When US President Donald Trump extended the ceasefire with Iran this week without setting an end date, he did more than buy time. He redefined what this phase of the conflict is about.

The instinctive reading of a ceasefire is that it signals de-escalation – a step away from confrontation. That Trump backed down. Got weak knees. Capitulated, as support for the war in the US continues to tank.

But that would be a misreading of the situation. The bombing may have paused, but the pressure on the Islamic Republic has not. It has merely changed form.

A more accurate way to understand the current moment is this: the war has not stopped; it has shifted.

For six weeks, the emphasis was on military force – US and Israeli strikes designed to degrade Iran’s military infrastructure and nuclear capabilities. That objective, by most accounts, was largely achieved. Iran’s military and nuclear capabilities are not today what they were before February 28. Not by a long shot.

Smoke and flames rise from the South Pars gas field following an Israeli strike, as seen through the window of a moving vehicle, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in Asaluyeh, Bushehr Province, Iran, March 18, 2026, in this screen grab obtained from social media video.
Smoke and flames rise from the South Pars gas field following an Israeli strike, as seen through the window of a moving vehicle, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in Asaluyeh, Bushehr Province, Iran, March 18, 2026, in this screen grab obtained from social media video. (credit: REUTERS)

But military action alone – at least since World War II – has rarely produced durable political outcomes. It can weaken, deter, and change the situation on the ground, but it does not, by itself, reliably produce the desired political results. The US experiences in Vietnam and Iraq are glaring examples of this.

What Washington is now attempting is something different: to turn those battlefield gains into leverage – and to do so not through continued bombing, but through sustained economic pressure.

That is where Trump’s unilateral announcement on Tuesday of a ceasefire extension fits in.

By extending it indefinitely – while at the same time maintaining the naval blockade of Iranian ports and effectively sealing off its oil exports through the Strait of Hormuz – Trump has created a pause of sorts: no active large-scale strikes, but no relief either.

Iran is not being hit from the air, but it is being squeezed economically in a way that may, over time, prove just as consequential.

Even Iranian officials have implicitly acknowledged this. The blockade, they have suggested, is not a peripheral measure but an act of war – an instrument that threatens the regime’s core source of revenue.

That is not hyperbole.

Iran’s economy was already under strain before the US and Israel struck on February 28, and that strain was one of the drivers behind the protests that brought millions into the streets in January.

Now, after nearly two months of war, the Islamic Republic’s financial situation is even worse – and worsening. With its ability to export oil severely curtailed by the blockade, the pressure is intensifying. Reports of tankers turning back, shipments disrupted, and ports left idle all point to an early, tangible impact, even if not yet decisive.

The operative word here is “early.”

Economic pressure does not produce immediate, visible results

ECONOMIC PRESSURE is different from brute military force. It does not produce immediate, visible results. It is gradual. It accumulates over time.

That, more than anything, explains the logic behind removing a deadline.

In a Fox News interview on Wednesday, Trump made clear that there is “no time frame” for the conflict and no urgency to conclude it quickly.

On the surface, that runs counter to the political pressures he faces at home from an electorate wary of prolonged entanglements, from lawmakers now in both parties signaling discomfort with an open-ended commitment, and from rising energy prices being felt at the pump.

A prolonged economic squeeze is different from a short, high-intensity military campaign. It is less visible but more persistent.

The costs are not measured in battlefield losses but in higher prices – something that, in the US, has always been one of the most sensitive political pressure points.

Trump’s calculation appears to be that a strategy that reduces immediate risk to American lives – even if it brings economic discomfort – is more sustainable domestically than a return to high-intensity military escalation.

Politically, this may still be a gamble, but strategically it makes sense.

Deadlines create expectations. They also create leverage for the other side. Iran has long shown an ability to use time to its advantage: to delay, divide, and wait out pressure in the hope that it dissipates or that political constraints in Washington force a change in course.

By explicitly removing the clock, Trump is attempting to flip that dynamic.

If there is no deadline, there is no moment at which pressure must be eased. If there is no rush, there is no incentive to compromise quickly. Instead, the burden shifts to Tehran: the longer it delays, the longer the economic pain continues.

That is the gambit at the heart of the current approach: that what weeks of bombing did not achieve, months of sustained financial strain might.

However, it is not without risk.

Any pause in active military operations carries the possibility that Iran will use the time to regroup, reassess, and reposition assets that have not yet been targeted. It is possible that Iran still retains capabilities yet to be revealed. A ceasefire, even a partial one, inevitably creates room to maneuver.

But it does the same for the other side as well.

For the US and Israel, this period allows for replenishment, repositioning, rest for pilots and air crews, and the quiet preparation of next steps should the current approach fail. The US is already moving a third aircraft carrier strike force into position.

In other words, it is not simply Iran that can take advantage of this time.

More importantly, the pause is not absolute.

The blockade remains. The economic pressure continues. And the military option is not being taken off the table – it is being held in reserve, visible enough to reinforce the message that the current phase is reversible.

Pressure without immediate escalation 

THAT COMBINATION – pressure without immediate escalation – is deliberate. It is designed to present Iran with a set of choices, none of them attractive.

Yediot Aharonot military analyst Ron Ben-Yishai outlined this week four possible paths for Tehran: escalation, negotiations under pressure, waiting out the pressure, or remaining in the current limbo. None comes without significant cost. Each path carries a price, which is precisely what the current strategy is meant to ensure.

The blockade, which Trump has made clear he is in no hurry to remove and which is being enforced, is a pressure-bearing device meant to create an environment that will eventually alter Iran’s decision-making calculus.

But this, too, will not be simple. As Ben-Yishai pointed out, there are currently multiple centers of power in Iran: the hardline Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps; the more pragmatic political echelon made up of the president, parliament speaker, and foreign minister; and Mojtaba Khamenei, the figure tabbed as supreme leader, but whose whereabouts and ability to function remain unknown.

Trump alluded to this when he described Iran’s government in a social media post as “seriously fractured,” saying the extended ceasefire was meant to give Tehran time to produce a unified proposal – helping explain why it did not show up at the proposed negotiations in Pakistan this week.

If, during the kinetic phase of this war, the Iranians were hoping to wear down Israel and the Gulf states through attrition – firing a few dozen missiles a day, enough to severely disrupt life without completely depleting their ballistic missile arsenal – the blockade is an attempt to reverse that logic: to wear Iran down through steady economic attrition.

That, at least, is the theory.

Whether it holds in practice will depend on factors beyond Trump’s control.

Iran’s internal divisions – between hardliners, pragmatists, and competing power centers – may slow decision-making. That could reinforce the case for not having a hard ceasefire deadline. But it could also increase the likelihood that one actor – most likely the IRGC – will act on its own, without prior coordination, and trigger an escalation.

And second, it depends on the American public’s staying power – its willingness to absorb higher energy prices now for the longer-term objective, as Trump has framed it, of forcing Iran to forfeit its nuclear program, including its 460 kg. of enriched uranium.

That leaves the outcome uncertain – but not undefined.

As Ben-Yishai noted, Tehran is now facing a narrowing set of options, each one more costly than the last:

Escalate, and risk a devastating military response at a time when American force in the region is only growing. Negotiate, and do so under pressure, with the blockade still in place and domestic critics ready to pounce. Wait, and absorb mounting economic damage that is already beginning to be felt on the street. Or try to muddle through the current limbo, hoping that time will once again work in its favor.

But that last option – the one Iran has relied on in the past – is precisely what Washington is now trying to take off the table.

By removing deadlines while maintaining pressure, Trump is attempting to turn time from an Iranian asset into an Iranian liability. Every day that passes without a decision is another day of lost revenue, another day of economic strain, another day in which the pressure does not ease but tightens.

Whether that pressure will be enough to alter Tehran’s calculus is still an open question.

But the logic behind it is clear. This is no longer about dramatic airstrikes or the further degradation of Iran’s air defenses or navy. It is about endurance – about which side can sustain pressure longer, absorb more pain, and ultimately force the other to choose.

In that sense, the extended ceasefire is not an end to the conflict. It is the beginning of a different kind of contest.