District Court charging Shomou Abu Abed, 32, of Nazareth, with maintaining contact with an Iranian foreign agent, carrying out intelligence-gathering and filming assignments for him, and passing along sensitive information she obtained through her work for a company that provides services to the Transportation Ministry.
The case was investigated jointly by the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) and the police’s Northern District Major Crimes Unit.
According to the indictment, Abu Abed’s contact with the handler began around October, after she was approached on Telegram by someone using the name “Winema Ton,” who initially presented the work as innocuous paid filming jobs tied to tourism content.
Prosecutors say the assignments escalated over time, and that by February, she already suspected she was dealing with hostile actors and, days later, understood she was in contact with agents operating on Iran’s behalf – yet continued carrying out tasks for payment.
The indictment says those tasks included filming commercial, governmental, and military-linked locations, mostly in and around Nazareth, and sending visual documentation, live locations, and explanatory information to the handler.
Strategic sites documented
Prosecutors allege that among the sites she documented were a shopping center and money changers in Nazareth and Afula, the strategic Amdocs building in Nazareth, the Haifa oil refineries after they had been struck during the war, a Home Front Command base in Nazareth, and sites connected to the Golani Brigade, including a memorial site near the Golani junction.
One of the most serious allegations centers on her workplace. Prosecutors say Abu Abed had worked since July for a company operating a Transportation Ministry customer-service center, giving her access to computerized systems containing citizens’ personal and sensitive information, including ID numbers and driver’s-license data.
Despite having undergone information-security training, she allegedly described the workplace and its systems to the handler, filmed the system for him, and extracted and transferred computerized personal information regarding a former member of the security establishment after being given that person’s ID number. Prosecutors say she was paid in cryptocurrency for the information.
The indictment also portrays a relationship that moved beyond passive compliance. Prosecutors say Abu Abed opened a crypto wallet at the handler’s request to receive payment, discussed buying a dedicated “operational” phone to conceal their communications, and sent links and explanatory material relating to Home Front Command and Golani.
In one exchange cited in the indictment, she sent a link to a Home Front Command training site and wrote that attacking the “rising generation” would amount to destroying the future. Prosecutors further say the handler explicitly warned her not to search online for sensitive military bases for fear their activity would be exposed.
Prosecutors charged her with nine counts of passing information that could be useful to the enemy, three counts of passing information to the enemy with intent to harm state security, and one count of contact with a foreign agent.
In a parallel detention request, the prosecution said Abu Abed admitted the acts in her interrogation and that investigators also seized much of the relevant correspondence and videos from her phone, alongside supporting evidence including cellphone-location data and findings tied to the crypto account. The state is seeking to keep her in custody until the end of proceedings.
The filing places the alleged conduct squarely in the context of the broader war. Its introductory section recounts the October 7, 2023, Hamas massacre, the expansion of fighting to multiple fronts, and a series of direct Iranian attacks on Israel, before alleging that since the war began, Iranian intelligence actors have intensified efforts to recruit Israeli citizens to collect intelligence, document sensitive sites, and carry out missions inside the country. The indictment says Israel was still fighting on several fronts at the time it was filed.
That framing reflects a much broader pattern now repeatedly cited by Israeli security officials. The Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) said in its January 2026 annual report that 25 Israelis and foreign residents were indicted in 2025 for spying for Iran, that 120 separate Iranian espionage incidents were thwarted that year, and that attempts to recruit Israelis as spies jumped 400% compared with 2024, which itself had already seen a sharp increase.
Recent cases have underscored how varied those assignments have become. In the past several weeks alone, authorities have publicized cases involving a 14-year-old from central Israel accused of carrying out Iran-linked tasks, a Jerusalem resident accused of documenting sites around the country for Iranian handlers in exchange for cryptocurrency, an Iron Dome reservist indicted on accusations of passing military-related information, and an ex-police interpreter charged with sharing missile-impact information and other details with a foreign agent.
Israeli authorities have repeatedly said many of the approaches begin online, especially through Telegram, and are packaged as easy paid work before escalating into more serious intelligence missions.