There are two main problems with US President Donald Trump’s November 3 declaration of a sudden end to US military aid to Israel after around four decades.
The obvious one is budgetary. What does it mean for Israeli offensive and defensive plans for 2026-2028, given that Jerusalem was expecting almost $8 billion from the US during those years?
But there is a second dilemma which is harder to quantify: What does this mean for the future balance of the US-Israel relationship, and how has Trump’s statement, by itself, massively moved the goalposts of the conflict over that balance?
The budget dilemma
Even a couple of weeks after Trump’s announcement, uncertainty clouds the future.
Is the delay of Israeli officials explaining the issue to the public due to continuous genuine confusion even in the US about what is next?
Alternatively, might it be because Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was too embarrassed and busy trying to stop Yashar leader MK Gadi Eisenkot from forming a new Israeli government?
As this article was being finished, Netanyahu issued a belated statement about military assistance being “gradually” phased out, but still addressed nothing about Trump’s intentions, how gradually may suddenly have changed, and what led Trump to suddenly announce a radically changed schedule.
The ambiguity about the amounts and timing of Trump’s freeze could lead American military and commercial defense officials to expand a pause on various weapons transfers or approvals even beyond the US president’s intentions.
This could seem like smart business to avoid trouble while the guidelines remain unclear.
Previously, the Jerusalem Post was told that the beginnings of a new third squadron of F-35 deliveries (which will eventually bring Israel from 50 to 75) would start in 2027.
Will that still happen, and will it happen on time?
How much will the loss of potentially up to almost $8 billion in military aid impact that deal or the parallel agreement to acquire new F-15 aircraft, which Israel lacks the capacity to independently produce and is not even trying to start producing?
The only good news here is that Trump will definitely continue to sell Israel the weapons it wants, vs a less certain scenario under potential restrictions from the US Democrats.
But even there, he has created problems.
Shifting the goalposts
The real debate in recent years was between Americans who wanted to continue full US-Israel military aid and those who wanted to phase it out.
Before October 7, no one outside of a tiny group of radicals in the Democratic Party talked about actually cutting off all weapons sales to Israel, even if it was ready to pay full price.
It was just a debate about whether weapons transfers to Israel would be significantly subsidized by Washington, not if the US would sell Israel F-35 stealth fighters and F-15 update-replacements for 50-year-old aircraft, but who, between the US and Israel, would pay how much for those sales.
Now, Trump’s statement has enabled both Democrats and Republicans who were already more opposed to Israel and its policies to call for a more serious debate on cutting off all Israeli security assistance.
Furthermore, Trump’s statement has now allowed these Democrats and Republicans to frame “only” opposing selling Israel offensive weapons, but supporting selling defensive weapons as the new pro-Israel position for them to fight against.
Baking into the debate that a majority of lawmakers may be ready to suspend selling offensive weapons even for full payment is an extraordinary shifting of the fault line of the Israel debate.
Political fallout
Trump did not create this problem of alienating the mainstream of the Democratic Party along with the earlier small group of radicals, nor of alienating a growing number of Republicans.
These started to expand as early as 2015 with the conflict between Netanyahu and then-US president Barack Obama over the Iran nuclear deal.
But Trump did assist in its metastasizing into a greater threat to the pro-Israel bipartisan status quo.
Initially, this happened with the Democrats and then also with some Republicans.
With the Democrats, he relished trying to use Israel as a wedge issue to muster some more votes in national elections.
This may or may not have worked for Trump politically, and it also arguably helped pave the way for Trump bombing the crucial Iranian Fordow nuclear facility, which Israel would have had trouble with.
However, it also made Israel over-associated directly with Trump, who, while sometimes politically successful, has also lost big twice and been incredibly divisive.
Having Israel hooked too closely to Trump’s brand made remaining pro-Israel unfeasible politically for many Democrats, even if they wanted to.
Aspects of Israel’s conduct since October 7, mostly in Gaza, and of the diverging interests and visions of Jerusalem and Washington for the region since that day, pressed more Democrats further into altering their basic view of Israel.
Next, aspects of the early 2026 Iran war, and especially its ongoing impact on American gas prices, pushed many Republicans away from Israel. But Trump’s crusade against foreign aid to all countries in his second term eventually placed Israel in a negative light.
In addition, the Republicans losses in the US midterm elections on November 3, went far beyond Israel.
Since April 7, while Netanyahu wanted to attack Iran, he has not.
Only Trump has attacked Iran – repeatedly – since then.
Netanyahu has wanted Trump to keep pressure on Tehran. But he has wanted many other things that the US president ignored, such that Trump’s decisions related to the Islamic Republic have been his own, based on his understanding of American interests.
Once or twice, Trump has pushed back on sentiments that he was fooled into war with Iran due to Netanyahu and Israel. Yet he has just as often let such misguided and inaccurate statements receive significant airtime, seemingly to use Israel as his own scapegoat relating to Iran.
He wants credit for any achievements against Iran, but he does not consistently accept fault for failures.
And of course, he and the Republicans lost due to many other issues: unpopular tariffs, especially vs Canada; unpopular mass arrests, sometimes using deadly violence, of illegal immigrants, many of whom had been long integrated in positive ways in their communities; and other issues not related to Israel.
Sure, Israeli officials still appreciate Trump’s tremendous support of Israel striking Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran, with fewer strings attached than under Democratic leadership.
But his statement last week has undermined Israel’s standing in future debates over weapons sales in ways that still cannot be fully comprehended.■