There have been three major rounds of appointments in IDF high command since the October 7 massacre in 2023.
One was less concentrated and involved the slow but consistent removal of senior officers viewed as central to the failure to prevent Hamas’s terrorist infiltration and massacre.
Included in that round was Brig.-Gen. Shlomi Binder, who was promoted to Major-General and commander of the Military Intelligence Directorate. His predecessor, Maj.-Gen. Aharon Haliva was removed. Brig.-Gen. Avi Bluth was promoted to Major General and appointed commander of Central Command.
A second round took place around March and summer 2025. Some of them completed the first round, but some were about IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Eyal Zamir putting his stamp on the military when he took over at that point.
That round included Maj.-Gen. Yaniv Asor replacing Maj.-Gen. Yaron Finkelman as commander of the Southern Command and Maj.-Gen. Rafi Milo replacing Maj.-Gen. Ori Gordin as commander of Northern Command.
It also included bringing Maj.-Gen. Tamir Yadai, out of recent retirement, is to return as deputy chief of staff after Maj.-Gen. (res.) Amir Baram stepped down from that post and became director-general of the Defense Ministry.
Some roles are only taken in hopes of rising higher afterward
A third round of long-standing officers from the IAF and the Israel Navy stepped down this Spring after the Iran war. Maj.-Gen. Omer Tischler replaced Maj.-Gen. Tomer Bar as IAF commander, and V.-Adm. Eyal Harel replaced V.-Adm. David Sa’ar Salama as commander of the navy.
The earlier two rounds of change set the framework for the next round.
Most officers do not relish the position of deputy chief of staff. It involves little public exposure and even less involvement with developing battles on the front. Essentially, the role is to work on force buildup behind the scenes in the shadow of the chief of staff.
Generals usually take on the role for around two years, and they hope that fulfilling it will help them become the next chief of staff.
It is rumored that Yadai might seek to bow out of the role before the two-year mark. If he does, or even if he makes it to the two-year mark, there is a clock ticking on who will replace him. That race is viewed as putting the winner into the running for chief of staff.
A shortlist for possible candidates is seemingly emerging
One of the clear front-runners for deputy chief of staff is Gordin, who was already in the race against Zamir for the top spot. So, fulfilling this role would make it even more likely he would later become chief of staff.
Gordin was the head of Northern Command during the fall 2024 war with Hezbollah, meaning he can take credit for the main thrust, which bludgeoned Hezbollah’s power, including eliminating its leader for three decades, Hassan Nasrallah.
Also, Northern Command is generally viewed as the most challenging and important field command role, given that Hezbollah and Syria have been viewed as more threatening than Hamas in the South.
Baram was commander of Northern Command right before Gordin, and most of the recent IDF chiefs of staff – Gabi Ashkenazi (2006-2011), Benny Gantz (2011-2015), Gadi Eisenkot (2015-2019), and Aviv Kohavi (2019-January 2023) – had also been commanders of Northern Command.
The other front-runner for deputy chief of staff would be Asor. Traditionally, he would have had a lower chance, both because Southern Command has been viewed as less important and because he was commander of the Manpower Directorate, which is often a dead-end role.
The last two IDF chiefs of staff, however, Herzi Halevi and Zamir, both headed Southern Command.
Also, Asor is better liked by Defense Minister Israel Katz, as he was one of his first appointments and has used more force while asking fewer questions in command.
Gordin may be viewed by Katz as more closely associated with Halevi, whom Katz regularly fought with and helped remove.
Asor was also raised in Mivtahim, a village near the Gaza border that was attacked by Hamas, and he has made it clear that fighting Hamas is both a command and a personal quest for him.
This means that if Yadai steps down before the October election, or while Katz is otherwise still the defense minister, Asor may have the upper hand.
If Yadai stays in office past October, let alone into 2027, Gordin might regain his standing as the lead candidate, depending on who the next defense minister is.
Baram is expected to be the lead candidate to replace Zamir in March 2026 or March 2027, as he has already served as deputy chief of staff and as the top nonpolitical person in the Defense Ministry.
But after Baram, Yadai will have a shot, and either Gordin or Asor, whoever replaces Yadai, will also have a strong shot.
The other key piece will be who replaces Binder and when the IDF intelligence chief will step down.
In late 2025, Zamir both defended Binder for his less central role in the October 7 massacre failure, and he could keep his job. He also criticized him to some extent, saying he would leave the army after his current role and not seek further promotion.
The assumption, then, was that this meant he would leave in August 2027, after three years.
If so, Bluth may already be in the race to replace Binder, although sources close to Bluth deny he is focused on anything other than his current role.
Yet it is also possible that Binder may be given a four-year term, as intelligence chiefs are typically given.
This could complicate the considerations and candidates for his replacement, as by August 2028, candidates such as OC Operations Directorate Maj.-Gen. Itzik Cohen, who is close to Zamir, might also be eligible. He has only been a major-general since June 2025, so such a promotion might be too fast by August 2027, but it could be viewed as viable a year later.
Regardless of who wins these various races, the game of musical chairs, which will make up many of the future key posts in the IDF, is on.