As we celebrate Jerusalem Day this coming week, it pays to recall the fateful decision to initiate the Six Day War and the lesser-known debate between religious officials over preemptive attacks.
In May 1967, Rabbi Shlomo Goren, then the IDF’s chief rabbi, was sent on a mission by then-IDF chief of staff Yitzhak Rabin.
Rabin was trying to convince the cabinet that the IDF must preemptively strike the Egyptians, who had closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli ships while beating war drums.
Prime minister Levi Eshkol was hesitant, particularly because of significant opposition to the move from the religious-Zionist ministers, led by Haim Moshe Shapira. In a heated cabinet meeting, Shapira had told Rabin that Israel should bunker down and prepare to defend itself, yet not take the first shot. As a man of faith he declared that we cannot bring danger upon ourselves and initiate the warfare, especially without international support. The Bible declares that “Israel will dwell alone” – yet that does mean that it must fight alone.
Rabin urged Goren to meet with Shapira and convince him of the urgency to act.
After consulting with other military commanders, including the head of the air force, Goren was confident. He spent four hours with Shapira. Goren argued to him that Israel could win if it attacked first – and that every day of delay would cost many more Israeli lives. He also claimed that there was no choice but to act, since the Arab nations were out to destroy Israel.
Shapira was not yet convinced, and was supported by another religious minister, Zorach Warhaftig, who worried that Israel required a casus belli to justify the war. He suggested sending a ship through the Straits of Tiran to evoke an Egyptian reaction. The move would risk soldiers’ lives but legitimate the war.
Most ministers, however, contended that Israel would inevitably be condemned no matter what they did. If they believed in the justness of their claims, they must act on their own conscience. At the end of this fateful meeting on June 4, 1967, the religious ministers relented and voted to support the war. The next day, Israeli jet fighters destroyed the entire fleet of the Egyptian air force. Many around the world, as expected, criticized the preemptive attack. Yet the conclusive victory – and salvation of Israel lives – was undeniable.
THE ARGUMENT over both the prudence and justness of this preemptive strike reflects a much larger debate over the morality of striking a belligerent nation before it has launched an act of aggression.
Many ethicists condemn anticipatory attacks in which there is no imminent or concrete threat, where a nation attacks a potential future threat in order to maintain the future balance of power – i.e., to prevent other countries from gaining strength or wealth that may be utilized against it.
These ethicists assert that a preemptive strike is justifiable only if one reasonably believes that a belligerent nation will attack in the very near future, and that waiting to respond will significantly increase your level of risk. Many thinkers, such as Prof. Michael Walzer, assert that even under these strict criteria, the preemptive strike in June 1967 was justified.
The Talmud also seems to recognize a distinction between these types of scenarios. In one case, in which Jews are under attack, it is deemed a mitzvah or obligation for Jews to fight back. Other warfare, however, is deemed as “discretionary” (reshut).
Historically, such discretionary wars required the approval of the 70-member Sanhedrin, which served here as an advisory committee to the king to ensure that such a dangerous course of action was necessary. This provided an important check, protecting soldiers from the capricious whims or imperial desires of the monarch.
What scenarios fall into this discretionary category? According to the Babylonian Talmud, these include cases in which Jews initiate the conflict toward “reducing the gentiles so that they will not come and wage war against them.” The Jerusalem Talmud, leaving unclear the motivations, more broadly includes all cases in which the Jews initiate the action.
Further complicating matters was that Maimonides broadly asserted that wars undertaken “to deliver Israel from an enemy” were a mitzvah. Yet he leaves undefined what it means to be in such a scenario.
Given these cryptic definitions, a wide range of interpretations emerged.
According to one interpretation, offered by R. Yehiel Michel Epstein, any war initiated because there is some concern of being attacked may be deemed a mitzvah. Such a definition draws from a medieval ruling allowing violation of Shabbat restrictions in preparation for an anticipated (but not yet actualized) attack.
Others, in contrast, seem to assert that an attack against a nation that is not clearly and imminently threatening a Jewish community would be deemed as “discretionary.” Only when the enemy is clearly on the move may one rise up and attack first.
By either definition, the Six Day War was certainly justified.
Beyond the problem of defining these categories, it remains difficult to assess, in practice, what type of threat is imminent and what is less pressing. Yet getting these decisions correct can be the difference between triumph and travail, life and death. Israel learned this both from the triumph of the Six Day War and the tragic opening period of the Yom Kippur War.
In this respect, a sliding scale might emerge in which the more distant the threat appears, the greater amount of consultation must be taken, as was done in the Talmudic Sanhedrin.
Launching a discretionary war must not be a capricious decision. While consultation is no guarantee of making the right choice, it does provide an important check on the country’s leaders not to cavalierly enter into warfare.
The writer is co-dean of the Tikvah Online Academy and a postdoctoral fellow at Bar-Ilan University Law School.